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FORGING A MORE COHERENT
GROUNDWATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA:
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CHALLENGES TO LOCAL GROUNDWATER
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS
Gregory S. Weber*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Groundwater is a vital component of California's precious water resources.' Despite its critical role in the state's
economy, outside of a few special districts, the state has
largely left it unmanaged.2 Thus, the state's laissez-faire
groundwater management "policy" has been virtually incoherent. As a result, extensive groundwater overdraft has occurred in many areas of the state.3 At the same time, the
uncertainties inherent in the common-law-based system governing the acquisition and transfer of private rights to
groundwater likely impede more rational reallocation of
groundwater in response to changing state and local economic needs.4
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; A.B., Williams College; Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law. Professor Weber teaches Environmental Law, Natural Resources Law, Civil Procedure, the law of "Toxics and Hazardous Substances,"
and Administrative Law.
1. See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 160-87, CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 31 (1987) (39% of California's applied

water needs come from groundwater pumping) [hereinafter BULLETIN 160-87].
The role of groundwater in the state, as well as the history of state and local
efforts to regulate it, is explored in much greater detail in an article to be published in early 1994. See Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in California:Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34
NAT. RESOURCES J. No. 3 (forthcoming Spring 1994) [hereinafter Patchwork
Quilt].
For consistency's sake, following the similar convention adopted in Patchwork Quilt, this article will spell "groundwater" as one word, even if the quoted
or cited materials spell it as two words, or one hyphenated word.
2. See, e.g., BULLETIN 160-87, supra note 1, at 34.
3. Id. at 31-34.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 14-38.
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In response to the state regulatory void, over the last
twenty years, numerous local governments in California have
attempted to regulate groundwater extraction in their jurisdictions. The principal feature of these local regulations has
been restrictions upon the exporting of groundwater from the
local jurisdictions.5 In a separate article, this author has critically surveyed the texts of eight county ordinances in their
hydrogeological, common law, and statutory contexts. 6 That
article concludes that the local efforts, to date, have largely
reinforced the already incoherent state of groundwater law in
California. v
This article examines the same California local groundwater export restrictions in their constitutional context. It
explores in detail an important question left largely unexplored in the earlier work: the authority of local governments,
under the state and federal constitutions, to restrict groundwater exports. In particular, it raises state constitutional
questions of preemption and reasonable use, and federal constitutional questions of conflicts with the Dormant Commerce
Clause. To date, these questions have been addressed by a
series of four trial court decisions, the most recent decided in
August 1993.8 No appellate court, however, has yet definitively answered these critical issues. As a result, those local
government agencies contemplating groundwater management have little authority to guide their decisions about
whether or how to regulate groundwater exports. With the
passage of 1992's A.B. 3030, 9 the pace of local groundwater
management efforts is likely to accelerate rapidly. Consequently, an updated and expanded examination of the constitutionality of local government efforts to restrict groundwater
exports is overdue.
Section II of this article summarizes the common law and
state statutes addressing groundwater, and introduces the
eight export ordinances.1" Section III considers the constitutionality, under articles X and XI of the California Constitu-

§§

5. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
6. See Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See infra notes 47, 68, 331.
9. 1992 CAL. STATS. ch. 947, codified as amended at CAL. WATER CODE
10750-55.4 (West Supp. 1993). See also infra text accompanying notes 57-67.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 14-38.
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1
tion, of the local groundwater export ordinances. ' Section IV
considers the constitutionality, under the federal Constitution's Dormant Commerce Clause, of the local groundwater
export ordinances. 12 Section V draws some broad conclusions
about the difficulties and appropriateness of constitutional
the goal of a more coherent groundlitigation in advancing
13
policy.
water

II.

CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW

A. Common Law Rights
Judicial decisions have established the scope of private
rights to use groundwater in California. 4 Three classes of
such rights exist: (1) overlying rights, (2) appropriative
rights, and (3) prescriptive rights.' 5 "Overlying rights" refer
to the right of a landowner to pump groundwater from beneath the land for use on, or in connection with, the land that
overlies the aquifer.' 6 An "appropriative right" is the right to
take groundwater that is surplus to the needs of overlying
users and use it on land that does not overlie the ground7
water basin from which it was extracted.' "Prescriptive
rights" attach to pumping that continues for the prescriptive
11. See infra text accompanying notes 39-326.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 327-534.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 535-544.
14. See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 43161, 503-06 (1956). See also generally ANNE SCHNEIDER, GroundwaterRights in
California, (Governor's Comm'n to Review Cal. Water Rights Law, Staff Paper
No. 2, 1977). For an extended treatment of the materials in this section of the
article, see Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1, at §§ III & IV.
15. HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 431-61, 503-06.
16. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 6-7. An "aquifer" is "a formation,
group of formations, or part of a formation that contains sufficient saturated
permeable material to yield significant quantities of water to wells and
springs." U.S. GEOL. SURVEY, DEFINITIONS OF SELECTED GROUNDWATER
TERMS- REVISIONS AND CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENTS 2 (Water Supply Paper No.

1988, 1972).
17. See, e.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 454-58. "Surplus" occurs "when
the amount of water being extracted from [a groundwater basin] is less than the
maximum that could be withdrawn without adverse effects on the basin's long
term supply." Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1307 (Cal. 1975).
An extraction by a municipality for local water supplies is always an appropriative use, even if the municipality overlies the aquifer. See HUTCHINS, supra
note 14, at 458-60.
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period after prior rights-holders have notice that a basin is
"overdrafted." I8
Case law has also established the relative priorities between and among the three classes of groundwater rightsholders. As between overlying users, no temporal priority exists. Rather, in times of shortage, each is entitled to a reasonable share of the common supply. 19 As between appropriators, temporal priority exists; the rights of a pumper first in
time are senior to those of a later appropriator.2 ° As between
overlying users and appropriators, overlying users have priority, regardless of the date of the inception of the overlying
use. 2 1 Prescriptive rights-holders can quantify their rights as
against both prior appropriators and overlying owners under
formulas developed by the courts.22
Uncertainty reigns under this common law system. 23
Since there is no centralized, state-administered system for
obtaining private rights to groundwater, a rights-holder can
quantify its right only by suing to adjudicate the rights of all
basin pumpers. 24 Such lawsuits are costly, time-consuming,
and require the collection of extensive information about
prior pumping patterns and basin hydrogeological characteristics. Given these limitations, in the short run, it may appear more rational to pumpers to allow a basin to become
overdrafted. Similarly, no centralized mechanism exists for
reviewing the desirability of a transfer of groundwater from
an existing use to a new place of use. 25 Lack of such a centralized process creates additional uncertainty that further
inhibits the reallocation of groundwater to new uses.
18. See, e.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 503-06. "Overdraft" occurs
"whenever extractions increase, or the withdrawable maximum decreases, or
both, to the point where the surplus ends." San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1307. To
trigger the running of the prescriptive period, a prior rights-holder must have
notice of "adversity in fact caused by the actual commencement of overdraft."
Id. at 1311.
19. See, e.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 440-41.
20. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 16 (citing Katz v. Walkinshaw,
74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903)).
21. See, e.g., id. at 14-16.
22. See, e.g., id. at 10-12 (citing Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d
1250, 1298, 1318 n.61).
23. See, e.g.,

GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS

LAW, FINAL REPORT 143 (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

24. See, e.g., id.
25. See id. at 163-65.
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State GroundwaterLegislation

No comprehensive state legislation addresses the acquisition and transfer of private rights to groundwater in California.26 Similarly, no comprehensive state legislation addresses the management of the resource.
Rather, the
sparse state groundwater management legislation has taken
one of three forms.28 First, the Legislature has endowed several classes of water agencies with power to manage groundwater.29 Second, the Legislature has created several specific
groundwater management districts to manage groundwater
resources in identified basins.3 0 Finally, in recent years, the
Legislature has granted existing local water agencies increased powers to manage groundwater resources. 3
C. County Efforts to Restrict GroundwaterExports
In response to the lack of centralized state groundwater
legislation over the last twenty years, eight California counties have enacted ordinances restricting the acquisition of
groundwater rights. 2 In general, the ordinances follow a
26. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 2-3, 91-93.
27. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 145.
28. In addition to these three groups of statutes, the Legislature has also
included groundwater within water quality statutes, authorized groundwater
studies, and assisted with groundwater recharge projects. See, e.g., CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 13050(e), Qi) (West 1971 & Supp. 1993) (groundwater included within
Porter-Cologne Water Quality planning process); id. §§ 12920-24 (PorterDolwig Groundwater Basin Protection Law affirms importance of groundwater
and requires a study of the resource); id. §§ 12925-28.6 (groundwater recharge
projects funded).
29. See, e.g., id. §§ 60000-449 (groundwater replenishment districts). The
Legislature has created the possibility of such districts; local citizens must still
establish them.
30. See, e.g., Sierra Valley Groundwater Management Dist., CAL. WATER
CODE app. ch. 119 (West Supp. 1993).
31. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1220(b) (West Supp. 1993) (counties
within specified area authorized to prepare groundwater management plans);
id. § 10753 (specified local public agencies authorized to manage groundwater).
32. In chronological order, these include: Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance
420 (July 18, 1972), 432 (Nov. 21, 1972); Butte County, Cal., Ordinance 1859
(Aug. 23, 1977); Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance 672 (Sept. 6, 1977); Modoc
County, Cal., Ordinance 255 (Mar. 6, 1978); SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL. CODE
ORDINANCES no. 410, § 2 (1980); Inyo County, Cal., Referendum Measure A
(passed Nov. 4, 1980); Nevada County, Cal., Ordinance 1365 (Jan. 27, 1986),
1370 (Mar. 24, 1986); Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1552 (Feb. 4, 1992),
1553 (Feb. 18, 1992).
In addition to these counties, as of late 1992, at least six other counties
were considering groundwater export policies. See infra note 49.
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uniform format.33 They announce findings,34 define terms,35
and establish permit schemes authorizing the export of
groundwater in limited circumstances from defined areas
under their jurisdiction.3 6 In addition, several ordinances absolutely restrict water export under certain circumstances.3
The circumstances and motivations surrounding the enactment of these ordinances are controversial. Considered in
the worst light, these ordinances appear to hoard local
groundwater to protect local interests at the expense of competitors from outside the respective counties. Considered in
the best possible light, these ordinances attempt to do three
things. First, they attempt to add certainty to local groundwater rights by ensuring that sufficient "surplus" groundwater exists to permit exports. By providing a locally administered process, they can avoid the need for expensive, timeconsuming groundwater basin adjudication. Second, as a corollary to the first goal, in determining the availability of
"surplus" water, the ordinances allow the permitting authorities to consider the environmental consequences of a proposed extraction for export. Finally, and most controversially, they function as local "area of origin" protections.38
Such protections aim to conserve a supply for future local economic development.
III.

STATE LAW PREEMPTION

Absent a comprehensive state legislative scheme for
groundwater regulation in California, can California counties
33. The principal exception is the short Sacramento ordinance, which lacks
separate legislative findings and definitions, summarily considering the factors
relevant to the granting of the permit. SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL., CODE

§ 15.08.095.
34. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY, CAL.,

CODE § 33-1 (findings);

IMPERIAL

COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 56200 (findings).
35. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-2 (definitions); IMPERIAL
COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 56200 (findings); TEHAMA COUNTY,

CAL., CODE § 9.40.010 (definitions).
36. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-4 (permit needed); IMPERIAL
COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 56302; TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 9.40.030 (permit). See also infra note 232.
37. See BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-3 (groundwater mining banned if
water exported from "basin"); GLENN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.400 (groundwater mining banned if water exported from county); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL.,

CODE § 9.40.020 (groundwater mining banned if water exported from county).
38. See Ronald B. Robie & Russell R. Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes: The
California Experience, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 419 (1979) (discussing state area-oforigin legislation).
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enact their own home-grown provisions? In particular, can
they restrict groundwater export from their counties? Article
XI, section 7, of the California Constitution states: "A county
...

may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,

sanitary, and other ordinances not in conflict with general
laws."3 9 The California Supreme Court has long held that

lelven in matters of statewide concern, the city or county has
police power equal to that of the state so long as the local
regulations do not conflict with general laws."40 That court
has developed an extensive analysis to determine whether
such "conflict with general laws," i.e., "preemption," has occurred in a given legislative arena.4 ' Over ten years ago, in
the only major article addressing local groundwater regulation, Antonio Rossman and Michael J. Steel concluded that
the Inyo County groundwater management ordinance did not
conflict with the "general laws," and hence was not preempted by state law.42 This section of the article updates the
39. CAL. CONST., art. XI, § 7 (West Supp. 1993). Prior to 1970, as article 11,
§ 11, the provision read: "Any county, city, town, or township may make and
enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as
are not in conflict with general laws." Id. (West 1954). This provision, in its
earlier wording, had been in the Constitution since its adoption in 1879. See
Coleman Blease, Civil Liberties and the CaliforniaLaw of Preemption, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 517, 518 n.6 (1966). "When this provision was written into the constitution in 1879, it was unique and the California courts had to interpret the
section 'unaided by anything that went before.'" James E. Allen, Jr. & Laurence K Sawyer, Comment: The California City Versus Preemption By Implication, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 603, 604 (1966) (footnote omitted) (quoting John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California III: Section 11 of Article XI of the
California Constitution, 32 CAL. L. REV. 341, 342 (1944)). Professor Peppin
elaborated: "The origin and purposes of the provision are exceedingly obscure.
It was adopted without debate in the Convention and apparently without public
discussion of any kind. It does not appear to have been taken from any other
state although it was subsequently adopted by three." Peppin, supra, at 341-42
(footnote omitted).
Similar provisions are currently found in the constitutions of Idaho, Ohio,
Utah, and Washington. See IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1993); OHIO CONST. art
XVIII, § 3 (1979); UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. 11, § 11 (1988).
40. Chavez v. Sargent, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (Cal. 1959); Candid Enter., Inc. v.
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 705 P.2d 876, 882 (Cal. 1985).
41. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 844 P.2d 534,
536-37 (Cal. 1993); People ex. rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d
1150, 1154-56 (Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 929 (Cal. 1990).
42. Antonio Rossman & Michael J. Steel, Forgingthe New Water Law: Public Regulation of "Proprietary"GroundwaterRights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903, 93643 (1982). In addition to "preemption" under article XI, § 7, Rossman and Steel
analyzed the Inyo ordinance under state equal protection and municipal affairs
law. Id. at 943-49. This article will reexamine only the preemption analysis.
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preemption analysis in light of the substantial developments
that have occurred in the decade since Rossman and Steel
first addressed the matter. In addition, it considers conflicting authorities not addressed by Rossman and Steel. Ultimately, it concludes that, although strong policy reasons support a conclusion that county groundwater export ordinances
should be preempted, the legal case for such preemption is
weak. Only a court willing to base its ruling on a combination of appeals to policy and to common law power to declare
"general" law could conclude that state law preempted the local groundwater export ordinances.
In its application to county groundwater export regulations, the preemption analysis framework has remained virtually unchanged over the last dozen years.4 3 The principal
developments have occurred on two fronts. First, and most
importantly, in California Water Code sections 1220 and
10753, the Legislature has authorized certain counties to enact groundwater management plans.4 4 Section 1220 expressly and exclusively applies to counties. 4 5 In contrast, section 10753 applies only to counties that meet its specific
requirements.4 6 In combination, however, these two statutes
greatly expand the express power of counties to control
groundwater exports. This express legislative recognition of
county power contrasts with the second development over the
last ten years. In three separate cases since Rossman and
Steel wrote their article, the California Superior Court has
addressed counties' general power to enact groundwater ex43. Compare Galvan v. Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 933, 935-36 (Cal.
1969), cited by Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 938, with the California
Supreme Court's currently preferred statement of the law, in People ex rel.
Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1155-56 (Cal. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 909 F.2d 929 (Cal. 1990). See also Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993). Indeed, the current formulation of the preemption analysis has remained virtually unchanged in the almost
30 years since In re Hubbard, 396 P.2d 809, 812-15 (Cal. 1964).
44. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1220, 10753 (West Supp. 1993).

45. Id. § 1220(b).
46. Section 10753(a) authorizes "local public agencies," defined in section
10752(g) as water service providers, to adopt groundwater management plans.
See id. §§ 10752(g), 10753(a). In addition, § 10753(b) allows local public agencies that do not provide water service to manage groundwater if no other local
public agency provides water service in the area, and the agency provides "flood
control, groundwater quality management, or groundwater replenishment." Id.
§ 10753(b). See also 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 320, § 3 (1993 A.B. 1152 [Costa])
(amending § 10753(b)). The 1993 A.B. 1152 is noted infra, note 60.
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port restrictions. Although without precedential authority,
the conclusion of the first two of these decisions has influenced at least two counties to seek special legislation rather
than risk losing a judicial challenge to a home-grown
ordinance.4 7
A. Legislative Authorization of County Groundwater
Management
The 1984 enactment of California Water Code sections
1215 to 1222, and the 1992 enactment of Water Code sections
10750 to 10755.4, have greatly broadened the power of certain counties to enact groundwater management plans. Yet
these provisions are far from general legislative authority for
county groundwater export restrictions. Although both sets
of statutes address groundwater management, neither expresses any legislative intent regarding the proper role that
groundwater export controls may play within a county
groundwater management scheme. Moreover, both acts apply only to a select group of counties. In addition, apart from
the uncertain role that groundwater export controls may play
within these schemes, the two sets of statutes raise a host of
interpretive questions. 48 This portion of the article analyzes
the scope of these statutes by looking at their application to
those counties that have attempted to enact groundwater export regulations without relying upon express state
authorization.
Over the past twenty years, eight California counties
have enacted or proposed ordinances restricting the export of
47. See Letter from James S. Reed, County Counsel, Mono County, California, to Gregory S. Weber (Oct. 27, 1992) (on file with author) ("It was my opinion that a county ordinance regulating groundwater export would likely be
found to be preempted, as Superior Courts in Inyo and Nevada counties have
ruled"); Telephone Interview with Joanne Yeager, Deputy County Counsel, Imperial County, California (Feb. 1992) (based on discussions with the Department of Water Resources on the Inyo and Nevada ordinances, the County concluded that it ran a substantial risk of having a home-grown ordinance declared
preempted).
Over the last four decades, appellate decisions involving California water
law have become increasingly rare. The California water bar is often left with
little more to guide it than unpublished trial court orders and decisions. Indeed, the pages of the California Water Law & PolicyReporter are filled primarily with reports of such otherwise unpublished materials. See, e.g., 1 CAL.
WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 13-16, 32-38 (1990).
48. For an extended introduction to these statutes, see Patchwork Quilt,
supra note 1.
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groundwater.4 9 In chronological order, these counties are:
Imperial, Butte, Glenn, Modoc, Sacramento, Inyo, Nevada,
and Tehama. Six of these counties are authorized at least
partially by section 1220(b) to regulate groundwater. Arguably, some of the eight are also authorized to regulate groundwater under section 10753.
1. California Water Code Section 1220(b)
California Water Code Section 1220(b) authorizes counties that contain "part of the combined Sacramento and
Delta-Central Sierra Basins" to adopt groundwater managecounties overlie a portion of the
ment plans.50 Twenty-seven
"combined basins."51 These include six of the eight counties
that have enacted groundwater export restrictions: Butte,
Glenn, Modoc, Sacramento, Nevada, and Tehama. Inyo and
Imperial can take no advantage of Section 1220.
49. See supra note 32. In addition to the eight counties that have enacted
groundwater export ordinances, six counties have taken steps toward developing new groundwater transfer regulations. In 1992, Sutter County circulated a
proposed groundwater export ordinance. Letter from James Scanlon, Deputy
County Counsel, Sutter County, to Sutter County Water Districts (Aug. 27,
1992) (on file with author). Since 1991, Imperial County has been reviewing
legislation to create a special district similar to the Mono County district. Letter from Joanne L. Yeager, Assistant County Counsel, Imperial County, to
Gregory S. Weber (1992) (on file with author). Yuba County has indicated interest in enacting water transfer ordinances. Letter in response to survey of 58
California County Counsels from Yuba County to Gregory S. Weber (Nov. 1992)
(on file with author). In 1992, San Joaquin County announced a general policy
opposing any transfers of water from San Joaquin County where the water had
not been offered first to other San Joaquin county users, or where affected
water agencies had not yet consented. San Joaquin County, Cal., Resolution 492-236 (Apr. 7, 1992). Yolo County has created a new county-wide water agency
charged with developing a water export policy. See County to Form Water
Agency, DAvis ENTERPRISE, Oct. 14, 1992, at Al, A5. Finally, Napa County has
indicated that it is working on a formal water export policy statement. Letter
in response to survey from Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District, to Gregory S. Weber (Nov. 12, 1992).
50. CAL. WATER CODE § 1220(b) (West Supp. 1993).
51. A glance at BULLETIN 160-74 demonstrates that only 10 counties entirely overlie the "combined Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins":
Shasta, Tehama, Butte, Plumas, Colusa, Sutter, Yuba, Yolo, Sacramento, and
Amador. CAL.DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 160-74, THE CALIFORNIA
WATER PLAN: OUTLOOK IN 1974 3-4, 6 (1974) [hereinafter BULLETIN 160-74].
Seventeen counties overlie a portion of the combined basins, but also overlie
other "basins": Modoc, Siskiyou, Glenn, Lassen, Sierra, Nevada, Alpine, Placer,
El Dorado, Calaveras, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Lake, Napa, Solano, Contra
Costa, and Alameda. Bulletin 160-74 speaks not of "basins," but of "hydrologic
study areas." Id.
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Even if a county initially appears within the scope of sec52
tion 1220(b), section 1220 further limits its applicability.
Section 1220(b) limits the power to those plans that will "implement the purposes of this section."5 3 "This section," i.e.,
section 1220, addresses export pumping from within the combined basins. Thus, the power conferred by subsection (b) is
apparently limited in two ways. First, an overlying county
can enact groundwater management plans in order to limit
"exports" from within the combined basin. There does not appear to be any direct authority, however, to allow counties to
regulate "exports" that may leave their counties, but that do
not leave the combined basins.5 4 Second, section 1220 does
not directly authorize counties that partially overlie the
"combined basins" to regulate groundwater in those portions
of their territory that do not overlie the combined basins. As
noted above, of the twenty-seven counties that overlie at least
a part of the basin, seventeen also extend beyond the combined basins.5 5 These seventeen counties, however, appear to
have groundwater management power over only the portions
of their land surface that overlie the combined basins.56
Of the six counties that have enacted groundwater export ordinances and that overlie the combined basins, only
Butte, Tehama, and Sacramento entirely overlie the combined basins. Thus, Glenn, Modoc, and Nevada have only
limited power under section 1220(b) to regulate groundwater
within their counties.

WATER CODE § 1220(b) (West Supp. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Thus, section 1220 was not really at issue in the litigation involving
groundwater exports from Tehama County to Colusa County. See, e.g., Brief of
Defendant at 21, Baldwin v. County of Tehama, No. 34447 (Super. Ct. Tehama
County, Cal.) ("[section] 1220 deals only with exports from the groundwater
basin").
55. See supra note 51.
56. Arguably, if a county that only partially overlies the protected basin
could establish some nexus between groundwater management in the portion of
the county overlying the combined basins and the portion not so overlying, it
might be able to extend its groundwater management power to the areas beyond the combined basins. Absent some hydrologic or engineered connection
between such areas, it seems unlikely that a county could make such a showing.

52. CAL.
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California Water Code Section 10753

As noted above, Water Code Section 10753, part of 1992's
A.B. 3030, does not on its face apply to "counties."5 7 Rather,
subsection (a) authorizes a "local agency" that provides
"water service to all or a portion of its service area" to manage
groundwater in a basin identified in California Department
of Water Resources Bulletin 118-75. 58 Thus, only counties
that provide such "water service" can take direct advantage
of section 10753(a). Phone calls to various counties that have
enacted, proposed, or reviewed groundwater export restrictions indicate that few, if any, provide water service. 59
Alternatively, section 10753(b) extends groundwater
management powers to local public agencies that do not provide water service, but that provide "flood control, groundwater quality management, or groundwater replenishment."6 ° This subsection also requires that no other local
agency provide water service. Subsection (b) thus extends
the authorization beyond the limited circumstances addressed by subsection (a). Nevertheless, the extension is not
universal. Again, a survey of eight counties, predominantly in
the Sacramento Valley, indicated that four of the eight might
fit within subsection (b).6
57. See supra note 46.
58. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10752(b), 10753(a) (West Supp. 1993).
59. As a former Sacramento County resident who paid county utilities bills
for three years, the author can attest that Sacramento County does, indeed,
provide water service. The author's research assistant spoke with representatives of Tehama, Yuba, Yolo, Glenn, Butte, Modoc, Inyo, and Sutter counties.
See Memorandum from Brad Epstein to Gregory S. Weber (Mar. 5, 1993) (on
file with author) [hereinafter, Memo]. Of these counties, only Sutter indicated
that it provided water service; its delivery area was limited to "two communities." Id. at 3.
60. CAL. WATER CODE § 10753(b) (West Supp. 1993). In 1993, the governor
signed A.B. 1152, 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 320 (amending § 10753(b)). The new version extends the rights to regulate to "alocal agency formed under [the Water
Code] for the principal purpose of providing water service that has not yet provided that service." Id. § 3. The new provision also clarifies the geographic
area of the regulatory authority of these non-water-providing agencies. They
may regulate either in any portion of their jurisdiction not receiving water service from a defined "local agency" or in any portion of their jurisdiction "served
by a local agency whose governing body, by a majority vote, declines to exercise
the authority of [A.B. 3030, as codified and amended,] and enters into [a management] agreement with the local public agency .... ." Id.
61. See Memo, supra note 59. The inquiry did not address the other requirement of section 10753(b), namely, whether any other local agency provides
water service. Irrigation districts exist in many of the surveyed counties. On
its face, subsection (b) applies only if no other local agency provides water ser-
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Of course, even if these counties might take advantage of
A.B. 3030, that bill would not validate existing water export
restrictions. The bill grants no express authority for water
export restrictions.12 Arguably, such a ban is implicit in the
groundwater management authority provided.6 3 Nevertheless, an ordinance that contained only an export ban would
hardly seem to be a "management plan." Section 10752(d) defines a "groundwater management plan" as a "document that
describes the activities intended to be included in a groundwater management program."64

Subsection 10752(e), in

turn, defines a "groundwater management program" as "a coordinated and ongoing activity.., pursuant to a groundwater
"65 A simple export ban, without more,
management plan ....

vice. If literally applied, then, if any local agency provided water service in any
part of a large basin, no other entity could attempt to fit under subsection (b)
anywhere else in that basin. A narrower reading of subsection (b)'s initial restriction might authorize an entity such as a county to fit within subsection (b)
if the county provided one of the listed services to a portion of the county that
was not served by a water service agency. Under such a narrower interpretation, a county could manage groundwater in the portion of the basin not otherwise served; to the extent that it wished to regulate groundwater in a portion of
the same basin served by a water service agency, it would have to coordinate its
efforts. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750.7, 10750.8, 10753(b) 10755.2-.4 (West
Supp. 1993).
With those caveats, the survey revealed that several counties might fit
under subsection (b). Tehama indicated that it has formed a separate flood control district whose directors are the County Board of Supervisors ex officio.
Memo, supra note 59, at 1. Glenn indicated that it provided flood control "only
at county owned facilities, such as industrial sites." Id. at 2. Butte and Sutter
indicated that they provided groundwater quality management because they
issue well permits. Id. at 2, 3. (If this is all it takes, then all counties would fit
within subsection (b), as state legislation requires local well registration ordinances. See CAL.WATER CODE §§ 13700-806 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993)). Butte
also indicated that it is participating in a groundwater replenishment program;
the Butte Water Users Association is conducting a water survey. Memo, supra
note 59, at 2. Modoc indicated that it provides flood control by maintaining a
channel along the Pit River. Id.
Interestingly, Inyo indicated that the City of Los Angeles also provided
water service to the county. Id. at 3. Might the City of Los Angeles issue a
groundwater management plan for Inyo County? That would certainly turn the
tables on the county!
62. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7 (West Supp. 1993) (listing 12 management powers).
63. See id. § 10753.7(e) (mitigation of overdraft authorized), id. § 10753.8
(extractions may be limited as last resort), id. § 10754 (groundwater replenishment district powers authorized), id. § 60230(f) (groundwater management district may prevent unlawful exportation of water).
64. Id. § 10752(d).
65. Id. § 10752(e) (emphasis added).
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would lack any sense of "coordination." Finally, Water Code
sections 10753.2 to 10753.6 detail notice, hearing, and majority protest procedures required of groundwater management
plans enacted under the bill. 66 At a minimum, a county
otherwise within section 10753 would seem to have to reenact
its export ban under the A.B. 3030 procedures. 7
Three Trial Courts Find Preemption
Although the Legislature has thus extended some counties' groundwater management powers, the preceding discussion demonstrates that these extensions are limited and
fraught with legal uncertainties. Moreover, neither Water
Code sections 1220 nor 10753 expressly authorize the particular export ordinances enacted to date in the eight counties
that have legislated in this area. The question remains: absent state legislative authorization, do counties have the
power to enact such ordinances, or are such efforts preempted
under state law? The remainder of this section discusses the
preemption litigation to date and reviews the preemption
B.

68

analysis.

In all three cases that have reached judgment to date,
the superior courts have found the particular ordinances at
issue were preempted by state law. All three courts issued
short decisions that contain few clues to the respective
judges' reasoning. Still, as noted above, in the practicing
water bar, these decisions have circulated and are influenc66. Id. §§ 10753.2-.6.
67. Although the recent Tehama County decision does not address that
county's ability to proceed under A.B. 3030, the court's holding appears to support this conclusion. See infra note 77.
68. To date, three export ordinances have been challenged in court as in
conflict with "the general laws." All three superior courts have concluded that
state law did preempt the ordinances before them. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, City of Los Angeles v. County
of Inyo, No. 12908 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal., July 8, 1983); Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Truckee Donner Public Utility Dist. v. County of
Nevada, No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Jun. 21, 1988); Ruling on
Motion for Summary Judgment, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 &
34446, (Super Ct. Tehama County, Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1993, appeal filed, Cal.
Ct. App. No. 3 Civil C017301, Dec. 3, 1993). Myers was originally filed in Colusa County as Superior Court case number 18498. The defendant County
transferred the case to Tehama where it was renumbered Tehama number
34147. There, it was consolidated with Petition for Writ of Mandate, Baldwin v.
County of Tehama, No. 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., filed May 27,
1992.) Baldwin involved a challenge to the Tehama County ordinance by a different group of irrigators.
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ing counties in their approaches to legislative solutions to

groundwater export issues.69

In the Inyo County litigation, the City of Los Angeles
challenged the groundwater management ordinance adopted
7 ° On July 13, 1983,
by Inyo County voters in a referendum.
the trial court ruled on the County's motions for summary
judgment and judgment on the pleadings, and the City's mo7 1
tion for partial summary judgment. The court concluded:
[T]he legislature of this state and the courts of this state,
together, have created a comprehensive scheme of legislative acts and decisional law dealing with the acquisition,
appropriation, use, control, and conservation of the waters
of this state, including groundwater, which constitutes a
general law of the state within the meaning of article XI,
section 7, and which preempts the application of Inyo
County's 72ordinances which are the subject of this
litigation.

In the Nevada County litigation, the Truckee-Donner
Public Utility District challenged the groundwater export ordinance adopted by the Nevada County Board of Supervisors. 73 On December 8, 1988, the trial court issued its order
69. See supra notes 47, 68.
70.
In City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12883 (Super. Ct. Inyo
County, Cal., filed Dec. 30, 1980), the City raised CEQA and Election
Code claims against the ordinance's procedural enactment; these
claims were rejected. In City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No.
12908 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1981), the city raised
its substantive arguments against the ordinance ....
Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 933 n.184.
71. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12908 (Super. Ct. Inyo County,
Cal., July 13, 1983).
72. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). The court explained its conclusions:
The state clearly has preempted the field. And rightly so. The welfare
of the state requires that its water resources be controlled for the best
interests of all of its citizens. To allow each county to make its own
rules as to the amount of water which can be used and for what purposes, could well jeopardize the reasonable distribution of the state's
water supply to its people. The state's most vital assets, such as its
water, must be thought of as assets of the entire state, not just of the
areas in which they arise. Otherwise, the source counties, with but a
portion of the state's people, are in a position to hold the state hostage.
Id. at 3.
73. Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util.
Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Nevada County, Cal., filed
June 21, 1989).

388

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. In that
order, the court ruled that the Nevada Ordinance:
is inconsistent with Article 10, section 2 of the State Constitution and provisions of the Water Code; and that the
Ordinance is preempted by California law. Local legislation such as Ordinance 1370 purporting to regulate the
acquisition and use of the waters of the state is prohibited
by the law and policy expressed in the Constitution, statutes, and decisions of California.7 4
In the Tehama County litigation, several groups of farmers challenged the groundwater export ordinance adopted by
the Tehama County Board of Supervisors." On August 11,
1993, the trial court ruled in the challengers' favor."6 In a
short but rambling opinion, the trial court concluded that:
74. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Truckee-Donner Pub.
Util. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920, (Super. Ct. Nevada County, Cal.,
Dec. 8, 1988). Further insight into this terse conclusion comes from the court's
June 21, 1988, "Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment." In that ruling, the
court elaborated:
The population centers of the state may require large quantities of
water not available to such centers locally. In periods of water
shortage, a drought, it may be necessary to pump from ground water
sufficient water to sustain the economy and population of the state.
Inyo County may be the most obvious example as of the present time.
However, this principle, with or without overdraft, will require statewide planning, not county of origin control. The state's future economy
and growth pattern will be determined by where and in what quantity
the water can be supplied.
This does not lend itself to 58 different statutes all of which will
naturally be attempting to protect its own domain. The County here
bases its right to control the ground water within its boundaries, the
ordinance purports to apply to the Martis Valley ground water basin,
on its police power, Constitution Article XI § 7. However, the County's
police power is limited to areas of legislation which had not been preempted by the state.
The Court finds that the legislature, Constitution, and the Courts
have in fact undertaken and created a comprehensive scheme for the
control, acquisition, use and conservation of the waters of this state,
including surface and ground water. That is to say, the state has occupied and preempted Ordinance No. 1370, which attempts to regulate
and restrict exportation of water from Martis Valley Basin.
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment, at 3.
75. See Baldwin v. County of Tehama, No. 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama
County, Cal., filed May 27, 1992) and Myers v. County of Tehama, No. 34147
(Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., filed Mar. 3, 1992).
76. Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama
County, Cal., decision filed Aug. 11, 1993).
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Tehama's ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with
Tehama chose to ignore [the
[Water Code] § 10750 ....
management procedure authorized by A.B. 3030]. There
were no discussions with other agencies who may be affected by the basin which is the subject of the ground77
water which is itself the issue in this litigation.
A comparison of the three trial court opinions reveals
substantial similarities in form. All three are relatively short
and not terribly specific in identifying either the particular
type of preemption or the particular conflicts with the general
law that lead to preemption. The basis for each opinion differs. On the one hand, the Inyo and Nevada decisions
strongly resemble each other. Despite these two courts' lack
of specificity in identifying a particular legal theory, both
found a "comprehensive scheme." Both cited article X, section 2, of the California Constitution, 78 although only the Nevada County decision found a direct contradiction between
the ordinance at issue and the constitutional provision. Both
included decisional law within the realm of "general laws"
with preemptive power. 79 Both opinions defined the preempted "field" broadly to include the entire realm of the control, acquisition, use, and conservation "of the waters of this
state."8 0 Finally, both decisions relied heavily on a policy
8s
against the balkanization of the state's water resources.
77. Id. at 4. The trial court's decision does not mention that Tehama
County had enacted its groundwater management ordinance over six months
prior to the enactment of Water Code § 10753. Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1552 (Feb. 4, 1992). The court also noted without discussion that section
10750.4 does not make A.B. 3030 the exclusive authority for local groundwater
management. Myers v. County of Tehama, at 2 (decision filed Aug. 11, 1993).
The court cited Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 707 P.2d 840 (Cal. 1985), to
outline the preemption analysis, but did not indicate which elements of the preemption test supported its ruling. Myers v. County of Tehama at 3-4 (decision
filed Aug. 11, 1993). Finally, the court cited Water Code § 1220 and § 10750 as
apparent legislative implementation of § 104 and § 105. Id.
78. For a discussion of the preemptive effect of this provision, see infra text
accompanying notes 147-244.
79. For a discussion of the role of decisional law in preemption analysis, see
infra text accompanying notes 293-301.
80. For a discussion of the impact of narrow and broad "field" definitions,
see infra text accompanying notes 276-288.
81. Thus, the Inyo County decision states:
The welfare of the state requires that its water resources be controlled
for the best interests of all of its citizens. To allow each county to make
its own rules as to the amount of water which can be used and for what
purposes, could well jeopardize the reasonable distribution of the
state's water supply to its people. The state's most vital assets, such as
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The recent Tehama decision also cited the constitutional
provision, although, like the Inyo decision, it did not expressly find a direct contradiction between that provision and
the ordinance at issue.82 Like the two prior trial courts, the
Tehama court also apparently defined the "field" broadly. 83
Similarly, the court implicitly adopted an "anti-balkanization" rationale for its holding.84 Unlike the other two decisions, however, the court grounded this rationale in the express statutory consultation procedure set up by section
10753.5 Finally, unlike either prior opinion, the Tehama

court neither found a comprehensive scheme for water resources development nor cited the common law as part of the
preemptive "general law."
C. Contradiction-BasedPreemption: California Water Code
Sections 104 and 105
Given these three trial court opinions and their unequivocal, if implicit, rejection of the arguments of Rossman and
Steel, a revisitation of the preemption analysis is in order.
However appealing this author finds the trial courts' anti-balkanization rationale, the paucity of discussion in the three
its water, must be thought of as assets of the entire state, not just of
the areas in which they arise. Otherwise, the source counties, with but
a portion of the state's people, are in a position to hold the state
hostage.
Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions at 3, Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No.
12908 (Super Ct. Inyo County, Cal., filed July 13, 1983). Similarly, referring to
the 58 different counties in the state, the Nevada County court opined: "This
does not lend itself to 58 different statutes all of which will naturally be attempting to protect its own domain." Decision on Summary Judgment at 3,
Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct.
Sutter County, Cal., filed June 21, 1988).
82. Decision at 2, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super.
Ct. Tehama County Cal. filed Aug. 11, 1993). The court's discussion of the constitutional provision was simply: "if one reads the provisions of Article X, § 2...
together with § 10004 (the State Water Plan) it appears that the State has involved itself in water planning and by virtue of § 10750 has given counties a
clear path to protect and manage groundwater." Id. at 2-3. In context, the
court appeared to use the constitutional provision simply as authority for the
cited state legislation.
83. Although the trial court did not expressly identify the "field" at issue, it
apparently found that field to be "management of water" or "water planning."
Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id.
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trial court opinions belies the difficulty of the preemption
analysis.
The preemption analysis usually begins with the fre6
quently quoted passage from Lancaster v. Superior Court:
Local legislation in conflict with general law is void. Conflicts exist if the ordinance duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. If the subject matter
or field of the legislation has been fully occupied by the
state, there is no room for supplementary or complementary local legislation, even if the subject were otherwise
87
one properly characterized as a "municipal affair."
86. Lancaster v. Superior Court, 494 P.2d 681, 682 (Cal. 1972), quoted in
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1155 (Cal.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 929 (Cal. 1990).
87. Id. (citiations omitted). This passage implicates two related inquiries:
"municipal affairs" and "police powers." The last portion of the Lancaster quotation points to a related "home-rule" area: charter cities' exclusive power to
legislate on "municipal affairs." Article XI, § 5, subdivision (a), of the California
Constitution grants charter cities "sovereignty over 'municipal affairs.'" California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 917 (Cal.
1991). See also Sho Sato, "MunicipalAffairs" in California, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1055 (1972); Peppin, supra note 39, at 371-76. Article XI, § 3 and § 4, authorize
counties to adopt charters. CAL. CONST., art XI, §§ 3, 4 (West Supp. 1993). The
county charter provisions, however, do not contain the "municipal affairs" language found in the city charter provisions. Compare id. §§ 1(b), 3(a) (county
charters supersede "all laws inconsistent") and id. §4(g) (county charters supersede general laws governing county powers and officers) with id. § 5(a); cf
id. §8(b) (if authorized by charter, counties "may agree with a city within it to
assume and discharge specified municipal functions") (emphasis added).
Because this article focuses solely on counties, the "municipal affairs" language, and its occasionally confusing overlap with preemption analysis, does
not apply. See Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1212, 122122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See also David R. McEwen, Comment, Land-Use Control, Externalities,and the MunicipalAffairs Doctrine:A Border Conflict, 8 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 432, 433-34 n.10 (1975) ("Any statements in cases referring to municipal affairs of a county must be viewed as clearly erroneous.") Cf Johnson v.
Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992). But cf Los Angeles County Safety Police
Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 237 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(charter county actions analyzed under municipal affairs cases). Thus, absent a
special clause in a county charter addressing groundwater management, the
power of a county to regulate groundwater exports does not appear to be impacted by the constitution's chartering provisions. To date, none of the litigation involving county groundwater exports has involved county charter provisions. The application of the "municipal affairs" language, if any, to charter city
groundwater management efforts is beyond the scope of this article. Cf FINAL
REPORT, supra note 23, at 151 ("The City of Grass Valley enacted an ordinance
which restricts new wells that are intended to provide water for land outside
the city limits.")
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The strongest indication of legislative intent to preempt local
law comes from an express preemption provision."s No state
legislation expressly bans counties from enacting groundwater export restrictions.8 9 Similarly, as discussed in section
In addition to the explicit "municipal affairs" language, the Lancaster quotation specifically, and preemption analysis generally, presupposes local police
power to legislate in a given arena. This article considers the extent of local
police power over groundwater below, in the discussion of California Constitution article X, § 2. See infra text accompanying notes 161-222. This section of
the article, discussing the preemptive effect, if any, of Water Code § 104 and
§ 105, assumes arguendo that police power exists in theory over at least some
aspects of groundwater regulation. The focus becomes whether a local exercise
of police power otherwise conflicts with these two statutes as statewide "general" law.
88. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 21 (West 1987) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform
throughout the state and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this
code unless expressly authorized therein"), construed in People v. Garth, 286
Cal. Rptr. 451, 452-53 (Cal. 1991).
According to an early preemption case, an express preemption clause, without more, cannot displace local law. Ex parte Daniels, 192 P. 442, 445 (Cal.
1920). In Daniels, the court considered a highway speed regulation that made
the state-enacted limits "exclusive of all other limitations fixed by any law of
this state or any political subdivision thereof." Id. at 445. The act then expressly preempted any "ordinance, rule or regulation" of local authorities. Id.
The court noted:
It must, of course, be conceded that a mere prohibition of the state Legislature of local legislation upon the subject of the use of the streets,
without any affirmative act of the Legislature occupying that legislative field, would be unconstitutional and in violation of the express authority granted by the state Constitution to the municipality to enact
local regulations.
Id. The court explained that such a bare preemption clause, without more,
would simply aim at nullifying the constitutional grant of power to local government from what is now article XI, § 7. Id. In the act before it, the court found
that the preemption provision at issue merely reiterated the provisions of article XI, § 7; general law prevails over conflicting local law. Id.
No case since Daniels has struck legislation as a naked preemption provision, unclothed by any "affirmative act of the Legislature occupying that legislative field." Id. Although this portion of Daniels has never been overturned or
even criticized, its practical effect appears greatly limited by In re Porterfield,
168 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1946). In Porterfield, the California Supreme Court found
that a general policy statement, without any other "affirmative act," preempted
an ordinance. See id. at 721-22. Porterfield is discussed at length infra text
accompanying notes 121-134.
Despite Porterfield, a county seeking to uphold the constitutionality of a
groundwater export ordinance when faced with a challenge based on Water
Code §§ 104 and 105, might attempt to bring those two statutes in effect, if not
literally, within the Daniels rule. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
89. Indeed, the Legislature has expressly left undecided the ability of counties to legislate in this arena. For example, in California Water Code § 1220(b),
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II of this article, there has been so little state legislation on
groundwater that it is hard to find state legislation that local
ordinances may "contradict" or "duplicate."9° Nevertheless,
the Legislature granted certain counties the power to regulate groundwater
'notwithstanding any other provision of law." CAL. WATER CODE § 1220(b)
(West Supp. 1993). This language at least weakly acknowledges that "other
provisions of law" might prohibit such powers. In contrast, in newly-enacted
Water Code § 10750.10, the Legislature gave local agencies groundwater management powers "in addition to, and not [in] limitation [of], the authority
granted to a local agency pursuant to other provisions of law." Id. § 10750.10.
See also CAL.WATER CODE app. § 119-402.
The rights and powers granted to the counties and the districts by this
act are in addition to those powers which they already have or those
which may be granted. No provision of this act shall be interpreted as
denying to the counties or the districts any rights or powers they already have or those which they may be granted, except as specifically
provided for in this act.
Id.
90. In Sherwin-Williams v. City of Los Angeles, 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal.
1993), the court stated that "contradiction" occurs when local legislation is "inimical" to general law. The court, however, gave no gloss on "inimical." The
classic "contradiction" involves local permission for something prohibited by
state law, or local prohibition of something permitted by state law. See, e.g.,
Peppin, supra note 39, at 380 nn.123-24 and accompanying text (summarizing
early cases). In the broadest sense, however, as the Lancaster quote indicates,
"contradiction," "duplication," and "occupation of the field" preemption are only
subsets of "conflict" preemption. See Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164, 170(Cal. Ct. App. 1993). The opinion in Pipoly v. Benson,
125 P.2d 482 (Cal. 1942), helps explain the overlap between concepts as seemingly divergent as "contradiction" and "duplication." Courts had traditionally
explained that duplicate local legislation falls under the preemption doctrine
not because it permits something prohibited by state law, or prohibits something permitted by state law, but because double jeopardy would bar a subsequent prosecution under state law of an offense earlier tried under municipal
law. See, e.g., Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 707 P.2d 840, 848 n.12 (Cal.
1985); In re Sic, 14 P. 405, 407 (Cal. 1887). See also generally Blease, supra
note 39, at 521-24 (summarizing the development and critiquing the Sic rationale). Thus, local prosecution of a crime would prevent subsequent prosecution
using allegedly superior state prosecutorial resources. Id. In Pipoly, while discussing local legislation in a field already occupied by state legislation, the
court gave a jurisdictional explanation that explains the "no duplication" rule in
terms of "conflict":
Paradoxical as it may seem, it is apparent that an ordinance and a
statute may be identical ...and yet the ordinance is invalid because
within the constitutional provision it is in conflict with the statute.
The invalidity arises, not from a conflict of language, but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which would result from dual regulations
covering the same ground. Only by such a broad definition of "conflict"
is it possible to confine local legislation to its proper field of supplementary regulation.
Pipoly, 125 P.2d at 485. Cf Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 349 P.2d 974, 979-80
(Cal. 1960) ("The denial of power to a local body when the state has pre-empted
the field is not based solely upon the superior authority of the state. It is a rule
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challengers have argued that two statutes and the 1928 constitutional amendment do contradict (i.e., conflict directly
with) county ordinances. 91
Water Code sections 104 and 105 represent the most express state legislative pronouncements on the state's power
over groundwater. Section 104 states: "It is hereby declared
that the people of the State have a paramount interest in the
use of all water of the State and that the State shall determine what water of the State, surface and underground,can
be converted to public use or controlled for public protection."9 2 Section 105 adds:

It is hereby declared that the protection of the public interest in the development of the water resources of the
State is of vital concern to the people of the State and that
the State shall determine in what way the water of the
State, both surface and underground,should be developed
for the greatest public benefit.93
of necessity, based upon the need to prevent dual regulations which could result
in uncertainty and confusion.").
In Abbott, the court recognized that "conflict" thus had, on the one hand, a
"conventional" and "strictest" sense, and on the other hand, a "liberal" definition. Id. at 983-84. It used "conflict" in the narrow sense to denote "contradiction-based" preemption: i.e., the traditional rule against varying state and local
permission and prohibition. See id. In the broader sense, it allowed "conflict" to
denote overlapping jurisdictions. Id.
The very recent case of Bravo Vending distinguishes two senses of "contradiction." Bravo Vending, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170. One sense involves the classic
situation where state and local governments differ over permission and prohibition. Id. "The other form occurs when the ... passage of the ordinance itself
contradicts the Legislature's intent, expressly stated in the statute, that no local government shall regulate conduct within that same 'field' or subject matter." Id. To avoid this conceptual ambiguity, Bravo Vending proposes recasting
the three-step Lancasteranalysis into a four-step process, stated, according to
the court:
in order of increasing difficulty . . . (1) Does the ordinance duplicate
any state law? (2) Does the ordinance contradict any state law? (3)
Does the ordinance enter into a field of regulation which the state has
expressly reserved to itself? (4) Does the ordinance enter into a field of
regulation from which the state has implicitly excluded all other regulatory authority?
Id.
91. See Plaintiffs Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment
at 18-23, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920
(Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Apr. 18, 1989).
92. CAL. WATER CODE § 104 (West 1971) (emphasis added).
93. Id. § 105 (emphasis added).
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Together, these two statutes announce unequivocally state
policy pertaining to water resources. Beyond a policy statement, however, their preemptive effect is uncertain.
The Nevada County challengers claimed that these pro-

visions directly conflicted with the Nevada County ordinance.9 4 The commissioners who compiled the Water Code,
however, concluded that these two sections have "little operative effect."9 5 Rossman and Steel argued that these two sections create no obstacle, direct or implicit, to county groundRather, they concluded that the two
water regulation.96
legislative policy that public valgeneral
a
sections "express
ues rather than proprietary concerns govern and control
water use. These broad policy declarations suggest that, absent specific state regulation, counties hold not only the po-

94. Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment at 1820, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. They attempted to discount the code commissioner's comments by arguing that the two statutes reserve jurisdiction to
the state even if the state has not exercised that jurisdiction. Id. at 20. See also
infra notes 95 and 99. Moreover, they argued that this reservation of jurisdiction was equivalent to the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis under the federal constitution. Plaintiffs Points & Authorities at 20 n.11, Truckee-Donner
Pub. Util. Dist.
The Tehama County challengers did not claim that these sections created a
direct conflict between state and local law; rather, they relied upon the two
statutes as evidence of implied preemption by partial legislative occupation of
the field. Plaintiff's Points & Authorities in Support of Petition at 11-14, Baldwin v. County of Tehama, No. 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., filed
May 27, 1992).
95. For example, in their comments to § 104, the commissioners stated:
"This provision has little operative effect. However, it was referred to as stating
a continuing policy in Sawyer v. Board of Supervisors (1930) 291 P. 892 [sic]...
which involved the constitutionality of the statute relating to dams." CAL.
WATER CODE § 104 (West 1971) (Code Commission Notes) (citation omitted). In
that latter note, the commissioners stated:
This provision has little operative effect but appears to be a statement
of general policy quite similar to that contained in the next preceding
section. The two statements are taken from acts providing for the investigations which resulted in the State water plan.
Note also the references to undergroundwater in the above two sections, and the implied assertion of jurisdiction to regulate such water.
While little statutory regulation exists as to "ground" water, as distinguished from water in streams whether surface or underground, there
may be some value in preserving these assertions of jurisdiction on the
subject.
Id. § 105 (Code Commission Notes) (emphasis added).
96. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 940.
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lice power authority, but also the responsibility to provide
needed public regulation."9 7
At first glance, Water Code sections 104 and 105 seem
much too vacuous to conflict in the sense of "contradicting"
the county groundwater ordinances at issue. By themselves,
the two statutes do not set up directly or, in their own language, "determine" a groundwater development scheme. In
the narrowest sense, they simply introduce a series of state
statutes that principally allocate rights to surface waters.9"
In a broader sense, they announce at least an attempt to reserve some public jurisdiction over the state's groundwater.9 9
But, whether considered as introduction or as reservation,
they do not permit private conduct otherwise prohibited by
local legislation. 10 0 Thus, in this classic, narrow sense of
"conflict" preemption, the two statutes apparently lack
any
substance with which to create a "contradiction."
Nevertheless, despite the apparent lack of "substance" to
the two statutes, broad readings of four California Supreme
Court cases suggest that simple policy statements, even without an accompanying legislative scheme, might support a
"contradiction-based" preemption finding. In two of these
cases, the court based preemption findings at least partially
97. Id. They reinforced their conclusions by reference to article X, § 2: "This
conclusion appears inescapable in light of the self-enforcing mandate of the constitution that all waters be devoted to reasonable and nonwasteful uses." Id.
The conclusions of Rossman and Steel may not be as "inescapable" as they argue. As noted below, ordinance challengers raise the same constitutional provision as grounds for invalidation. See infra notes 147-244 and accompanying
text.
98. But see infra, text accompanying note 122.
99. To the extent that § 104 and § 105 arguably "reserve" exclusive jurisdiction over groundwater to the state, at the expense even of its legal subdivisions,
a "conflict" does, indeed, develop between general and local law. This type of
jurisdictional conflict more closely resembles the broad meaning of conflict
noted by Abbott as opposed to the narrower sense of "contradiction." See supra
note 90. As such, the differences in the "narrow" and "broadest" readings of
§ 104 and § 105 mirrors the distinction noted by Justice Blease between a conflict based on a contradiction with an implied general law and a conflict based
on an implicit occupation of the legislative field. See Blease, supra note 39, at
529, 531, 533 (discussing Ex Parte Daniels, 192 P. 442 (Cal. 1920) and In re
Porterfield, 168 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1946)). In keeping with that distinction, it
makes more sense to examine the jurisdictional reservation argument in the
context of "occupation of the field." See infra notes accompanying text 263-326.
That section ultimately concludes that the state has occupied the field of
groundwater allocation.
100. Similarly, no argument readily suggests that the two statutes prohibit
private conduct otherwise permitted by local ordinance. See supra note 90.
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upon judicial perceptions of a need for uniform, statewide
10 1 In three of the
treatment of the given subject matter.
cases, it based its findings at least partially upon conflicts
10 2
In combinawith legislatively declared general policies.
tion, the language from these cases can support a preemption
finding based on Water Code sections 104 and 105.
The "uniform treatment" cases include Abbott v. City of
04
Los Angeles 10 3 and Chavez v. Sargent.1 In Abbott, the court
considered an ordinance that required criminals to register
5
with local authorities. 0 Citing its earlier decisions in Tol07
10 6
man v. Underhill and Chavez,1 the court noted that both
cases involved needs for "uniform treatment throughout the
state."'0 8 So, too, with the criminal registration scheme
before it in Abbott, where the court concluded: "[i]t is equally
true that any legislation that would deprive a class of citizens
from moving freely between localities within the state is such
10 9
a subject as requires uniform treatment."
Even stronger than Abbott is language from one of the
10 In Chavez the court
cases upon which it relies: Chavez.
considered a local ordinance affecting jurisdictional strikes
1
and union shop or security agreements. ' As with Abbott,
Chavez found that many portions of the challenged ordinance
did indeed duplicate or conflict with specific state legislation
on point." 2 In addition, however, the court noted: "Furthermore, and of significance in impelling a conclusion that no
part of the local ordinance can be effective, is the fact that in
aspects wherein it does not substantially either parallel or
101. See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 349 P.2d 974, 982-83 (Cal. 1960);
Chavez v. Sargent, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (Cal. 1959). See also Tolman v. Underhill,
249 P.2d 280, 283 (Cal. 1952).
102. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 420-21 (Cal.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Chavez, 339 P.2d at 801,
809; In re Porterfield, 168 P.2d 706, 710, 721-23 (Cal. 1946).
103. Abbott, 349 P.2d at 974.
104. Chavez, 339 P.2d at 801.
105. Abbott, 349 P.2d at 976.
106. Tolman, 249 P.2d at 280-82 (regarding University of California loyalty
oaths).
107. Chavez v. Sargent, 339 P.2d 801 (Cal. 1959) (regarding jurisdictional
strikes).
108. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 349 P.2d 974, 982-83 (Cal. 1960).
109. Id. at 983.
110. Chavez, 339 P.2d at 801, 809.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 810, 825-29, 832-34 (Cal. 1959).
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breach specific state legislation it conflicts, as hereinafter explained, with a general legislative declaration of policy."113
Chavez thus involves both "uniform treatment" and conflict
with general policy.
Taken out of context, the "uniform treatment" and "general policy" language from Abbott and Chavez is not too far
from the statements in Water Code sections 104 and 105 that
"the State shall determine" how best to develop the state's
waters.11 4 For two reasons, however, the "uniform treatment" cases do not truly support the groundwater ordinance
challengers' direct conflict theory of preemption. First and
foremost, both cases involved legislative occupation of the
field; thus, they involved "conflict" preemption in the broader,
jurisdictional sense." 5 Second, both cases involved detailed
legislative enactments. For example, in Abbott, the court
noted the "enactment of a detailed scheme by the state Legislature" addressing the "field" of crime prevention and detection. 16 Even in Chavez, although the Legislature had not enacted a "completely detailed scheme of regulation of the
'field,'" it had "declared both a general policy and basic regulations in implementation thereof which.., are fully compre17
hensive of the field."
The strongest language supporting a holding that a general policy statement may preempt local law comes from a
third landmark case: In re Porterfield."" In that case, the
court struck down a City of Redding ordinance that, among
other things, required union organizers to pay a license
tax. 9 The court found that this tax conflicted with the Legislature's declaration in Labor Code section 923 that "the individual workman has full freedom of association, self-organi113. Id. at 809 (citation omitted). To support its conclusion that conflict with
"a general legislative declaration of policy" preempts a local ordinance, the
court cited In re Porterfield, 168 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1946). See also infra text accompanying notes 121-134 for a detailed discussion of Porterfield.
114. By analogy to the legislation in Abbott, local groundwater export ordinances thus appear "to deprive a class of citizens from moving [water] freely
between localities within the state" and thus, the analogy continues, address
such "a subject as requires uniform treatment." Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,
349 P.2d 974, 982-83 (Cal. 1960). See also supra text accompanying note 109.
115. See Abbott, 349 P.2d at 979-81; Chavez, 339 P.2d at 810-11. See also
supra notes 90, 99.
116. Abbott, 349 P.2d at 983.
117. Chavez, 339 P.2d at 810-11.
118. In re Porterfield, 168 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1946).
119. Id. at 722.
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zation, and designation of representation of his own choosing,
to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment
."120 The conflict arose because the tax unduly burdened
workers' exercise of the legislatively recognized freedoms."'
Like Water Code sections 104 and 105, Labor Code section 923, as construed in Porterfield,is a general declaration
of policy. The two sets of statutes share two additional similarities. First, as noted above, the two water code sections
are set forth at the beginning of the Code, helping to introduce fundamental concepts applicable to the code in general. 1 22 Similarly, the first line of Labor Code section 923 unequivocally announces its "introductory" character: "[iun the
interpretation and application of this chapter [concerning
contracts against public policy], the public policy of this State
123 Despite the Legislature's apis declared as follows ...
parent invitation to confine Labor Code section 923,
Porterfield refused to limit the section's scope to the mere "interpretation and application" of this chapter. Rather,
Porterfieldfound preemptive substance in section 923.124 By
analogy, the court could similarly read preemptive substance
into the otherwise introductory policy language of Water
Code sections 104 and 105.
A second similarity between the two sets of statutes
comes from the paucity of implementing legislation. Unlike
12 5
the preempthe legislative schemes in Abbott and Chavez,
tion ruling in Porterfield did not depend upon a "detailed" legislative scheme that implemented broad policy language. By
analogy, the court could similarly read preemptive substance
into Water Code sections 104 and 105, even without a detailed legislative scheme addressing groundwater rights.

120. Id. at 721-22 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1989)). This section
is unchanged from the version construed in Porterfield. Compare 1937 Cal.
Stat. ch. 90, § 923.
121. In re Porterfield, 168 P.2d at 711.
122. See supra text accompanying note 98.
123. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1989).
124. See Porterfield, 168 P.2d at 721-23. See also Chavez v. Sargent, 339
P.2d 801, 819 (Cal. 1959) (Porterfield"established that the policy declared in
§ 923 of the Labor Code is not limited to the interpretation of the chapter of the
code of which that section is a part, but is a general independent declaration of
state policy, and local legislation in conflict therewith is void.").
125. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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Porterfield thus presents the strongest case for basing
preemption on a broad legislative policy declaration. 126 Nevertheless, for at least three reasons, the analogy between Labor Code section 923 and Water Code sections 104 and 105 is
not perfect. First, although Porterfielddid not turn on a preemptive "detailed" legislative scheme, Labor Code section 923
does have at least some companion provisions that implement its broad policy language. 127 Through such companion
provisions, the Legislature reinforced concretely its broad
policy concerns. Such reinforcement, in turn, lends coherence
and substance to the broad policy language. In contrast,
other than A.B. 3030, no statutes implement the "groundwater" references in Water Code sections 104 and 105. The
Legislature's almost total failure to implement the relevant
portions of the two Water Code sections deprives the sections
broad policy language of any reinforcing coherence and sub-

126. Several cases from other jurisdictions also base preemption findings
upon broad policy declarations. Of these, many suggest that an ordinance may
be preempted if it is contrary to the "spirit" of the law or repugnant to the
state's general policy. See, e.g., Fox v. City of Racine, 275 N.W. 513, 514 (Wis.
1937) (regarding dance marathons); City of Marengo v. Rowland, 105 N.E. 285,
286 (Ill. 1914) (examining local blue laws). Of these two cases, however, only
City of Marengo invalidated the ordinance before it. Id. Although that case
cites the "spirit" and 'general policy" language, the preempting state statute
was a specific criminal "disturbing the peace" law, and not a broad policy statement such as California Labor Code § 923. Id. at 286. A more recent Wisconsin
case invalidated a local ordinance requiring landlords to rent to unmarried persons. See County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993). In that case,
the court found the ordinance violated "the public policy of this state which
seeks to promote the stability of marriage and family." Id. at 716. The court
found legislative expressions of this policy in the broad policy language found in
the statute that introduced three chapters of the Wisconsin Statutes. Id. at
716-17 (citing Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2)-(3) (1993)). Although the broad language
of this Wisconsin statute parallels California Labor Code § 923, the Wisconsin
statute introduces three full chapters of related statutes in which that state's
legislature had detailed its policy. Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2)-(3) (1993).
Several New York cases also contain language suggesting that an ordinance is invalid if it contradicts a legislatively declared policy. See, e.g., New
York State Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987),
affd 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding anti-discrimination ordinance). In most of
these cases, however, the Legislature had detailed its policy concerns in specific
statutes. See, e.g., ILC Data Device Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 588 N.Y.S.2d
845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding comprehensive state and federal workplace
safety laws preempted local ordinance).
127. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 921, 1122 (West 1989), construed in Chavez, 339 P.2d at 828. See also Knopf v. Producers Guild of America, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 782, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
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stance. The deprivation is even more apparent given the extensive legislative attention to surface water.
Second, Porterfield and Labor Code section 923 implicate
fundamental, personal constitutional rights. 128 Section 923
expressly mentions "liberty of contract" and "freedom of association." 12 9 The Redding ordinance reviewed in Porterfield
affected constitutionally protected freedom of speech and
3 ° Thus,
rights to engage in a business or economic activity.
even if these fundamental personal liberties did not themselves directly compel the conclusion that Labor Code section
923 preempted the license tax, they provided a powerful context that heightened the court's concerns over the local legislation.' 3 1 In contrast, Water Code sections 104 and 105 do
not occur in the1 32same context of heightened concern over personal liberties.
Finally, Porterfield is now nearly fifty years old.
Although it remains cited by recent cases, 133 outside of Labor
Code section 923, it has not been used recently by the courts
to justify preemption based on legislative statements of
broad, general state policy. Similarly, courts have not cited
recently the "conflict with broad policy" portion of Chavez
that court based upon Porterfield.
The most recent preemption case from the California
Supreme Court that looks at legislative policy statements is
ambiguous about such statements' preemptive effect when
1 34
standing alone. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
the court reviewed the constitutionality of a city ordinance
128. See In re Porterfield, 168 P.2d 706, 714 (Cal. 1946).
129. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1989).
130. Porterfield, 168 P.2d at 719.
131. The court likened the local tax upon union solicitors to a smothering tax
on "breathing." Id. at 722.
132. Actually, in terms of constitutionally protected interests, the analogy to
Porterfield may not be so strained as suggested in the immediately preceding
discussion. In the water-scarce west, the lack of water may "smother" individual property owners and local economies. Government conduct that induces
such scarcity implicates fundamental rights of property ownership and economic association. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, Californians have
constitutionalized the importance of nonwasteful water use. CAL. CONST., art.
X, § 2 (West Supp. 1993). See also infra note 148. The role of the constitutional
amendment is discussed more fully below. See infra text accompanying notes
147-244.
133. See, e.g., County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 of Los Angeles County v. Los
Angeles Employees Ass'n, Local 660, 699 P.2d 835, 853 (Cal. 1985).
134. 610 P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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banning offsite advertising billboards. Among other claims,
the court considered the preemptive effect of the state "Outdoor Advertising Act." 135 One section of that act, Business
and Professions Code section 5226, presented sweeping policy
language similar in scope to the language of Water Code sections 104 and 105.136 On its face, the court found "not clear"
the significance of the policy language: "The section states
broad policy objectives but neither expressly authorizes billboards in business areas nor explicitly limits the authority of
municipalities to prohibit billboards in such areas."137 The
court noted that it could construe section 5226 "literally to
authorize maintenance of billboards in commercial areas despite any contrary local prohibition." 138

Nevertheless, it

found that such an interpretation would conflict with two additional sections of the Outdoor Advertising Act that authorized at least some local regulation of outdoor advertising in
business districts. 139 In summary, the court concluded that
135. See CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-499 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
136. As quoted by the court, § 5226 states:
The regulation of advertising displays adjacent to any interstate highway or primary highway.., is hereby declared to be necessary to promote the public safety, health, welfare, convenience and enjoyment of
public travel, to protect the public investment in such highways, to
preserve the scenic beauty of lands bordering on such highways, and to
insure that information in the specific interest of the traveling public is
presented safely and effectively, recognizing that a reasonable freedom
to advertise is necessary to attain such objectives. The Legislature
finds:
(a) Outdoor advertising is a legitimate commercial use of
property adjacent to roads and highways.
(b) Outdoor advertising is an integral part of the business
and marketing function, and an established segment of the national economy, and should be allowed to exist in business areas,
subject to reasonable controls in the public interest.
CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5226 (West 1990), quoted in Metromedia, Inc., 610
P.2d at 420.
137. Metromedia, Inc., 610 P.2d at 420-21.
138. Id. (footnote omitted). The court did not cite Porterfield.
139. The court cited § 5229 and § 5230. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 420-21 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490
(1981). As quoted by the court, § 5229 states: "The provisions of this chapter
shall not be construed to permit a person to place or maintain in existence ...
any outdoor advertising prohibited by... any ordinance of any city...." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5229 (West 1990), quoted in Metromedia, Inc., 610 P.2d at
421. As quoted by the court, § 5230 states: "The governing body of any city,
county, or city and county may enact ordinances, including, but not limited to,
land use or zoning ordinances, imposing restrictions on advertising displays adjacent to any street, road, or highway equal to or greater than those imposed by
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[v]iewed in context, section 5226 appears to be a statement of policy, adopted to explain why the Legislature enacted a statute providing for the eventual elimination of
outdoor advertising displays [in certain locations, but not
in others] .... The section does not constitute a substantive limitation on the police power of the municipality,
not be construed to preempt municipal
and thus should
140
authority.
The Metromedia, Inc. court's discussion of section 5226
sheds a little light on the general policy-based contradiction
preemption analysis. At a minimum, it demonstrates that
policy statements, standing alone, do not necessarily preempt
local law. Like any other statute, expressions of general policy must be read in context. Beyond those points, however,
Metromedia, Inc. does not resolve directly the interpretation
of Water Code sections 104 and 105. In context, the Metromedia, Inc. court found no preemption because two other
portions of the same act permitted some local regulation. Absent those companion provisions, the Metromedia, Inc. court
acknowledged that it could read the broad policy language of
section 5226 literally to authorize outdoor advertisements of
the type prohibited by the local regulation. 141 Such a reading
would have been consistent with Porterfield.
Unlike Business and Professions Code section 5226,
Water Code sections 104 and 105 have no companion provisions that restrict their broad language. The best evidence of
the context of their enactment remains the Water Code commissioners' comments noted above. 142 The literal source of
the policy language in section 104 comes from a 1921 statute143 that merely authorized the predecessor of the Department of Water Resources to investigate and develop a state
this chapter." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5230 (West Supp. 1979), quoted in
Metromedia, Inc., 610 P.2d at 421. The current version of § 5230 reflects statutory amendments since 1980. Section 5230 now allows tougher local regulation

if the municipality compensates billboard owners. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 5230 (West Supp. 1993). It also now expressly prohibits municipalities from
authorizing billboards prohibited under the statute. Id.
140. Metromedia, Inc., 610 P.2d at 421. In contrast, the court found that
another section of the act at issue did "preempt the San Diego ordinance to a
limited extent." Id.
141. Id. at 420.
142. See supra note 96.

143. Cal. Stats. 1921, ch. 889, p. 1685, § 1.
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water plan.'4 Nothing in that 1921 act otherwise purports to

restrict local regulation of water at all. 145 Similarly, the language in Water Code section 105 also came from an act authorizing a state water plan. 1 46 Thus, in context, neither
Water Code section 104 nor 105 evince legislative intent to
preclude local regulation of groundwater. Rather, these two
broad policy statements simply serve to introduce the public
importance of resource planning. Moreover, they affirm, as
against private rights-holders, the public's claim to regulatory jurisdiction. Unlike the broad policy announced by Labor Code section 923 and confirmed in Porterfield,nothing in
sections 104 and 105 suggests a contradiction-based preemption of local groundwater regulation.
D.

ContradictionPreemption:California Constitution
Article X, Section 2

In addition to the two California Water Code provisions
discussed above, litigants have claimed that the 1928 amendment to the California Constitution, now known as "article X,
section 2," also creates a direct contradiction with local
groundwater regulations. 1 47 In general, article X, section 2,
prohibits wasteful and unreasonable water use.14 8 In addi144. Id. Section 3 of the act stated:
It shall be the duty of the state engineering department to determine
the maximum amount of water which can be delivered to the maximum area of land, the maximum control of flood waters, the maximum
storage of waters, the effects of deforestation and all possible and practicable uses for such waters in the state of California.
Id. § 3. Section 4 of the act required the State Engineer: "Todetermine a comprehensive plan for the accomplishment of the maximum conservation, control,
storage, distribution and application of all the waters of the state, and to estimate the cost of constructing dams, canals, reservoirs or other works necessary
in carrying out this plan .... " Id.
145. Indeed, the only references to localities in the 1921 act speak of cooperation between state and local entities in sharing data, reviewing proposals, and
receiving contributions from "any political subdivision of the state." Id. § 5.
146. 1925 Cal. Stat. ch. 477, § 1.
147. See Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment
at 20-23, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. County of Nevada, No. 35920
(Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Apr. 18, 1989); Plaintiffs' Points & Authorities
in Support of Petition at 17-22, Baldwin v. County of Tehama, No. 34446
(Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., Aug. 11, 1989).
148. This section states in full:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this
State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the
State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are
capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
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tion, the provision states: "the general welfare requires that
the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
It asserts that
fullest extent of which they are capable ....
and for the
people
the
of
water conservation is "in the interest
150 Finally, it expressly, if ambiguously, republic welfare."
and appropriators of the
jects any intent to deprive riparians
15 1
entitled.
are
they
which
to
water
method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such
waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial
use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The
right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such
water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be
served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water
course attach to but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may
be required or used consistently with this section, for the purposes for
which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the
reasonable use of water of the stream to which the owner's land is riparian under reasonable methods of diversion and use, or as depriving
any appropriator of water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled. This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature may also
enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.
CAL. CONST., art. X, § 2 (West Supp. 1993).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id. This declination to deprive rights-holders of their lawful entitlements to water begs the question: to what water are such rights-holders lawfully entitled after the amendment? See Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S.
Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights in California
Water Resources: From Vested Rights to UtilitarianReallocations, 19 PAC. L.J.
1031, 1065-71 (1988); Brian E. Gray, "In Search of Bigfoot": The Common Law
Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 225 (1989).
On its face, this last noted portion of the amendment, coming in its penultimate line, does not expressly eschew any intent to deprive groundwater pumpers, whether holders of overlying or appropriative rights, of their rights to the
water of which they are "lawfully entitled." Indeed, the amendment does not
mention "groundwater" anywhere. Nevertheless, its express, open-ended application to "the water resources of the State" led the courts early on to include
groundwater within the amendment's ambit. See, e.g., Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 494 (Cal. 1935). Nothing in the history of the amendment
suggests an intent to limit groundwater rights, at least not in any way not
otherwise applicable to surface water rights. See Schulz & Weber, supra, at
1065-71 (no mention of groundwater). Absent any indication of an intent to
single out groundwater rights for limitation, such rights should be considered
at least implicitly protected by the referenced language preserving legal entitlements to reasonably exercised riparian rights and lawfully diverted appropria-
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The origins and meaning of the 1928 amendment that
added these provisions has been the subject of some recent
discussion. 152 Whatever its background, its potential sweep
under current interpretations is quite broad. 15 3 Nevertheless, no appellate case has yet applied the constitutional provision in circumstances at all similar to those raised by local
groundwater regulations.
Reduced to their essentials, the ordinance challengers
claim that the export ordinances "hoard" groundwater for local users in violation of the constitution's mandate that water
be put to beneficial uses to the fullest extent possible. 15 4 For
tive rights. At the very least, although it appears in passages that seem to
address only diversions from surface watercourses, arguably the amendment's
reference to appropriative rights encompasses appropriative groundwater
rights. Extension of such protection, whether implicit or explicit, would arguably set up a potential conflict with those local ordinances that appear to restrict
groundwater pumping rights.
152. See Schulz & Weber, supra note 151, at 1065-71; Gray, supra note 151
(article responding to Schulz & Weber article).
153. See, e.g., Ronald B. Robie, The Delta Decisions: The Quiet Revolution in
California Water Rights, 19 PAC. L.J. 1111, 1137-39 (1988); Schulz & Weber,
supra note 151, at 1089-93. See also Imperial Irrig. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
171 (1991).
154. See supra note 97. "Hoard" is intended to connote a retention of supply
beyond that needed for current uses. Constitutionally permissible, i.e., nonhoarding, groundwater uses should include more than mere economic uses. For
example, in recent years, California water law has recognized that beneficial
uses of surface waters for fish, wildlife, aesthetics, and recreation can be consistent with article X, § 2's, mandate that waters be used to "the fullest extent
capable." See, e.g., CAL.WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1993); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725-26 (Cal. 1983). By analogy,
conservation of groundwater to preserve environmental values is equally consistent with the constitutional mandate. Just as it is no longer necessarily
.wasteful" to keep surface water instream for nonconsumptive or noneconomic
beneficial uses, it should not be considered automatically "wasteful" to keep
groundwater in an aquifer if appropriate to maintain surface vegetation or to
prevent land subsidence.
To the extent that local ordinances legitimately aim to preserve such nonconsumptive values, they should survive an article X, § 2 challenge. As used in
this article, "hoarding," however, involves more than mere attempts to keep
water in the ground for nonconsumptive uses. "Hoarding" involves the retention of groundwater solely to protect local economic uses. Such protection may
occur in at least two ways. First, regulations may attempt to prevent the conversion of existing local groundwater uses to groundwater export uses. Second,
regulations may attempt to prevent the initiation of entirely new pumping for
export uses, in order to preserve water for future local economic uses. In individual aquifers, limits of hydrogeological knowledge, coupled with varying perceptions of adequate margins of safety to account for the limited knowledge,
may make difficult the initially regulatory or ultimately judicial task of draw-
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their part, the ordinance supporters have argued that the
regulations are permissible local exercises of police power
that further the constitution's prevention of waste and unreasonable use by filling a regulatory void and preventing unregulated extractions harmful to the groundwater basin and its
users. 15 5 Moreover, the counties might argue that, on their
face, the ordinances generally allow an export if potential exporters comply with permit procedures and receive permit

approval. 156 Again, the criteria for permit approval generally
include factors rationally related to groundwater and basin
conservation. 15 7 Finally, a bolder county might challenge the

very notion that "hoarding" is constitutionally impermissible.
Such a county might argue that groundwater retention is permissible as an effort to preserve a local resource base for future local economic development. Such an unabashedly selfserving argument could draw by analogy from two lines of
authority. First, several opinions allow extensive local regulation of the extraction of water and other natural resources
5 8 Second, the Legislature itcritical to the state's economy.'
59
self has enacted several "area of origin" restrictions.1 By
ing the line between legitimate and illegitimate groundwater retention. Given
the uncertainties over aquifer characteristics in many areas of the state, a danger remains, however, that "hoarding" may well be masquerading as preservation of environmental and other nonconsumptive values.
Some of the economic and policy arguments for and against such "hoarding" are considered in greater detail in Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1. This
section of this article considers the legal power of counties, under article X, § 2,
to restrict groundwater exports for any purpose.
155. See supra note 93. See also In re Maas, 27 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1933).
156. See infra note 232 (ordinances have permit provisions).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 33 P.2d 672 (Cal.
1934) (upholding zoning ordinance restricting residential water well drilling);
City of South Pasadena v. City of San Gabriel, 25 P.2d 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933),
appeal dismissed, 292 U.S. 602 (1933) (upholding nonzoning ordinance granting
discretionary permit authority to restrict residential water well drilling); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 351 (Cal.
1962) (upholding zoning ordinance banning rock and gravel operations); Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.2d 865, 868 (Cal. 1953) (upholding
zoning ordinance banning oil well drilling); 52 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 138 (1969)
(finding zoning ordinance banning commercial logging, mining, quarrying, and
drilling constitutional).
159. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1215-22 ("Area of Origin" law), § 10505
("County of Origin" law), §§ 11460, 11128 ("Watershed Protection" law),
8§12200-04 ("Delta Protection" law) (West 1971 & Supp. 1993). See also generally Robie & Kletzing, supra note 38 (discussing California statutes).
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extension, if the Legislature can so "hoard," then locally initiated "hoarding" might not necessarily be unconstitutional.
To determine whether local groundwater export ordinances "contradict," and are thus preempted by, article X,
section 2, the analysis must examine that section's restrictions, if any, upon local police power regulations that retain
groundwater in a basin. The examination begins by reviewing the extent of the local police power over natural resources
extraction. The article then considers two potential limitations upon this power potentially imposed by article X, section 2. First, it considers whether any local groundwater regulation necessarily contradicts the 1928 amendment's key
provisions against "waste" and "full devotion to beneficial
uses. " 160 Second, assuming that some local groundwater extraction and export regulation is permissible, it considers the
range of permissible local restrictions, including the propriety
of unabashed local groundwater "hoarding."
1. Local Police Power Over Natural Resources
Extraction
At the very least, under the law in effect prior to the 1928
amendment's adoption, the local police power permitted
counties to enact ordinances that prohibited excessive
groundwater pumping. 161 As noted above, counties traditionally have police power as broad as the state's, so long as their
ordinances do not contradict the general laws. 162 Indeed, the
constitution specifically acknowledges that California counties are "legal subdivisions of the state."'6 3 Rossman and
Steel based a county's power to manage groundwater on its

160. Article X, § 2, separately prohibits "waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water...." CAL. CONST., art. X, § 2 (West Supp. 1993).
For convenience, this article ignores any distinctions between these three alternatives, and speaks solely of "waste" or "unreasonable use" interchangeably, to
refer to all three specific constitutional proscriptions.
161. See In re Mass, 27 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1933).
162. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d
1150, 1154 (Cal. 1984).
163. CAL. CONST., art. XI, § 1 (West Supp. 1993).
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16 4
As authority for their
power to regulate the environment.
16 5
Maas.
re
In
position, they cited
Maas involved a challenge to an Orange County ordinance that prohibited the "waste" and "unnecessary flow" of
groundwater from wells. 166 The court easily rejected a challenge that the county lacked police power to conserve
water. 16 7 The court acknowledged that groundwater conservation was "a legitimate field for the exercise of the police
power." 6 ' Following earlier opinions, the court then framed
and answered a two-part test to determine the validity of the
ordinance. First, the court found the ordinance "local" to the
county.' 6 9 Second, the court found that "[tihe ordinance does

164. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 933-35 (citing In re Maas, 27 P.2d
373, 374 (Cal. 1933) (upholding county ordinance prohibiting wasteful groundwater extraction) and Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co.,
112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 854-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding water district's right
to enjoin gravel miner's groundwater pumping that interfered with district's
conjunctive use storage)).
Rossman and Steel also ground the county's police power in "the self-executing mandate of the 1928 amendment to the California Constitution." Id. at
936 (footnote omitted). As noted, that provision banned waste of water and applied reasonable limitations to all water uses. See Schulz & Weber, supra note
151, at 1064-71. Rossman and Steel argue that "local enforcement [of this
amendment] by a political subdivision, such as a county, is appropriate when
the state has not acted." Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 936. In contrast,
ordinance challengers have claimed that the ordinances themselves violate the
amendment by wastefully hoarding water. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment at 21-22, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util.
Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Apr.
18, 1989); Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6-7, Myers v. County of Tehama, No. 34147 (Super Ct. Tehama
County, Cal., Mar. 3, 1993).
165. In re Maas, 27 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1933).
166. Section 3 of the ordinance defined "waste," in effect, as any runoff of
well water that was not used 'for the beneficial purposes of irrigation ... or for
domestic use, or the propagation of fish." Id. at 373. It also banned as 'waste"
excess irrigation runoff, defined as runoff that exceeded five percent of the total
groundwater applied for irrigation. Id. at 373-74. Apparently coincidentally,
Maas was authored by Chief Justice Waste. Id. at 373.
167. Id. at 373.
168. Id. at 374 (citing Ex parte Elam, 91 P. 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907)).
169. Id. (following In re Isch, 162 P. 1026 (Cal. 1917) and People v. Velarde,
188 P. 59, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920)). Discussing the Orange County groundwater
ordinance, the Maas court elaborated: "It is purely local in character and operation, for it seeks to prevent the undue waste of the percolating waters within
the county of Orange, thereby conserving said waters and materially benefiting
the public welfare." Id.
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no violence to any general law of the state to which our attention has been directed."17 °
Decided in 1933, five years after the enactment of article
X, section 2, Maas seemingly supports a conclusion that a
county's police power extends to groundwater extraction regulation. Nevertheless, as the emphasized portion of the last
quotation indicates, the opinion is hardly unequivocal. The
court's nineteen-word discussion of "conflict with the general
laws" 171 gives no hint as to the "general laws" to which its
attention had been directed. Absent from the opinion is any
mention of the 1928 constitutional amendment. 172 As such,
the case is silent about these local powers' post-amendment
survival.

173

Moreover, the opinion itself shows two signs of obsolescence. First, the "general law" addressed to the Maas court in
1933 could not have included Water Code sections 104 and
105 since, as noted, the Code itself was not enacted until ten
years later. 174 Second, current preemption cases involving
county ordinances do not separately analyze the "local" nathey simply look
ture of the ordinance's subject. 175 Rather,
7
1
laws.1
general
the
with
for "conflict"
The Nevada and Tehama County ordinance challengers
seized upon Maas' signs of obsolescence to reduce its impact. 177 Indeed, the recent opinion in the Tehama County
170. In re Maas, 27 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1933) (emphasis added). The quoted
sentence forms the court's entire preemption discussion.
171. Id. at 374.
172. Maas predates by three years Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486 (Cal.
1935). Peabody held that the 1928 amendment applied to groundwater.
The absence of any reference to Water Code § 104 and § 105 is more explainable. The Water Code was not enacted until 10 years later. 1943 Cal.
Stats. ch. 368, § 104. Nevertheless, the statutes upon which the Legislature
based these two code sections had been on the books since the mid-1920's.
173. A case generally stands only for those propositions actually discussed
and necessary to the decision. See, e.g., Stone v. State, 165 Cal. Rptr. 339, 345
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (Watt, J., dissenting). Later courts cautiously review
claims that earlier decisions overruled precedent sub silentio. See, e.g., Karlin
v. Zalta, 201 Cal. Rptr. 379, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), hearing denied.
174. See supra note 172.
175. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d
1150, 1154-55 (Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 929 (Cal. 1990).
176. Id.
177. In the Nevada County litigation, plaintiffs distinguished Maas in several ways. In particular, they argued that the holding in Maas had been overturned by later law, and that Maas failed to discuss article X, § 2 of the California Constitution. Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
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case found Maas outdated by subsequent water legislation.7

s

Nevertheless, by themselves, these two signs of being dated
should not diminish Maas' precedential value. First, as the
preceding section indicated, Water Code sections 104 and 105
do not by themselves directly contradict local groundwater
ordinances.' 7 9 Thus, their post-Maas codification sets up no
additional direct barrier to county legislation. Second, Maas'
separate analysis of the groundwater ordinance's "local" nature should require no reexamination of the "local" or "statewide" nature of groundwater conservation. At first glance,
Maas' "local" test resonates with the confusing distinction between "statewide" and "local" or "municipal affairs."' 8 0 To
that extent, it seems to beg the question, since the characterization of a matter as one of "statewide" concern depends, in
large part, on the Legislature's conduct in acting to displace
state law.' 8 1 Moreover, even on matters of statewide concern,
Judgment at 37-38, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors,
No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Apr. 18, 1989). In addition, plaintiffs argued that the Nevada ordinance impermissibly extended county powers
beyond county borders and discriminated against nonresidents. Id. at 32-38.
The trial court, however, did not address the police power arguments in its
terse decision. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3-4, TruckeeDonnerPub. Util. Dist. (Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Dec. 8, 1988).
Similarly, the plaintiffs in the recent Tehama County litigation also challenged the county's police power to enact its ordinance. In an argument that
was ultimately successful, they, too, distinguished Maas as inapplicable and
outdated. See Plaintiffs Reply to Respondent Brief at 3-4, Myers v. County of
Tehama, No's 34147 & 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Mar. 17, 1993). In
particular, they claimed that the ordinance in Maas attempted to increase the
available supply for water users, while the Tehama ordinance attempts to restrict access to such supplies. Id. at 4. In addition, they claimed that the
Tehama ordinance violates the "regional interest" limitations on local police
powers adopted in the landmark land-use planning case. See Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v.City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976). The trial court did
not reach the Associated Homebuilders argument. Decision, Myers v. County of
Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super Ct. Tehama County, Cal, filed Aug. 11,
1993). The court's discussion of Maas did not rely upon plaintiffs' "supply increase" distinction. Id. at 2.
178. The court stated: "[Maas] precedes the State Water Plan [Water Code]
section 10000 et seq, 1220 et seq and other provisions of the Water Code dealing
with management of water." Decision at 2, Myers v. County of Tehama, Super.
Ct. Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1993).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 92-146.
180. See supra note 87.
181. See, e.g., California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,
812 P.2d 916, 925 (Cal. 1991) (holding that before municipal affairs doctrine
triggered, there must be an actual conflict between a local ordinance and a state
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local governments are free to legislate, so long as their ordinances do not conflict with general law. 1 82 Thus, the question remains: do the groundwater ordinances "conflict with
general law" as developed since Maas? More particularly, the
question Maas leaves unaddressed also remains: do the ordinances contradict the 1928 amendment?
Maas remains the sole appellate case directly construing

the power of counties to regulate wasteful groundwater extraction. 8 3 The closest case involving other local governmental authorities' power over groundwater is Alameda County
Water Dist. v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., Inc.18 4 In Niles, the
court found that a county water district had police power,
under the 1928 amendment, to conserve groundwater.'8 5
Niles, however, involved a public agency that the Legislature
had expressly charged with authority to manage ground-

statute). By extension, if the State has not legislated at all, there can be no
conflict.
182. See, e.g., Bishop v. City of San Jose, 460 P.2d 137, 140-41 (Cal. 1969).
183. In an opinion ultimately depublished, the court of appeal declined to
decide whether state law preempted a county groundwater ordinance. Patterson v. County of Tehama, 235 Cal. Rptr. 867, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), review
denied, ordered not published. Section 11 of that ordinance expressly prohibited the county or any of its subordinate governmental units from restricting
'the rights of the owner of privately owned real property to surface water, percolating water or underground water appurtenant thereto." Id. at 895 n.29.
In County of Colusa v. Strain, 30 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963),
citing Maas, the court upheld the authority of a county to require a permit
before any person changed "the natural course of any channel or waterway." Id.
(citing In re Maas 27 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1933). The defendant, however, apparently
failed to argue that the county lacked authority over water resources. Given
that failure, the court eschewed a detailed preemption analysis. It explained:
Not cited by defendant are various provisions of the Water Code by
which the State has asserted control over water resources, the appropriation and to some extent the diversion of the water. In the absence
of discussion by counsel, we are not disposed to explore this phase of
the matter in any detail. Suffice it to refer to In re Maas, [citation],
holding that the police powers of counties permit them to adopt ordinances for the conservation of water when such ordinances do not conflict with any general law of the State.
Id. Given its admitted refusal to discuss "the matter in any detail," Strain provides only weak support for Maas' continued vitality. Id.
184. Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 112 Cal.
Rptr. 846, 855-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
185. Id. In another portion of the opinion, the court spoke of the district's
"public (and undisputed) duty to prevent waste of underground water in [the
relevant] basin." Id. at 854.
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police power language
water resources.1 6 As such, its1 broad
87
counties.
to
weakly
only applies

Although there is thus a paucity of authority construing
county police power to conserve water resources, several opinions construe municipal power over the extraction of water
and other natural resources. In several zoning cases, the California Supreme Court has upheld local prohibitions of water89 and gravel-quarrying. 190
well-drilling,188 oil-well-drilling'
In Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena,191 the court
considered the combined effects of a zoning ordinance and a
"boiler" ordinance upon a water company's rights to drill a
water well within an area zoned for residential development. 192 The zoning ordinance banned all commercial uses
within that residential area, including the water company's
water production activities. 193 The court concluded that the
local legislative body could properly determine that the commercial activity ban bore "some reasonable relation to the
public interest." 194 In reaching its decision, the court relied
186. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 30000-32200 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993); 1961
Cal. Stat. 4092, ch. 1942. Two additional preemption cases demonstrate the
role that express state authorization to manage water resources gives to statecreated agencies. See Baldwin Park County Water Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, 25 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (holding county ordinance impacting
water supply for fire suppression preempted by water district law); California
Water & Tel. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (holding public utilities regulation of private utilities preempts county
water ordinance).
187. The "county" in "county water district" simply identifies a type of public
agency; it has no necessary legal relation to any of the 58 California counties.
188. See Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 33 P.2d 672, 677 (Cal.
1934).
189. See Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1953); see
also Pacific Palisades Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beach, 237 P. 538, 539 (Cal.
1925) (holding the city has "the unquestioned right to regulate the business of
operating oil wells within its city limits, and to prohibit their operation within
delineated areas and districts, if reason appears for so doing"); cf Marblehead
Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 634 (1931) (finding "there can be no question of the inherent right of
the city to control or prohibit such [oil] production, provided it is done reasonably and not arbitrarily").
190. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342
(Cal. 1962).
191. Sunny Slope Water Co., 33 P.2d at 672.
192. The "boiler" ordinance required a permit before any one could "install,
set up, or commence the operation of any steam boiler." Id. at 673. The water
company needed such a boiler in order to operate its well-drilling rig. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 675.
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upon a similar case, City of South Pasadena v. City of San
Gabriel.'9 5 In City of South Pasadena, the court upheld a
water-well-drilling ordinance that was not tied to a zoning
19 6
scheme.
In Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 1 9 7 the court considered a zoning ordinance that made plaintiffs oil production a nonconforming use and forbade the development of
new wells on its property. The court acknowledged that
"[t]he policy in this state favors the conservation of oil deposits through statutory regulation." 198 It continued: "The people have a 'primary and supreme interest' in oil deposits.
And it is recognized that oil production is a business which
must operate, if at all, where the resources are found." 19 9 Despite this confluence of state statutory regulation, state legislative acknowledgment of the people's "primary and supreme
interest," and recognition that oil must be developed where
found, or not at all, the court concluded: "[n]evertheless city
zoning ordinances prohibiting the production of oil in designated areas have been held valid."20 0 The court found it "well
settled that the enactment of an ordinance which limits the
owner's property interest in oil-bearing lands located within
the city is not of itself an unreasonable means of accomplishing a legitimate objective within the police power of the
city."2 o'
195. 25 P.2d 516, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933), appeal dismissed, 292 U.S. 602
(1933) (upholding water-well-drilling ordinance). The court cited another thenrecent extraction case, Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d
528, 532 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931) (upholding oil-welldrilling ban).
196. City of South Pasadena, 25 P.2d at 517.
197. 254 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1953).
198. Id. at 868 (citation omitted). The court cited chapter 1, division 3, of the
Public Resources Code. Id. (citing CAL. PUB.RES. CODE §§ 3000-473 (West 1984
& Supp. 1993)).
199. Beverly Oil Co., 254 P.2d at 868 (citation omitted). The court also cited
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3400 (West 1984).
200. Beverly Oil Co., 254 P.2d at 868.
201. Id. The court then concluded that the existence of a variance lessened
the actual impact upon the plaintiff. Id. As such, the court found that the
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the ordinance was "an unreasonable,
oppressive or unwarranted interference with property rights" sufficient to invalidate it. Id. at 869. A "variance" is an exemption from general zoning requirements due to the specific circumstances of a particular tract. See Matthews v. Board of Supervisors, 21 Cal. Rptr. 914, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
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In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angethe court upheld another Los Angeles zoning ordinance
that prohibited the plaintiff from using its property for rock,
sand, and gravel operations. The trial court had found that
the property had no economic value for any purpose other
than such quarrying. 2° 3 Despite its own finding that quarrying could be conducted without grave harm to surrounding
residential communities, the trial court deferred to the city
council's determination that quarrying should cease. 2 °4 The
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination. °5
Like the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that this
deference was appropriate because "reasonable minds could
differ" over the necessity of the local legislative determination.20 6 In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly rejected plaintiffs suggestion, based on language from earlier
cases, that local government could only regulate, but not prohibit entirely, natural resources development.20 7
les,2 °2

202. 370 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1962).
203. Id. at 344.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 352.
206. Id. at 347, 351.
207. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 34751 (Cal. 1962). Plaintiffs contended that "where property is primarily or preponderantly valued for the extraction therefrom of a natural resource ... the
legislative authorities may not constitutionally prohibit it altogether, although
they [i.e., plaintiffs] admit that they may otherwise regulate the extraction and
recovery of such natural resources." Id. at 347. The plaintiffs then cited several
cases, including In re Kelso, 82 P. 241, 242 (Cal. 1905). The ConsolidatedRock
court admitted that "there is language in these cases, which pressed to its ultimate conclusion, and divorced from the facts of each particular case in which it
was used, lends color to plaintiff's position." ConsolidatedRock, 370 P.2d at 347
(citing Kelso, 82 P. at 242). ConsolidatedRock distinguished plaintiffs authority. Id. at 347-50. It found that some of plaintiffs cases, such as Kelso, antedated the establishment of comprehensive zoning schemes designed to "protect
others, and the general public, from uses of property which will, if permitted,
prove injurious to others." Id. at 347-48. Finally, the court concluded:
Too many cases have been decided upholding the constitutionality of
comprehensive zoning ordinances prohibiting the removal of natural
products from lands in certain zones for us now to accept at full value
the suggestion that there is such an inherent difference in natural
products of the property that in a case where reasonable minds may
differ as to the necessity of such prohibition the same power to prohibit
the extraction of natural products does not inhere in the legislative
body as it has to prohibit uses of other sorts.
Id. at 351 (citing cases from across the county involving oil and gas, sand and
gravel, and topsoil).
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Based on Beverly Oil and ConsolidatedRock, the California Attorney General opined that Marin County could constitutionally enact an ordinance that prohibited "commercial
logging, mining, quarrying, and drilling, together with all associated uses, activities and structures, in certain areas of the
county."20

The opinion noted the "numerous [state] laws

regulating each of the activities prohibited by the proposed
ordinance." 20 9 Nevertheless, following Beverly Oil and Con-

solidated Rock, it concluded: "these laws do nothing to preclude an otherwise valid zoning ordinance which prohibits
the extraction of the resource in question."210 As Beverly Oil
had concluded that the manifest state interest in oil did not
preclude a valid zoning ordinance prohibiting drilling, so too
did the Attorney General conclude that state legislative expressions of the "public interest in the forest resources and
timberlands of this state" did not "invalidate a zoning ordinance which prohibits logging where such prohibition is
otherwise reasonable." 2 11 Remarkably, the Attorney General

reached this conclusion despite an earlier opinion that the
Legislature had occupied the field of "timber operations."212
The opinion concluded that the ordinance reasonably promoted the "public health, safety, morals, and general welfare."21 3 As a final point, it noted that although the Marin
208. 52 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 138, 139 (1969). Subsection (d) of the ordinance
under review banned [dirilling and the.., removal.., of any solid gaseous or
liquid material naturally occurring or otherwise deposited below the surface of
the ground . . ." Id. Water appears to be within the ordinance's scope.
209. Id. at 139. The opinion cites examples from Public Resources Code provisions governing logging, mining, and drilling. Id. It does not, however, discuss groundwater.
210. Id. at 139-40.
211. Id. at 140 (quoting CAL.PUB. RES. CODE § 4541 (West 1984)).

212. Id. (citing 28 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 190 (1956)). After the earlier opinion,
the Legislature expressly preempted local timber practice regulations. See CAL.
PuB. RES. CODE § 4580 (West 1984). Nevertheless, the Attorney General concluded that this section's preemptive effect did not extend to local zoning ordinances prohibiting timber harvesting altogether. The Attorney General's distinction between preempted regulation of timber practice methods, but
permitted prohibition of any timbering, seems sound. See Higgins v. City of
Santa Monica, 396 P.2d 41, 46 (Cal. 1964) (holding although Public Resources
Code statutes preempt mode and manner in which city may execute tidelands
trust oil leases, they do not preempt the field of determining whether or not
such lands should be developed for oil and gas at all).
213. 52 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 138, 140-41 (1969). The Attorney General noted
that "the scope of these terms, . . .particularly that of 'general welfare' has
grown to include such considerations as conservation, [and] economic effects
.... " Id. at 140. In addition to listing advancement of several environmental

1994]

COHERENT GROUNDWATER POLICY

417

ordinance "appears valid on its face, the extent to which it
can be factually justified and the manner in which it is applied would also weigh heavily in any eventual judicial evaluation of its validity."2 1 4
In combination, Sunny Slope, Beverly Oil, Consolidated
Rock, and the 1969 Attorney General's opinion support
county police power to regulate groundwater extraction. ConsolidatedRock rules that natural resources development does
not receive different regulatory treatment from other economic activity. Beverly Oil and the Attorney General's opinion conclude that state legislative expressions of the public's
interest in resource conservation and development, even
when coupled with an extensive legislative scheme occupying
the field of regulation of that resource's development, do not
preclude local resource development prohibitions. Finally,
the Attorney General's opinion notes that local police power
is broad enough to encompass environmental, resource con2 15
servation, and economic interests.
Although the four opinions seemingly reinforce Maas,
their support is not entirely on point. Maas remains the principal county police power case addressing water conservation.
The other four cases involved not conservation, but "comprehensive zoning ordinances."216 In contrast, the county
groundwater regulation ordinances, while ultimately intimately linked to land use practices, are not enacted under the
general zoning laws. Those zoning laws address the compativalues, the Marin ordinance also listed as a goal prevention of "[a] diminution
generally of private economic incentives for further investment in and development of recreational, residential, and agricultural uses; [and d]estruction or deterioration of public developments or improvements including but not limited to
roads, parks, and marine facilities." Id. at 141 n.4 (quoting proposed MARIN
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 22.43.010 (e)-(f)).
214. Id. at 141.
215. Id. at 140-41.
216. City of South Pasadena,relied upon by Sunny Slope, upheld a waterwell-drilling ordinance enacted apart from any general zoning law. Sunny
Slope Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 P.2d 672, 676 (Cal. 1934) (citing City
of South Pasadena v. City of San Gabriel, 25 P.2d 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933)).
Nevertheless, the City of South Pasadenaopinion uses zoning language to uphold the ordinance before it. City of South Pasadena,25 P.2d at 517. That opinion focuses on the maintenance of a business in a residential area, and not on
questions of water conservation. Id. (holding residential district "entitled . .. to
be protected from the invasion of business establishments which, however lawful, are yet susceptible of a manner of operation injurious to the health, comfort,
or general welfare of its inhabitants").
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bility of different land uses. For their part, the water export
ordinances address the legality of a particular water use
under water rights law, or the reasonableness of that use
under article X, section 2, vis-A-vis other potential water conservation or development options. 2 17 Moreover, the hallmark

of a zoning law is its comprehensiveness: its division of a jurisdiction's entire land surface into specific categories. 218 The
benefits and burdens of compatibility of uses are spread
across the jurisdiction. To date, however, most of the groundwater export ordinances lack any such attempt at comprehensiveness in allocation of benefits and burdens of water
conservation. To the extent that the groundwater ordinances
exempt many local pumpers from any restrictions, or place
harsher restrictions on groundwater exporters, the ordinances may be susceptible to charges of arbitrariness. 2 19 Fi-

nally, Beverly Oil, ConsolidatedRock, and the Attorney General's opinion did not involve water. There remains a strong
feeling that "water is different" from other resources. 220 Re217. Cf CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13700-806 (West Supp. 1993). These statutes
establish minimum water-well-drilling standards to protect aquifers and water
quality, and authorize additional county regulation to protect aquifer quality.
State law thus determines how a well is to be constructed, if a well is otherwise
permissible. The zoning ordinances simply determine whether the maintenance of a well or well-drilling is compatible with the other surface uses. The
groundwater export ordinances under review in this article address other interrelated matters: the acquisition of water rights and the economic or environmental appropriateness of the intended water use. Unlike the zoning or welldrilling standards laws, these latter issues necessarily involve an entirely different inquiry: a comparison of the intended water use vis-h-vis other actual or
potential water uses. This inquiry necessarily implicates the statewide concerns with water resource allocation and triggers the preemption analysis quite
apart from questions involving the legitimacy of a zoning or an aquifer-protection ordinance.
218. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d
342, 347-48, 351 (Cal. 1962) (discussing constitutionality of "comprehensive"
land use plans).
219. See infra text accompanying notes 239-244.
220. See, e.g., Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (Cal. 1933) ("The
conservation of other natural resources is of importance, but the conservation of
the waters of the state is of transcendent importance."). See also Decision at 3,
Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County,
Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1993) ("This court believes that it must be understood that
water is unique."); Schulz & Weber, supra note 151, at 1102-05 (discussing the
"water is different" syndrome). Whether justified or not, water has received
different treatment from other resources, particularly because it is not priced in
conventional markets. These differences form some of the rationalizations for

the area of origin laws. See, e.g.,
FOR THE FUTURE

NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES
NAT'L WATER COMM'N].

323-24 (1973) [hereinafter,

1994]

COHERENT GROUNDWATER POLICY

419

gardless of the legitimacy of the support for this "feeling,"
water is legally different from other resources in one critical
respect: only water has a specific constitutional provision
mandating its "beneficial use to the fullest extent possible." 22 1 Like Maas, Sunny Slope was decided after the enactment of the 1928 amendment, but does not address its possi2 2 The inquiry thus
ble application to a well-drilling ban.2
returns to the question left hanging by Maas: do local groundwater ordinances contradict article X, section 2?
2. Local GroundwaterRegulation After Article X,
Section 2
As noted above, nothing in the history leading up to the
enactment of the 1928 amendment demonstrates any particular concern over the amendment's application to groundwater
rights. 22 3 Similarly, nothing in that history suggests that
the amendment was meant to restrict local police power over
groundwater.2 2 4 Rather, the amendment seems to have
made two changes to the course of California water rights.
First, as between private rights-holders, the amendment clarified that the reasonable use doctrine applied to disputes between riparians and appropriators.2 2 5 Second, as broadly in2 26
terpreted in Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, as between all
water rights holders and the public, the amendment asserted
2 2 7 Absent any
the public's police power over water resources.
indication that the amendment was meant to restrict the lo221. CAL.

CONST.,

art. X, § 2 (West Supp. 1993).

222. Notably, the Sunny Slope court stated: "We are not here presented with
a situation where the only water bearing area available for [the water company's] purposes has been zoned for residential purposes. Such a situation
would present questions not involved in this appeal." Sunny Slope Water Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 33 P.2d 672, 677 (Cal. 1934). On the one hand, the court
may have merely been considering the "takings" implications of the complete
deprivation of a business activity. Cf. Consolidated Rock, 370 P.2d at 347-51
(holding even severe natural resource development restrictions did not amount
to regulatory taking). On the other hand, the "other questions" could well include the reasonableness, under article X, § 2, of a municipality's complete denial of access to an aquifer. In the case before it, the court noted that the water
company involved owned drilling rights to 130 acres of land beyond the city
limits that overlay the same aquifer. Id.
223. See supra note 151.
224. See Schulz & Weber, supra note 151, at 1065-71 (no mention of local
police power restrictions).
225. See id. at 1055-58, 1064-65.
226. 22 P.2d 5, 16 (Cal. 1933).
227. Id. In oft-quoted language, the court expounded:
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cal exercise of police power over water resources, unless local
ordinances contradict specific constitutional text, courts
should not presume a conflict with local ordinances.228
Even if the passage of the amendment did not presumptively displace local power over groundwater resources, litigants have claimed that local legislative efforts necessarily
contradict several of the amendment's critical provisions. In
particular, they have claimed that the ordinances contradict
both the proscription of waste and unreasonable use, and the
prescription that state waters "be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable." 2 29 Litigants might

also base an additional challenge on the portion of the
amendment eschewing any intention to deprive appropriaIn the main, [the amendment] is an endeavor on the part of the people
of the state, through its fundamental law, to conserve a great natural
resource .... The conservation of other natural resources is of importance, but the conservation of the waters of the state is of transcendent
importance. Its waters are the very blood of its existence. The police
power is an attribute of sovereignty and is founded on the duty of the
state to protect it citizens and provide for the safety, good order, and
well being of society. It is coextensive with the right of self-preservation in the individual.
Id. (emphasis added).
This quotation, and other portions of the passage, do speak collectively of
"the state," "the people of the state," "our rivers and streams," "the great and
increasing population of the state," "the conservation of the waters of the state,"
"[the state's] waters are the very lifeblood of [the state's] existence," "the duty of
the state to protect its citizens.. . ." Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, nothing in the passage addresses the intramural division of police power between
the State and its political subdivisions. Any such discussion would have likely
been dicta, since Chow involved a dispute between downstream riparians and
an upstream appropriator. See Schulz & Weber, supra note 151, at 1072-73
(arguably, much of the police power language also dicta). Similarly, the Chow
court's statement that the amendment's adoption "superseded all state laws inconsistent therewith," Chow, 22 P.2d at 16, merely states a truism: any legislation, whether local or state, that conflicts with the article is necessarily unconstitutional. It says nothing about whether all local water conservation
legislation necessarily contradicts the amendment.
228. This discussion foreshadows the discussion of "occupation of the field."
See infra text accompanying notes 263-326. As discussed there, even if there is
no direct textual contradiction between the amendment and local groundwater
ordinances, the amendment informs that portion of the implied preemption
analysis that looks to the manifest strength of the state's interest in a subject
and the inability to tolerate local regulation.
229. Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment at 22,
44, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super.
Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Apr. 18. 1989)); see also Plaintiffs Points & Authorities
in Support of Petition at 17-22, Myers v. County of Tehama, No. 34147 (Super.
Ct. Tehama County, Cal., Mar. 3, 1993).
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tors of "water to which the appropriator is lawfully
entitled."2 3 o
The local legislative efforts to regulate groundwater ex23
ports demonstrate a wide variety of statutory schemes. '
Yet for purposes of assessing their constitutionality under the
1928 amendment, the range of local legislative goals implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, breaks down into three broad
interests: protection of aquifer and environmental values,
protection of existing rights-holders, and protection of the local economy. Similarly, the range of local legislative methods
to obtain these goals breaks down into two main groups: permit schemes and outright pumping prohibitions. Given the
variety of the ordinances, a complete analysis of each is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, this portion of
the article considers whether these local legislative goals and
means contradict the amendment's operative passages.
Construction of two hypothetical ordinances, at opposite
ends of a means-and-ends continuum, will focus the discussion. At one extreme, the likeliest ordinance to survive a facial challenge under article X, section 2 would be a comprehensive permit scheme that sought to prevent overdraftinduced aquifer or environmental damage.2 3 2 At the other
extreme, the toughest ordinance to justify would be a self-

230. See supra note 151.
231. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. See also generallyPatchwork Quilt, supra note 1, at § IV (surveying ordinances in detail).
232. All the ordinance schemes have some provisions for permits and can be
read to prevent some aquifer or environmental harm. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 33-4 (permit required), id.§ 33-7 (aquifer protection); GLENN
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.410 (permit required), id. § 20.04.440 (aquifer protection); IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES N]id.§ 56300 (aquifer
protection), id. § 56302 (permit required), id. § 56213 (private rights unaffected); Inyo County, Cal., Referendum Measure A (approved Nov. 1980), adding § 7.01.010 (aquifer protection), id. § 7.01.040 (permit required) MODOC
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.08.020 (permit required), id. § 13.08.060 (aquifer protection); NEVADA COUNTY, CAL., LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ L-X 6.1
(aquifer protection), § 6.3 (permit required); SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 15.08.095 (permit and aquifer protection); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 9.40.030 (permit required), id. § 9.40.060 (aquifer protection). Nevertheless,
as discussed more fully below, they demonstrate an enormous range of comprehensiveness, i.e., inclusion of varying classes of pumpers. At least on its face,
the Inyo County ordinance, applicable in part to all county pumpers, is the most
comprehensive effort to date.
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avowedly local protectionist ordinance that burdened only
out-of-county exporters.23 3
a. Comprehensive Environmental Protection
Ordinance
A comprehensive environmental or aquifer protection ordinance should withstand a facial challenge that it contradicts the 1928 amendment's "waste," "full use," and "private
rights protection" clauses. The stated purposes, i.e., to prevent aquifer damage or environmental harm from excessive
pumping, do not contradict any of the amendment's three operative clauses under consideration.23 4 As for "waste," the ordinance's avowed purpose seeks to prevent wasteful
overpumping that causes demonstrable harm to public and
private values. Nothing suggests that the 1928 amendment
was meant to shield local pumpers from either the law of nuisance or local police powers to address actual or threatened
nuisances. Similarly, as for "full use," nothing suggests that
retention of water in an aquifer to prevent subsidence or vegetative loss is not a beneficial use. 235 Finally, as for private
rights to pump groundwater, they are by no means unlimited.
233. Although not nearly as extreme as the hypothetical ordinance, portions
of the Tehama County ordinance are the most similar. For example, the ordinance's largely unintelligible mining ban applies only to those pumpers who
will export groundwater from the county. See TEHAmA COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 9.40.020 (mining ban applies only to out-of-county exporters); see also Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1. Similarly, although the ordinance's uncodified preamble does devote considerable attention to the county's environmental concerns, it is more explicit than most in its attention to preservation of the local
economy. Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1552, 1-7 (Feb. 4, 1992). As initially enacted, however, several other portions of the ordinance demonstrated
far greater comprehensiveness than most other counties' efforts. See, e.g.,
TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.030 (permits required of all pumpers who
use water on a parcel other than on, or contiguous to, the parcel where extracted), id. § 9.40.040 (no pumper may extend the radius of influence of a well
beyond the lines of the parcel where extracted, or a contiguous parcel). Soon
after the ordinance's initial enactment, however, the county council greatly reduced its comprehensiveness by enacting a grandfather clause that shielded all
pre-1992 pumpers from these last requirements. See Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1553, § 1 (Feb. 18, 1992).
234. Of course, as noted below, the circumstances surrounding the enactment or application of such an ordinance may call into question the bona fides
of the local legislature's stated purposes, or the necessity of the ordinance's enactment. See infra text accompanying notes 465-466. See also 52 Ops. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 139, 142 (1969) (holding that even where facially permissible, local
ordinance's reasonableness prevents fact questions upon application).
235. See supra note 154.
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Rather, the very laws governing acquisition of private rights
to pump groundwater restrict pumpers from unfettered
pumping.23 6
As for the ordinance's means, a comprehensive permit requirement, applicable to all pumpers, would also seem to survive facial challenge. Permit schemes have frequently been
upheld when challenged as facially unconstitutional, arbi23 7 A requirement that a
trary deprivations of private rights.
pumper obtain a permit before pumping is no more "wasteful"
than the state-administered permit scheme for surface diversions. 238 The state scheme's constitutionality remains unquestioned. Similarly, the state surface water appropriative
scheme belies any claim that a local groundwater permit
scheme necessarily prevents use of water "to the fullest extent" possible. Finally, a comprehensive scheme, such as the
comprehensive zoning schemes upheld in Sunny Slope, Beverly Oil, and ConsolidatedRock, can further inoculate the ordinance from charges of arbitrariness. Such a scheme rationally spreads the burdens and benefits of groundwater
regulation across the full spectrum of local society. In sum,
this hypothetical ordinance should survive a facial challenge
that it inherently contradicts article X, section 2. On its face,
it does not permit waste, unreasonable water use, or private
rights' impairment.
Of course, none of the ordinances enacted to date present
our ideal construct. The most telling objection to most of the
county schemes lies not in their stated purposes, but rather
in their means. In some instances, however, the means chosen call into question the bona [ides of the stated purposes.
Most of the ordinances enacted to date are under-inclu239 they place
sive, not over-inclusive. With a few exceptions,
their principal or only regulatory burdens on appropriators:
pumpers who use the water on land not overlying the basin.
236. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 10-22.
237. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261, 289 (Cal. 1984) (denying facial challenge to Berkeley rent control ordinance where procedures permitted rent control authority to make individual adjustments that avoided confiscatory results).
238. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1250-1450 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993).
239. For example, several of the ordinances, such as those of Inyo, Nevada,
Butte, and Tehama, place some burden-usually a permit requirement--on incounty users who will be using the water on land not overlying the basin. See
supra note 232.
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Although at least some in-county appropriators need permits
in some of the schemes,2 4 ° overlying owners and users, to a
large extent, remain free to pump without any local over-

sight.241 In three counties, the regulatory burden is more
squarely placed on an even more limited class of pumpers:
appropriators for export beyond the county lines.2 4 2 Such a
distinction between those appropriations for use in and out of
the county appears to be based solely on the preservation of a
local economic base. Absent a legitimate,2 43 conservationbased rationale for this distinction between in-county and
out-of-county appropriations, these county-based export restrictions seem to exist primarily to retain resources for existing or future local uses. To this extent, they do appear to
violate the constitution's express requirement that water be
put to its fullest use possible.2 4 4
240. BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-4 (permit required for water use
"outside of area in which said pumping affects the natural available supply");
IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 56201 ("appropriator" uses
water outside of "area of influence" of extraction), id. § 56302 (appropriators
need permits); Inyo County, Cal., Referendum Measure A (approved Nov. 1980),
adding § 7.01.040 (permit required to extract water); MODOC COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 13.08.020 (permit required to take water out of defined areas); NEVADA
COUNTY, CAL., LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT CODE § L-X 6.2(D) ("groundwater export" defined as "removal ...to any place outside the immediate groundwater
basin"), id. § 6.3 (permit required to "export" groundwater); TEHAMA COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 9.40.030 (permit required to use water anywhere but on parcel
overlying or contiguous to parcel where extracted).
241. The Nevada County ordinance expressly announces: "It is not the intent
of this ordinance to affect the withdrawal or use of groundwater by an overlying
landowner or occupier which withdrawal is for domestic use or irrigation on the
overlying parcel." NEVADA COUNTY, CAL., LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT CODE § LX 6.1. To date, only the Inyo ordinance substantially burdens overlying owners.
See infra note 244. The Tehama "radius of influence" provision may also impact
some overlying pumpers by preventing them from extending their wells' cone of
depression beyond their property lines. TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 9.40.040. The later-enacted grandfather clause, however, greatly restricts the
practical effect of this burden, as it exempts all overlying owners who were
pumping prior to the ordinance's enactment. Id. § 9.40.045.
242. See, e.g., GLENN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.400 (groundwater "mining"
banned only if water taken outside of county), id. § 20.04.410 (permit required
only if groundwater taken from county); SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 15.08.095 (permit required only if groundwater taken out of county); TEHAMA
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.020 ("mining" banned only if water taken from
county).
243. As used here, "legitimate" denotes a non-hoarding purpose. See supra
note 154.
244. In this light, the Inyo ordinance is instructive. On its face, it requires
all extractors to comply with well registration and extraction report requirements. Thus, the City of Bishop, an in-county municipal extractor, must also
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Although such "hoarding" is constitutionally suspect, a
local legislative decision to regulate only appropriators, and
not overlying owners, more easily withstands a facial challenge under article X, section 2. The current law of private
groundwater rights places a practical burden of preventing
245
overdraft, however defined, upon a prior rights-holder.
Without a centralized, state-supervised appropriation permit
system, anyone is free to extract from the basin. An overlying
owner or prior appropriator who wishes to challenge the subsequent appropriation must do so by filing a lawsuit. Even if
the burden of determining "surplus" water is on the subsequent appropriator, the initiation of a lawsuit represents a
major commitment of time and resources by the prior rightsholder. These practical burdens are a major disincentive to
stop overpumping a basin; as a result, the current system encourages potential "waste" and "unreasonable use," in violation of the 1928 amendment, by failing to provide a procedure
for readily establishing the availability of water for export.
In contrast, a permit procedure required of all potential
appropriators within a county would run the risk of discouraging water development by potential appropriators who
would first have to bear the cost of hydrogeological or other
studies necessary to establish the availability of water for appropriation (and ultimate "export.") In such a scheme, resource development will occur only if the benefits of the extraction exceed the extraction and transaction costs spent to
obtain the rights. Given a choice between "under-regulation"
and corresponding wasteful overdevelopment in a basin, and
"over-regulation" with corresponding wasteful underdevelopment, a county could rationally determine that the long-term
consequences of potential overdevelopment are worse than
potential underdevelopment. With overdevelopment, the
water is lost forever. Moreover, permanent environmental or
aquifer damage may occur. In contrast, with underdevelopment, at least the water still remains in the ground. Ultimately, as groundwater development continues throughout
comply with the permit process. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 944. However, then provides a de minimis exemption from the extraction permit review.
INYo COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.070 (1980). These exemptions make the
county's principal extractor, the City of Los Angeles, one of the only extractors
that had to comply with the permit process. Of course, it is no coincidence that
the city is the principal groundwater exporter from the county.
245. See supra text accompanying note 24.

426

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

the state, more and more basins may well be pushed to adjudication. At that point, all extractors, both appropriators and
overlying users, face substantial transaction costs in establishing their rights. A county could well conclude that appropriators, who have no practical place-of-use limitations on the
amount of water they can extract, are the class most likely to
encourage overdevelopment and, ultimately, prompt basin
adjudication. As such, it would be reasonable to require such
appropriators to bear the transaction costs up front, at the
initiation of their appropriation.
Of course, overlying users are entirely capable of overdrafting a basin themselves. A county permit scheme only for
appropriators would not necessarily solve the long-term
problems of under-regulating groundwater extractions in all
basins. Nevertheless, it is not entirely irrational to begin to
regulate by requiring appropriators to obtain a permit. The
potential arbitrariness under the 1928 amendment of the
three noted current schemes stems from the requirement
that only extractors who use the water outside of the county
of extraction bear the regulatory load.
b. Avowedly Protectionist "Hoarding"Ordinance
Does an avowedly protectionist local legislative effort to
"hoard" groundwater for future local economic development
by prohibiting all out-of-county exports necessarily contradict
the 1928 amendment's "waste," "fullest use," or "private
rights" provisions? In effect, such an ordinance would be a
locally enacted "area of origin" provision, attempting to reserve water for future development.246 A bold county might
attempt to justify the avowedly protectionist elements of its
ordinance by coupling police power language from the zoning
cases with the existence of several state area-of-origin statutes. 24 7 As in the preceding construct, both the legislative

goals and the means of such an ordinance must withstand a
constitutional challenge.248
246. See Robie & Kletzing, supra note 38 (California state area-of-origin
statutes).
247. Even the foremost champions of local groundwater regulation suggest
that such an absolute export ban would likely contradict the "fullest extent"
provision. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 933 n.184.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 234-245.
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Is reservation of water for future local economic development a constitutionally legitimate goal for local legislation?
Such a goal is implicit in the State Legislature's area-of-origin provisions. The California Attorney General concluded
24 9
that state area-of-origin legislation was constitutional.
Implicit in that opinion is that it does not "waste" water or
impede its "fullest use" to allow rural areas to use water that
might otherwise be put to higher economic use in other areas
of the state. Similarly, as discussed above, the Attorney General also noted that economic development is a legitimate
goal of local police power.25° If protecting the local economy
is a normal task for local legislative bodies, and if state legislation that reserves water for certain areas is constitutional,
then a local "hoarding" ordinance does not appear to fail for
lack of a proper purpose. Any such invalidity must, then,
come from the means chosen to implement the legislative
goals.
The three earliest state area-of-origin provisions-the
County of Origin, the Watershed of Origin, and the Delta Protection Acts 251-bear little resemblance to a county's absolute
export ban. Rather, in their cryptic provisions, they allow
priority to
relevant counties or watershed areas some limited
25 2 Unlike an exneeds.
receive water sufficient to meet their
port ban, these three acts do not legally impede development
of the water, or its use in some area outside of the area of
origin, prior to that area's actual need for the water. Moreover, unlike a local export ban, these three initial acts were
part of the statewide plan for water resources development
that produced the State Water Project and the Central Valley
Project. 2

3

The State Legislature might well have concluded

that sufficient water existed for everyone in the state, and
that it needed to be moved from areas of surplus to areas of
249. 25 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 8, 25-26 (1955). The Attorney General based
need in
that conclusion on the availability of the water for interim uses prior to
the areas granted preference. Id. at 26. Riparian rights, with their limitations
of water use to the riparian lands, also function as an area-of-origin restriction.
See NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 220, at 323. The provisions of article X,
§ 2 that protect riparian rights expressly shield that area-of-origin restriction
from a challenge that it impedes "fullest use." See supra note 151.
250. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
§ 11460
251. CAL. WATER CODE § 10505 (county of origin) (West 1971), id.
protection).
(delta
12200-04
(watershed of origin), id. §
252. See, e.g., Robie & Kletzing, supra note 38, at 431-38.
253. See 25 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 8, 9-27 (1955).
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scarcity, but that areas of plenty should not be unfairly deprived of the later opportunity to share in the state's natural
bounty.254 In contrast, a local export ban appears to succumb
to a claim that it locks up water in violation of the "waste" or
"fullest use" provisions of the state constitution.255
The State Legislature's 1984 enactment of Water Code
section 1220, however, suggests that export bans may be an
appropriate exercise of the police power. As noted above, in
that section, the Legislature prohibited the pumping of
groundwater for export from within the "combined Sacramento Valley/Delta Central Sierra Groundwater Basin."256
Three conclusions about the constitutionality of export bans
are thus possible. First, such bans might facially contradict
the constitution's "fullest use" provision, and thus are invalid,
whether enacted by the State or by local legislatures. Second,
at the opposite extreme, Water Code section 1220 could establish that "fullest use" requires neither most efficient nor
most (temporally) immediate use.257 Such an interpretation
would defer to a legislative determination that the "public
welfare" required the ban.258 If the State wished to prevent
local legislative export bans, it could simply enact its own legislation that preempted the field. Until such time, local legislative bodies could be free to enact their own export bans similar to Water Code section 1220. Finally, Water Code section
254. See Robie & Kletzing, supra note 38, at 424-25, 429. Unless manifestly
unreasonable, courts will defer to legislative determinations of "reasonable" use
under article X, § 2. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
255. See, e.g., Robie & Kletzing, supra note 38, at 424-25 nn.28-29. Under
any interpretation, a local export ban would likely not violate the "private
rights" provisions, since water could otherwise be pumped and used within the
county. Although the principal market for such water might well be outside the
county, it is hard to imagine that land overlying groundwater would otherwise
lose all of its value if an export market were denied. Absent such a deprivation,
it is difficult to see how a local export ban would trigger a compensable "taking."
256. See supra note 50.
257. No court has ever held that article X, § 2 required the most efficient
water use possible. See Big Bear Municipal Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mutual
Water Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 757, 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Schulz & Weber, supra
note 151, at 1062-64, 1078-81. Arguably, if economic efficiency were required
under the constitution, the entire nonmarket system of allocating water rights
might fail.
258. See California Trout, Inc., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (holding unless manifestly unreasonable, legislative determination entitled to deference under article X, § 2). Compare Consolidated Rock Prod. Co, v. City of Los Angeles, 370
P.2d 342 (Cal. 1962), discussed supra text accompanying notes 202-207.
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1220 might be constitutional, but local export bans might be
unconstitutional.25 9 On its face, section 1220(a) does not enact a permanent export ban. Rather, it bans only exports
that are not in compliance with a local groundwater manage-

ment plan. 260 As such, it is but a temporary part of a state-

approved regional effort to manage the important groundwater resource. Moreover, as a state legislative enactment, it
represents but an additional step in the Legislature's extensive statutory efforts to determine how best to devote the
state's water "to its fullest extent." Again, a local export ban
lacks any semblance of comprehensive legislative adjustment
of water development. As a permanent restriction, a local export ban potentially locks up resources forever. Finally, unlike section 1220, a pure "hoarding" ordinance does nothing to
encourage basin management.
A complete analysis of the constitutionality of the state
area-of-origin protections is beyond the scope of this article.
Accordingly, since Water Code section 1220 provides at least
superficial support for a local export ban, determination of
the constitutionality of such local bans will have to wait.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of that issue, the enactment of section 1220 certainly complicates the analysis. Of
the three scenarios sketched above, local export bans fail in
all but one. Most likely, a pure "hoarding" ordinance would
fail for the reasons noted in the third possibility. A permanent resource lock-up, without any incentives for "management," and without any attempt at a comprehensive resource
development scheme, should violate the constitution's
"waste" and "fullest extent" provisions.
The preceding discussion thus denotes two ends of a continuum to examine the potential contradictions between the
1928 amendment and the local ordinances. All of the ordinances to date fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum. Beyond this brief facial review of the broad outlines of
the eight ordinances, generalizations about their constitutionality are difficult; they demand separate analyses upon
separate fact patterns. Nevertheless, some broad conclusions
i.e., local
259. It seems inconceivable how the converse might ever be true;
unconstitutional.
is
1220
§
but
export bans are constitutional
the
260. In practice, for groundwater-rich counties jealous of their supplies,
laws.
management
groundwater
ban may be a major disincentive to enacting
See Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1.
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seem possible. First, an outright export ban, without a permit process or an extremely sound and documented conservation or environmental protection rationale, seems unenforceable as impermissible hoarding under the 1928 amendment.
Beyond that extreme, courts should look with great skepticism at the position that export bans take in the local groundwater regulatory schemes. The lesser the burden on in-district users, and the greater the relative burden on out-ofdistrict users, the more suspicious the courts should be that
the local regulatory body is impermissibly hoarding water.
Similarly, the faster the local regulatory body adopts export
restrictions without trying other management options, the
more likely it is that the local bodies are impermissibly
hoarding water that the constitution demands be made available to all potential users within the state.
Although courts should approach county groundwater
export restrictions with a healthy dose of skepticism, nothing
within article X, section 2 necessarily conflicts with evenhanded, well-crafted, local groundwater regulation. Ultimately, the Legislature should assume a much larger role in
framing a coherent policy on groundwater extraction, use,
and transfer.261 Until such action occurs, barring a determination that general law has otherwise occupied the field of
groundwater regulation,262 counties should be free to attempt to solve problems of waste and unreasonable water
use. Although this article ultimately concludes that such occupation of the field has occurred, the textual case for such
preemption is slim and ultimately depends upon judicial willingness to declare state policy. If a court were to reject the
"occupation" analysis, then a county should remain
free
under article X, section 2 to conserve groundwater. In such
circumstances, local regulatory solutions might include a permit procedure whereby an extractor who otherwise would
have appropriative rights under state law bears the initial
burden of establishing the availability of water for extraction.
Under such a scheme, if the county treated all off-basin
places of use equally, and looked solely to the availability of
water for appropriation, the county would be preventing the
possibility that a basin might become overdrafted simply because no single overlying owner wished to undertake the time
261. See id.
262. See infra text accompanying notes 264-326.

1994]

COHERENT GROUNDWATER POLICY

431

and expense of a lawsuit challenging the potential
appropriation.
E. Implied Preemption by Occupation of the Field
In addition to express and contradiction-based preemp"occution, preemption may occur where the Legislature has
2 6 3 The
legislation.
local
pied the field" to the exclusion of
Legislature may occupy a regulatory field expressly or implicitly.2 64 Here, there is no statute by which the Legislature has

expressly occupied the field to the exclusion of local regulation. Thus, the only remaining grounds for preemption is implicit legislative occupation of the regulatory field.
Under longstanding law, three tests exist to determine
implied occupation of the field:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2)the subject matter has
been partially covered by general law couched in such
terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or
(3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of
the possible benefit to the
the state outweighs
2 65
municipality.

Two of these three tests do not help determine the validity of
the groundwater export ordinances. The third test-adverse
impact on transient citizens-simply has no application to
county groundwater regulation. Although "transient" is
vague enough to invite judicial interpretation, and the mobility of Californians is legendary, the Supreme Court has kept
266 Under these narrow conthis third test narrowly confined.
and
263. See Lancaster v. Superior Court, 494 P.2d 681, 682 (Cal. 1972),
supra note 87.
P.2d
264. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683
1990).
(Cal.
929
F.2d
909
grounds,
other
on
rev'd
1982),
(Cal.
1150, 1155
1964)); ac265. Id. at 1155 (quoting In Re Hubbard, 396 P.2d 809, 814 (Cal.
1969).
(Cal.
935-36
930,
P.2d
452
Court,
Superior
v.
cord Galvan
to the
266. In most cases, the court simply notes this test's inapplicability
Supervisors,
of
Bd.
County
Solano
v.
Corp.
IT
in
example,
case before it. For
order
820 P.2d 1023 (Cal. 1991), the court upheld a local planning commission's
considering
In
facility.
waste
hazardous
a
of
closure"
requiring a "clean
simply
whether state laws implicitly preempted the local order, the court
effect
undue
order's
challenged
the
of
issue
no
is
there
course,
stated: "Here, of
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fines, transients simply are no more affected by the county
on 'transient citizens.'" Id. at 1028. In Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 844 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1993), the court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
the sale of spray paint to minors and requiring retailers to post signs warning of
criminal sanctions for graffiti. Again, the court simply stated:
Whether the statute partially covers the subject matter, however specified, proves to be of no consequence. This is because neither the prevention of graffiti nor the retail display of aerosol paint and broadtipped marker pens is a "matter in which transient citizens of the state
are peculiarly concerned, as they are or might be in regulation of traffic
or registration of criminals."
Id. at 542 (quoting In re Hubbard, 396 P.2d 809, 814 (Cal. 1964) (finding gambling and gaming house regulations not matters that concern transients)). See
also County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d at 1157 (holding ordinance governing herbicide application "has little effect on transient citizens, and it cannot be concluded that the effect on them outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality"); Candid Enters., Inc. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 705 P.2d 876,
882 (Cal. 1985) (regarding school development fees: "Petitioner concedes, as it
must, that the imposition of the [fees] does not satisfy the third test" (emphasis
added)); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 777 P.2d 157, 167 n.16 (Cal. 1989) ("Nor is there even an alleged
adverse effect on transient citizens.").
The most recent California Supreme Court cases addressing this third test
in any detail are Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 707 P.2d 840, 854 (Cal. 1985)
and Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261, 311 (Cal. 1984). In Cohen, the
court partially upheld an ordinance requiring escort services to obtain licenses.
Cohen, 707 P.2d at 854. The court began its discussion of the third test in typical conclusory fashion, finding it "clear" that the test did not apply. Id. The
court then continued:
The legislative history also provides some guidance on this question.
As Chief Murphy's letter of May, 1981, to the mayor reveals, there
have been several instances where escort service employees have committed thefts against tourists. Thus, the ordinance may very well have
some positive impact on the "transient citizens of the state" since it
provides a means for identifying suspects in the event criminal activity
is alleged to have occurred while escort services were being provided.
Moreover, any negative impact occasioned by the period of time necessary to secure an escort permit before engaging in the business is
shared by transients and residents of the city alike.
Id. Similarly, in Fisher, the court upheld major portions of the Berkeley rent
control ordinance. Fisher,693 P.2d at 311. The court first concluded that the
ordinance's exemptions of hotels and other temporary lodgings shielded transients from most of the ordinance's impact. Id. In addition, "to the extent that
transients might be affected, the [rent] withholding provision would likely have
a positive effect, because it would help assure prospective newcomers that established maximum housing rents will be enforced." Id.
The modest discussion in Cohen and Fisher, together with the quick dismissal of the issue in most cases, demonstrates that this third test literally
applies almost exclusively to travelers and tourists. Cf Abbott v. City of Los
Angeles, 349 P.2d 974, 983 (Cal. 1960) (holding criminal registration requires
uniform treatment because it "would deprive a class of citizens from moving
freely between localities within the state").
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groundwater regulations than non-transients.267 Similarly,
the first test has little application, either. In applying this
test, the courts look to whether the Legislature has taken a
"patterned approach" to the subject.2 68 As part II of this article notes, the Legislature has not comprehensively addressed
questions of private rights to groundwater use and transfer. 26 9 Any preemption by implication will have to be found

under the second test.
The second test has two interrelated components. First,
"general law" must have partially covered "the field." Second,
it must have covered the field in such a way as to indicate
that "a paramount state concern" will not tolerate local action. The Supreme Court has queried: "[are] substantial, geographic, economic, ecological or other distinctions ... persua-

sive of the need for local control" and has "local need[ I ...
and comprehensively dealt with
been adequately recognized
270
at the state level[?]"

In the litigation to date, the application of this second
test has been a major battleground. Rossman and Steel
27 1
found no preemption by implication under this second test.

Citing the paucity of state groundwater legislation, they concluded that the Legislature had "abdicated its lawmaking
function" over groundwater. 2 They cited examples of ex267. As Rossman and Steel explain, the "burden" "does not describe the final
effect on all citizens, but rather the impact of [a] local ordinance on citizens
passing through a locality; the %urden' arises from punishment of citizens without their knowingly engaging in unlawful actions." Rossman & Steel, supra
note 42, at 942-43 (citing Galvan, 452 P.2d at 939). The county ordinances can
avoid any harm to transients by punishing local property owners who either
drill themselves or allow "transient" pumpers to drill wells for appropriations.
268. See, e.g., Galvan v. Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 937 (Cal. 1969). The
mere number of laws does not indicate a patterned approach. Id. Moreover, the
degree of detail itself does not indicate an intent to occupy the field. See, e.g.,
People v. Jenkins, 24 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1962).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 14-38; see also Rossman & Steel,
supra note 42, at 938-39.
270. Galvan, 452 P.2d at 938. See also Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 691 P.2d
261 (Cal. 1984) (holding Berkeley demographics and property values involved
"significant local interest . . .that may differ from one locality to another");
Gluck v. County of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (finding
local tolerance to X-rated newspapers might vary from county to county). Cf
Polis v. City of La Palma, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating
"there is nothing peculiar about La Palma to suggest that interest in term limits [for local government officials] is more significant here than elsewhere").
271. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 940-41.
272. Id. at 940.
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press preemption in other water law statutes, implying that
absent such express preemption, no preemption by implication should be found.2 7 3 Finally, they concluded that the
groundwater basin addressed by the Inyo County ordinance
had unique features appropriate for local regulation. 4 In
contrast, the Nevada and Tehama ordinance challengers
have argued strenuously that the general law has sufficiently
encompassed the field in a way that displays "a paramount
state concern" over water resource allocation.2 7 5 Resolution
of the conflicting positions requires determination of the
"field" at issue, identification of the applicable "general laws,"
and consideration of the "local distinctions" allegedly requiring local action.
Determination of the "field" may well determine the outcome of the preemption battle.2 7 6 In such an inquiry, courts
separately characterize the subject matters of both the "general law" and the ordinance in question.2 7 7 Courts consider
not only the legislation's face, but also its purposes.2 7 8 In
Galvan, the court suggested that a "field" is "an area of legis273. Id.
274. Id. at 941. Rossman & Steel argued that Inyo County's location in the
Sierra rain shadow "requires maintenance of a high water table to support flora
and fauna. No other major basin in the state faces this unique ecological dilemma." Id. (footnote omitted).
275. Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment at 22,
Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct.
Sutter County, Cal., Apr. 18, 1989); Plaintiffs' Points & Authorities in Support
of Petition at 10, Myers v. County of Tehama, No. 34147 (Super. Ct. Tehama
County, Cal., Mar. 3, 1993).
276. See, e.g., Candid Enters., Inc. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 705
P.2d 876, 882 n.4 (Cal. 1985) (citing California Water & Tel. Co. v. County of
Los Angeles, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)). See also David S.
McLeod, Comment, The CaliforniaPreemptionDoctrine:Expanding the Regulatory Powerof Local Governments, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 729, 733-34 (1974). "Characterizing the subject matter of the local law as something other than the 'field'
preempted by the state scheme is the stronger of the two approaches for avoiding preemption." Id. The other approach found by McLeod involves a judicial
balancing of respective state and local interests. Id. at 733.
277. See, e.g., Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 707 P.2d 840, 851 (Cal. 1985)
(holding ordinance regulated business of operating escort services; statutes regulated criminal sexual conduct); Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 164, 170 (Cal Ct. App. 1993).
278. See Bravo Vending, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175-79. Courts may find that a
different purpose from a comparable statute helps an ordinance avoid preemption. See, e.g., Citizens for Uniform Laws v. County of Contra Costa, 285 Cal.
Rptr. 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Kelly v. Yee, 261 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989). Yet, such a different purpose alone will not necessarily shield the local
law from preemption if the ordinance "'materially interfere[s]' with the
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lation which includes the subject of the local legislation, and
is sufficiently logically related so that a court, or a local legislative body, can detect a patterned approach to the subject."27 In California Water and Telephone Co. v. County of
Los Angeles,2 s° the court elaborated on the importance of the
determination: "One of the clouds in the crystal ball is the
definition of the field which may ultimately be adopted in any
particular case. If the definition is narrow, preemption is circumscribed; if it is broad, the sweep of preemption is expanded."2 11 Although the California Water and Telephone

court found it unnecessary to choose between the parties' selfserving wide characterizations of the "field,"28 2 other courts
have devoted considerable attention to the appropriate
characterization. 28 3
Wells Fargo Bank v. Town of
W."
achievement of the state law's purposes ...
Woodside, 657 P.2d 819, 821 (Cal. 1983).
279. Galvan v. Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 937 (Cal. 1969).
280. 61 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
281. Id. at 626.
282. Id. See also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 844 P.2d 534,
541-42 (Cal. 1993) (holding there is no need to choose between narrow and
broad definitions of ordinance, since the statute showed no intent to occupy
either field).
283. See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 396 P.2d 809, 813 (Cal. 1964) (holding that
despite extensive statutes, Legislature had not preempted entire field of gambling); Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993). Bravo Vending involved an ordinance that, among other things,
banned the sale of cigarettes in vending machines. Id. Plaintiff vending
machine company claimed that California Penal Code § 308 preempted the ordinance. Id. at 166. That statute, among other matters dealing with sales of
cigarettes to minors, addresses the criminal culpability of persons who sell cigarettes to minors via vending machines. CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West Supp.
1993). The court spent considerable time attempting to define the relevant
fields covered by the statute and the ordinance. It rejected two broadly stated
fields the plaintiff proffered for § 308 as "absurd" and "fantastic." Bravo Vending, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172-73. It similarly rejected the City's narrowly stated
field. Id. at 173. Ultimately, it concluded that § 308 encompassed two aspects
of the sale of cigarettes to minors: "To whom is it illegal to sell cigarettes, and
what are the penal consequences of doing so?" Id. at 174. The court then
turned its attention to the ordinance. It concluded that the ordinance's text did
not include matters addressed by § 308. Id. Despite this lack of textual contradiction, the court considered evidence of the ordinance's purpose:
If the Legislature has indicated, either expressly or by implication, its
intent to fully occupy a particular field ... then local entities should
not be allowed to frustrate that intent by enforcing ordinances which
have the purpose and effect of intruding into that restricted subject
matter, but which are so carefully drafted as to avoid the appearance of
doing so. A city should not be permitted to hide the preempted substance of a regulation behind its nonpreempted form.
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Determination of the "fields" of play in the groundwater
regulation arena present the usual opportunities for widely
divergent interpretations. For example, if, on the one hand,
the "field" addressed by the ordinances is narrowly circumscribed to include only "groundwater exports," then there is
simply little evidence of state legislative attention to groundwater exports. As noted above, aside from a handful of special district acts, Water Code sections 1220 and 10730 are the
only state statutes that directly address local groundwater
management, much less export control. As also noted above,
in both these two acts and in the special district legislation,
the Legislature has not indicated whether the powers
granted by statute are exclusive of general county police powers. 28 4 Even if the "field" involved is broadened to include
"groundwater appropriation," virtually no state legislation
exists on this topic. 28 5 If, on the other hand, the "field" is
broadly construed as "water resource allocation," then, as described above, the general law is quite extensive. Such a
broadly construed "field" would encompass, at the very least,
the Water Code's extensive legislative treatment of the acquisition of water rights and the development of the state water
28 6
plan.
The three trial courts have generally eased their way to
their preemption finding by defining the field broadly. Without addressing the matter squarely, the recent Tehama
County decision scattered references to "management of
water," "water planning," and "the subject of water, regard-

Id. at 175-76. After reviewing extensive legislative history, the court concluded
that the ordinance sought to "regulate the business of selling cigarettes in order
to make illegal purchases of cigarettes by minors less likely by prohibiting the

particular manner of sale most often used by minors." Id. at 178-79. Ultimately, citing Cohen, the court concluded that the ordinance and statute peacefully coexisted. Id. at 179-80.
284. See supra note 89.
285. Of course, as will be discussed below, if the "general laws" include "common law," then an extensive body of common law addresses the private acquisition of rights to extract groundwater. See infra text accompanying notes 293301.
286. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100-2900, 10008-11985 (West 1971 &

Supp. 1993). In addition, if, as discussed more fully below, the "general law"
includes the common law, then a field defined as broadly as "water resource
allocation" would include the common law riparian and groundwater rights decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 293-301.
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less of its source or intended use."28 v Similarly, the Inyo and
Nevada County trial courts both defined the field quite
broadly. 2 8 A broad definition likely dooms a local ordinance.
The various ordinances enacted to date demonstrate a
range of possible "fields." The ordinances' virtually universal
requirement for an export permit largely single out ground-

28 9 At a miniwater appropriators for regulatory attention.

mum, these permit requirements condition the common law
appropriative right by at least requiring evidence of surplus
prior to approval. 290 Thus, all of the permit schemes address

the field of acquisition of appropriative rights to groundwater. Because the acquisition of such rights requires determination of the basin-wide effects of pumping and export, the
"field" of even these simple permit elements is broad enough
to include a multitude of groundwater management issues.
At this point, tension develops between the apparently narrow focus of the permit schemes on exporters and the broader
resource management considerations necessary to determining export rights under the permit schemes. Those ordinances, most notably Inyo County's,291 that at least superficially create a basin-wide resource management
infrastructure clearly address the broader field of resource
management. Those ordinances that focus on the tiny fraction of pumpers who seek only to export appear to address
only the narrower issues of acquisition of appropriative
rights. Ironically, since a broadly defined ordinance is more
easily ensnared by the preemptive net, the more evenhandedly the ordinance treats local groundwater extractors, the
more likely a court may find that the ordinance's "field"
moves toward the heavily state-dominated "water resources
management" field. Thus, using the continuum discussed
above,292 the more protectionist the ordinance, the narrower
the "field" addressed. In contrast, the more evenhanded the
regulatory burden and the broader the local legislative objectives, the more the ordinance moves into the broader "water
resources management" end of the definitional spectrum.
287. Summary Judgment at 2-3, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 &
34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., Aug. 11, 1993).
288. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
291. Inyo County, Cal., Referendum Measure A (passed Nov. 4, 1980).
292. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text
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Determination of the "field" necessarily interacts with
determination of the "general laws" encompassing the various fields. Few opinions discuss the scope of "the general
law."293 As noted above, both the Inyo and Nevada County
trial courts included common law decisions within the scope
of preemptive "general laws."294 In contrast, Rossman and
293. Professor Peppin did discuss the meaning of "general law" in the second
of his groundbreaking articles on the California home rule doctrine. John C.
Peppin, MunicipalHome Rule in California:11, 30 CAL. L. REV. 272, 282 (1942).
His discussion, however, considered only whether all state legislative enactments were necessarily "general laws." Id. at 282-94. In particular, he focused
on the validity of those state statutes "made applicable to less than all cities
..... Id. at 282. He did not discuss whether the "general law" included common law.
In Blitch v. City of Ocala, 195 So. 406, 407 (Fla. 1940), the Florida Supreme
Court quoted from a leading treatise on municipal law:
Ordinances such as the one here under consideration are enacted
under the general police power and "they must not (1) infringe the constitutional guarantees of the nation or state [or] ... (2) must not be
inconsistent with the general laws of the state, including the common
law, equity and public policy, unless exceptions are permitted .... "
Id. (emphasis added). See also Miami Shores Village v. Post No. 124, 24 So. 2d
33, 35 (Fla. 1945) (quoting Blitch, 195 So. at 406). Blitch's inclusion of the
"common law," however, is dicta, since Blitch did not involve the conflict of an
ordinance with common law. As its authority, Blitch quoted 3 EUGENE MCQUIL.
LIN, LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 119 (2d ed. 1928). That treatise, however, does not give any authority for its inclusion of "common law" and "public
policy" in its definition of "general law." Id. Rather, the quoted portion comes
from the author's summary of cases construing the police power. Id. at 118-19.
Although McQuillin notes many cases in the materials preceding his summary,
none of these cases include ordinances invalidated because of their conflict with
either "the common law" or other judicial "public policy" declarations. See id. at
118 n.7.
The current edition now reads:
At the risk of being struck down as invalid, ordinances must in general
conform and not be inconsistent with the public policy of the state, as
found in its constitution and statutes or, when the constitution and
statutes are silent, in itsjudicialdecisions and the constant practice of
its public officials.
5 MCQUILLIN, LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15.21, at 115 (3d ed. rev.
1989) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). It cites four cases as authority. Id.
at 116, 34 (Supp. 1992) (citing Marengo v. Rowland, 105 N.E. 285 (Ill. 1914);
Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 91 N.E. 1041 (Ill. 1910), Allin v. American
Indem. Co., 55 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1932); City of Springfield v. $10,000 in U.S. Currency, 786 P.2d 723 (Or. 1990)). Again, none of these cases involve ordinances
invalidated because of conflicts with either the "common law" or other judicial
"public policy" declarations.
294. See supra text accompanying note 79. The Tehama County court did
not address the matter in its decision. See Summary Judgment, Myers v.
County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., Aug.
11, 1993).
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Steel argue that decisional law does not have preemptive
force.295 To date, the California Supreme Court has raised
but once and left undecided the role of decisional law in preemption analysis.29 6
295. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 942. In addition, they argued that
the body of decisional law addressing the acquisition of private rights to
groundwater does not immunize private rights-holders from police power regulation. Rossman & Steel, supranote 42 at 942-43 (analogizing to county zoning
power over land acquired by adverse possession). This second argument has
merit. See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1011 (Cal. 1976). In
Birkenfeld, the court considered the Berkeley rent control ordinance. Id.
Among other arguments, plaintiff landlords claimed that "rent control is not
within the municipal police power because it is 'private law' purporting to regulate private civil relationships." Id. The court rejected that sweeping claim:
"The California Constitution contains no such 'private law' exception to municipal powers. The fact that municipal imposition of rent ceilings necessarily affects private civil relationships by no means makes it unique among city police
regulations." Id.
296. See Chavez v. Sargent, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (Cal. 1959). Rossman and
Steel cite Chavez, but do not mention its reservation of the "common law" as
"general law" issue. Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 934-35 n.195.
Since Chavez, the closest the court has come to addressing this issue was in
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1984). In Fisher, the court construed the Berkeley rent control ordinance. Id. One provision in that ordinance
created an evidentiary presumption affecting the burden of proof in a retaliatory eviction defense. California Evidence Code § 500 states: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that
he is asserting." CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966). Section 160 further defines "law" as including "constitutional, statutory and decisional law." Id. § 160.
The City claimed that its ordinance was a "law" for purposes of §§ 160 and 500.
Fisher, 693 P.2d at 303. The court framed the issue as "whether a local ordinance can be deemed a 'statute' for purposes of deviating from the established
rules of evidence relating to burden of proof." Id. The court stated:
The answer to this question would seem to be so settled that, like other
firm rules of law, few courts have recently had occasion to address the
issue. Long before enactment of Evidence Code sections 500 and 160,
we suggested that municipal governments have no authority to depart
from the common law of evidence .... [[A]n "ordinance is void ... [to
the extent that it purports to] lay down rules of evidence .... " ) Similarly, commentators have maintained that, "[w]ithout express authority the general rules of evidence or procedure may not be changed by
ordinance by a municipal corporation."
Fisher, 693 P.2d at 303 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). Because
Fisher arose in connection with the interpretation of a statute's meaning of
"law," it is not directly on point. Moreover, its context as a trial procedure matter raises some separation of powers issues that might distinguish its discussion of contradiction between a local and a judicially made law. Finally, the
decision in Orena v. City of Santa Barbara, 28 P. 268 (Cal. 1891) upon which
Fisher relies, does not itself answer the broader question: the inclusion of common law in article XI, § 7's "general law." Nevertheless, Fisher is the most
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The only extensive California discussion of this subject is
a 1966 article by Coleman Blease. 297 In that article, now-Jusrecent California decision suggesting that local legislatures may not contradict
common law.
297. Blease, supra note 39. When he wrote the article, Mr. Blease was, inter
alia, the legislative representative for the Southern California Branch of the
American Civil Liberties Union. Id. at 517. Since the late 1970's, now-Justice
Blease has served on the California Court of Appeal for the Third Judicial District. In Wexner v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist., 258 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (unpublished opinion), Justice Blease finally had the opportunity to
address the matter upon which he had written almost a quarter-century earlier. Wexner involved a local school board's removal of five books by Richard
Brautigan from the school library. Id. California Education Code § 35160
granted local school boards authority to "initiate and carry on any program...
or otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict with ... any law . .. ."
Id. at 35 (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160 (West 1993) (emphasis omitted)).
This statute closely followed the language of article IX, § 14. Wexner, 258 Cal.
Rptr. at 258. That constitutional provision, governing the powers of a school
board, in turn parallels the preemption language in article XI, § 7. Id. Justice
Blease then drew upon cases construing the predecessor of article XI, § 7, that,
he stated, "hold that the terms 'laws' or 'general laws' in Article XI... (now § 7)
includes the common law." Id. at 34 n.5. Justice Blease then elaborated:
Analogously, "any law" includes not only the regulations of the State
Board of Education but the common law as well. Hence, to the extent
that our preemption analysis rests upon common law extrapolation of
the pertinent statutes, it is sufficient to override the authority granted
the Board by § 35160. "Any law" thus includes common law.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
Modestly, Justice Blease did not cite his exemplary article as authority for
his conclusion. He did, however, generally cite In re Porterfield,Chavez and a
third case, In re Koehne, 381 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1963), as authority for his conclusion that article XI, § 7's reference to the "general laws" includes the common
law. Wexner, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 34 n.5, 35. None of these three cases, however,
directly holds that "general laws" include the common law, in the broadest
sense of purely judge-made law governing the acquisition of rights or the imposition of duties. Rather, these three confusing cases involve common lawmaking in a narrower sense: judicial interpretations of statutory or constitutional
texts. As noted above, Chavez expressly declined to decide the issue. Chavez,
339 P.2d at 809. See also supra note 296; Blease, supra note 39, at 534. Similarly, as discussed above, Porterfieldinvolved an express legislative declaration
of policy; i.e., California Labor Code § 923, arising in the context of constitutionally protected freedoms, principally freedom of speech. Porterfield,168 P.2d at
723, discussed supra text accompanying notes 121-133. See also Blease, supra
note 39, at 533 (discussing Porterfield). While constitutional law is largely
"judge-made," it is textually based; in contrast, the law of groundwater appropriation is entirely a judicial construction in the classic common law mode. Finally, in Koehne, the court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting intoxication in any place open to public view. Koehne, 381 P.2d at 633-34. The
court concluded that California Penal Code § 647, governing public intoxication,
preempted the ordinance. Id. It based its conclusion partially upon "the language of § 647... and the circumstances surrounding its enactment...." Id. at
634. In his article, Justice Blease had described this case as "a specific exercise
of statutory construction," and thus "analogous to the reasoning in the
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tice Blease distinguished cases involving conflicts with implied general laws, a category of cases that included those
based on judicial declarations of public policy, with cases
finding an implied legislative intent to occupy the field.29
Justice Blease concluded that policy-based judicial determinations of law had to be considered "general laws" within the
meaning of article XI, section 7.299 A contrary holding would
lead, he wrote, to the anomalous result that judges could invalidate state statutes criminalizing certain conduct on public policy grounds, although such decisions would not invalidate local ordinances proscribing the same conduct.3 0 0 In
effect, he concluded, "[1]ocal governments would thus be invested with power to invade what had been recognized as a
proper province of the courts."30 1
Justice Blease's analysis seems sound in those cases
where it applies. The opinions upon which he draws his conPorterfieldline of cases." Blease, supra note 39, at 555. He stated: "The court
was thus determining the general law - that the legislature had, in effect,
intended to authorize drunkenness on private property even if in public view.
On this reading the Los Angeles ordinance was in direct conflict with the purpose of the State law." Id. See also id. at 555-56 n.265 (The case alternatively
"relied on a[n implicit preemption] theory more akin to the reasoning in [In re
Lane, 372 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1962)] ....
The use of alternative theories is
frequent in preemption cases and can lead to confusion.").
To the extent that Justice Blease's argument solely involves "common law
extrapolation of the pertinent statutes," it seems beyond question that a statute
can have no independent "meaning" apart from the common law. Statutes have
legal meaning only when applied by judges in discrete factual contexts. As
such, judicial extensions of statutory or constitutional texts should be considered part and parcel of the "general" law. The broader question, however, involves the role of judge-made law that lacks, as with groundwater law, any explicit constitutional or statutory grounding. In his article, Justice Blease
concluded that the same principles applied, "whether invoked in the construction of an ambiguous statute or the making of a common-law-based public policy .... " Blease, supra note 39, at 536.
As noted above, Justice Blease's efforts in Wexner lack precedential value;
the Supreme Court depublished the opinion.
298. Blease, supra note 39, at 526, 529-31, 534-36.
299. Id. at 536.
300. Id. To illustrate his argument, he drew from Schwartz-Torrance Inv.
Corp. v. Bakery Workers' Union, 394 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1964), which involved judicial invalidation of trespass convictions of union pickets under state statutes.
Blease, supra note 39, at 536. He argued that Schwartz-Torrance invalidated
the state convictions because of judicially recognized public policies. Id. If
these policies were not "general law," he concluded that an anomaly would result: a conviction based on a local trespass ordinance would not be invalid,
although a state law conviction would be invalid. Id.
301. Id.
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clusions all implicated fundamental, constitutional rights.3 °2
Given the rights involved, it is appropriate for courts to find
or declare them "public policies" that neither state nor local
legislature may contradict. The application of Justice
Blease's "public policy as general law" analysis outside of the
realm of fundamental or constitutional rights raises important separation-of-powers concerns. In our tripartite system
of government, it simply is inappropriate for the courts to invalidate legislative determinations, be they state or local,
simply
on the grounds of some judicially declared public pol30 3
icy.

Nevertheless, the constitutionalization of California

water law through the 1928 amendment, and the repeated
judicial recognition that water allocation decisions always
take place against the backdrop of "statewide considerations
of transcendent importance," 30 4 justify the incorporation of

judicially declared water law and policy into the groundwater
preemption debate.30 5
302. See, e.g., Blease, supra note 39, at 532-33 (discussing In re Porterfield,
which involved union members' "full freedom of association and self-organization"); Id. at 534-35 (discussing Chavez, another case involving fundamental,
constitutional rights). Similarly, Justice Blease's depublished opinion in Wexner, while it found evidence of public policy in Education Code provisions, see
Wexner v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist, 258 Cal. Rptr. 26, 36-37 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (unpublished opinion), also noted that "related, complex and closely
balanced questions of state and federal constitutional law would be implicated
if the Board's claim of lawful authority to remove non-obscene library books
were upheld." Id. at 37.
303. See Wexner, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33 (finding judicial lawmaking in preemption arena is a "purely defensive activism" that preserves the rights of the
majoritarian branch to take "further considered action"). See also California
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 208
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (Blease, J.) (citation omitted):
Ordinarily, absent a plain constitutional mandate, a conflict in public
policy between the judiciary and the Legislature must be resolved in
favor of the latter. Where various alternative policy views reasonably
might be held whether the use of water is reasonable within the meaning of article X, § 2, the view enacted by the Legislature is entitled to
deference by the judiciary. An invitation to substitute the policy view
of a court in this circumstance for a reasonable policy enacted in a statute is an invitation to return to the benighted days of substantive due
process.
Id.
304. Imperial Irrig. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 231 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See also, e.g., Joslin v. Marin Mun.Water
Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967); California Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
305. To focus attention on the role that judicial policy pronouncements can
play in the implied preemption analysis, this article has addressed "common
law as general law" here. If, however, common law is "general" law for pur-
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As noted above, the case law addressing the acquisition
of private rights to groundwater is substantial. 30 6 Moreover,
Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District 30 7 demonstrates
that there are no narrowly defined "fields" involving California water law; even the narrowest field arguably applicable

here-rights to extract groundwater-necessarily implicates
the "transcendent" field of statewide water resource allocation. Even if in some circumstances, as discussed above, 30 8 a
county groundwater export ordinance might not directly contradict either the 1928 amendment or Water Code sections
104 and 105, the implied occupation analysis under review
here looks to the general law for expressions that "a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action." 30 9 In combination, Joslin; article X, section 2; and
Water Code sections 104 and 105 highlight that "paramount
state interest" in water resource allocation.
poses of implied preemption, then, surely, nothing precludes similar consideration of common law for purposes of contradiction-based preemption. The addition of common law to the general law adds two bodies of decisional law that
county ordinances might contradict. First, as noted above, an extensive body of
case law addressed the acquisition of private rights to groundwater. To the
extent that the local ordinances at issue merely set up permit requirements for
local, nonjudicial determinations of the right to appropriate groundwater, they
do not directly "contradict" these common law decisions. The local ordinances
certainly do not permit something banned by common law. And, at least on
their face, neither do they prohibit something permitted by decisional law.
Rather, they simply set up a procedure for determining whether an applicant
has met the case law set of criteria for an appropriation: the availability of "surplus" water. To the extent that local regulations unqualifiedly restrict a water
use otherwise permitted by state common law, there may be some apparent
contradiction. Nevertheless, since case law addresses only the acquisition of
private rights to groundwater, local governments may regulate such private
rights for the public welfare under their police powers. The validity of such
local regulations is tested under a police power analysis.
Second, in addition to these core judicial decisions on private groundwater
rights, the case law contains broad judicial policy statements about water's
"transcendent importance" to the people of the state. See, e.g., Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967); see also supra note 304.
Again, on their faces, nothing in the local ordinances' permit requirements
either permit something prohibited by these policy pronouncements, nor prohibit something permitted by the pronouncements.
Although these two groups ofjudicial decisions thus do not resolve the preemption inquiry upon "contradiction" grounds, they play an important role in
the implied preemption analysis.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
307. 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
308. See generally supra text accompanying notes 92-244.
309. People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1155
(Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 929 (Cal. 1990).
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The strongest statement of the state's inability to tolerate such balkanization can be found in Joslin: "Although, as
we have said, what is a reasonable use of water depends upon
the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from state-wide considerations of
transcendent importance."3 10 Of course, as noted above, absent preemption, counties are not prohibited from regulating
1
on matters of statewide concern. 3 ' And, as also noted above,
evenhanded local groundwater regulation might not directly
contradict article X, section 2.312 Nevertheless, as Joslin
noted, the state's paramount interest in "the ever increasing
need for the conservation of water in this state, [is] an inescapable reality of life quite apartfrom its express recognition
in the 1928 amendment."3 1 3 The court noted that state policy
"314
regarding water "conservation and use" was "unanimous.
The Joslin court's statement, in turn, finds statutory
support in Water Code sections 104 and 105.315 As noted
above, construed most narrowly, those two statutes helped
introduce the California water plan-the state's broadest ef3 1 6 The language of these
fort to manage its water resources.
two statutes, however, echoes with overtones of the state's
reservation of jurisdiction over all water-resource allocation
decisions. Even assuming, arguendo,that these two statutes
do not technically reserve such jurisdiction, the overtones reinforce the primary role of the people of the state in allocating
water resources. Moreover, the specific water projects ultimately developed by these code sections' statutory predecessors form the ties that bind much of California. These ties
concretely demonstrate the interdependence of Californians
on water resources, and the needs of the state to speak with
17
one legal voice on water allocation matters.
As noted above, the proponents of county groundwater
ordinances claim that they are furthering the Joslin declared
310.
311.
312.
313.
phasis
314.
315.
316.
317.

Joslin, 429 P.2d at 894.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 147-244.
Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967) (emadded).
Id.
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 325-326 and accompanying text.
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policy of water conservation. 3 " And, as noted in the same
discussion, this article concludes that some county groundwater regulations might indeed survive a "direct contradiction" analysis based solely on article X, section 2. Nevertheless, the ability to survive the direct contradiction analysis on
a conservation rationale does not mean that the same ordinances survive the implied preemption challenge. Survival
under the direct conflict analysis merely means that, given
state legislative authorization, some well-crafted local
groundwater schemes would not run afoul of the 1928 amendment. The implied preemption analysis, however, focuses not
on the merits of any one local groundwater scheme to see
whether it, by itself, leads to the waste or unreasonable use of
water within the meaning of article X, section 2. Rather, the
implied preemption analysis asks whether the general law
manifests such statewide concerns that do not tolerate the
possibility of local regulatory regimes. Absent state legislative approval, an ad hoc regulatory regime based on fiftyeight self-initiated county export controls will necessarily be
incoherent, even if one or more of the fifty-eight schemes are
evenhanded and well-crafted. 1 9
Moreover, the counties' reliance on "conservation" to support their home-grown schemes cannot itself be addressed in
vacuo. The water conservation policy expressed in Joslin is a
318. See supra text accompanying notes 155-244.
319. The implied preemption analysis looks also to whether "'substantial,
geographic, economic, ecological or other distinctions are persuasive of the need
for local control and whether local needs have been adequately recognized and
comprehensively dealt with at the state level.'" Galvan v. Superior Court, 452
P.2d 930, 933 (Cal. 1969) (quoting Robbins v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 853, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966)). Rossman and Steel argued that Inyo
County's unique setting in the Sierra rainshadow created peculiar ecological
considerations suited for local regulation in the absence of a state scheme.
Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 941. The shortest response is simply that
these local needs are not "persuasive": addressing them by county-initiated local groundwater management regimes inevitably leads to an incoherent water
resources allocation policy that the state simply cannot tolerate. A fuller, more
contemporary response, albeit not entirely satisfactory to many counties, is that
the Legislature, first through Water Code § 1220, and more recently through
A.B. 3030, has provided many counties with an opportunity to undertake some
groundwater management efforts appropriate for their particular circumstances. See supra notes 50-61 (discussing counties' powers under Water Code
§ 1220 and A.B. 3030). Thus, even though neither of these statutes expressly
states that its provisions are the exclusive sources of law authorizing local
groundwater management, collectively they represent at least a step towards a
state-sanctioned comprehensive groundwater management scheme.
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statewide policy intimately linked with the entire scheme of
private rights to water use and the statewide plan for water
resources conservation and development.32

0

The water con-

servation policies announced in the unauthorized county ordinances principally aim to conserve county supplies. The
Inyo and Nevada ordinances most graphically demonstrate
the local focus. While the Inyo ordinance requires consideration of "the needs and practices of all water users in the state,
and the status of the state's entire water resources" 321 before
a groundwater export permit may be issued, it makes clear
that the overriding concern is not state water allocation, but
the "paramount protection of Inyo County's citizens, environment and economy."322 The Nevada ordinance is even more
explicit. To the identical text, it adds: "This finding shall be
given paramount consideration over all other findings."32
Even if each county "considered" the state's overall water resources in each groundwater export permit decision, without
giving local concerns paramount importance, fifty-eight separate views of these "overall resources" would likely emerge.
Finally, the extension of the counties' water conservation rationale leads to other potential water balkans. The same arguments justifying the ability to condition groundwater extraction could be used to regulate locally either riparian
rights, pre-1914 appropriative rights, or the specific contours
of the largely uncodified public trust doctrine. Surely, the
State could not tolerate fifty-eight separate systems for acquiring, preserving, or transferring uncodified rights to surface waters solely in the name of local conservation efforts.
The recent legislative efforts under Water Code sections
1220(b) and 10753 to allow some local groundwater regulation do not themselves demonstrate that counties may, sua
sponte, balkanize the state's resources. To be sure, these two
statutes do deserve criticism that they, too, encourage bal320. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894-95 (Cal. 1967)
(citing Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935); Chow v. City of Santa
Barbara, 22 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1933)).
321. INYo COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.030(j).
322. Id. § 7.01.030(a) (emphasis added).
323. NEVADA COUNTY, CAL., LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § L-X 6.7 (A)
(Jan. 27, 1986). See also Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1552, 1-7 (Feb. 4,
1992) (preamble: local Tehama County economic interests in restricting groundwater exports).
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kanization. 2 4 Nevertheless, they are distinguishable from
the ordinances at issue here in two principal respects. First,
they are creatures of the state legislative process. Although
that process does not in itself guarantee the attainment of a
coherent policy, it does mean that all Californians have been
represented in the decision to allow differing local groundwater regulations. One of the evils of balkanization is simply
that locals preserve resources for themselves in a process by
which those excluded from a resource's use are also excluded
from the decision to exclude. Second, both statutes require
some degree of basin-wide coordination. In contrast, the ordinances at issue here do not consider the multiplicity of jurisdictions that have some interest in a given basin's use.
The vast grid of dams and aqueducts that move water
from and among many different portions of the state demonstrates concretely that Californians are truly interdependent.
This interdependence was heightened by the recent drought,
which required new levels of state and local cooperation in
temporarily reallocating water needs. Water development
policy is so vital to the overall interests of the people of the
state as to require "uniform treatment throughout the
state."325 As noted above, the trial courts that have invalidated county groundwater export ordinances based their decisions, in part, on the desire to avoid the incoherent, countyby-county balkanization of groundwater resources. 26
In conclusion, although the three trial court opinions are
terse, they reach the right conclusion. Although not preempted by direct contradiction with constitutional or statutory provisions, the inclusion of decisional law into the
calculus demonstrates preemption by implication under the
second of the Hubbard tests. Even a well-crafted, evenhanded county scheme, lacking direct legislative sanction,
necessarily leads to the intolerable possibility of incoherence.

324. See Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1.
325. See Chavez v. Sargent, 339 P.2d 801, 810 (Cal. 1959) (finding possible
significance, for preemption analysis, "that the subject is one which, in our
view, ... requires uniform treatment throughout the state") (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). See also Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (Cal.
1933) (finding importance of water conservation and development to the future
welfare of the state).
326. See supra note 81.
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DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES

In addition to challenges under the California constitution, local groundwater export restrictions face challenges
under the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.32 v Such challenges apply even to those ordinances or special management districts expressly authorized
by the State Legislature.328 In addition, such challenges potentially apply even to those ordinances that burden both instate and out-of-state appropriators or transferees. 329 To

date, the Commerce Clause has been crucial in a challenge to
the efforts of Imperial County, California to restrict groundwater movement out of the county. 330 The Imperial County
case, however, involved several peculiar circumstances that
make its application to other local groundwater restrictions
327. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. That clause grants the Congress the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States." Id. The judgemade "Dormant" or "Negative" Commerce Clause doctrine restricts state actions that improperly burden interstate commerce even where Congress has not
legislated in a given arena. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2023-24 (1992).
In addition to Commerce Clause challenges, the federal Constitution provides other limits on a state's activity in the interstate water market. See, e.g.,
Ann B. Rodgers, The Limits of State Activity in the Interstate Water Market, 21
LAND & WATER L. REV. 357, 365-77 (1986) (Privileges & Immunities, Property,
Commerce, and Equal Protection Clauses all restrict state activity). The following discussion focuses solely upon the Commerce Clause.
328. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2021-22 (discussing Michigan
statute barring import of solid waste into a county unless the county authorized
such importation).
329. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot, 112 S.Ct. at 2021-22, 2024-26 (holding it is irrelevant that the Michigan scheme "purports to regulate intercounty commerce in
waste").
330. See, e.g., Munoz v. County of Imperial, 604 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), judgment vacated, 449 U.S. 54 (1980),
on remand, 636 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, 510 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.
Cal. 1981), affd, 667 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and entered a preliminary injunction restraining the county from enforcing the export restriction. Id., see
Munoz, 510 F. Supp. at 882-86, App.: Order Granting Motion For Preliminary
Injunction, 1977. See also Munoz v. County of Imperial, 667 F.2d 811, 813 (9th
Cir. 1982) (noting that, in an unpublished decision later reversed on other
grounds, California Court of Appeal concluded that Imperial County land use
restrictions on water export, via tank trucks, to Mexico violated Commerce
Clause).
In addition to the Imperial litigation, the successful Nevada County challengers analogized to the Commerce Clause restrictions when making their
state law preemption arguments. See Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Board. of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., Apr. 18, 1989).
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uncertain.3 3 1 In addition, it predated the United States
331. The case involved the trucking of groundwater pumped from Imperial
County, California, to Mexico. See County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d
14, 16 (1977), reh'g denied, 564 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1977), applicationdenied, 434 U.S.
899 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977) (finding litigation lacked a
substantial federal question). Thus, it involved two matters different from
many potential Commerce Clause challenges: (1) water fully severed from the
ground and transported by truck, and (2) international commerce. Even those
commentators who would wish to preserve a state's power, post-Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982), under authority of the Commerce Clause, to determine the circumstances under which water rights may be
first allocated recognize Sporhase's applicability to movement of water after initial allocation. See Frank J. Trelease, Interstate Use of Water-Sporhase v. El
Paso, Pike & Vermejo, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 315, 334, 345-46 (1987) [hereinafter, Trelease, Interstate Use]; Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State
Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 347, 361-68 (1985)
[hereinafter, Trelease, State Water & Lines]. Moreover, the presence of an international boundary implicates peculiarly federal concerns over regulating
commerce with different countries. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 437 n.9 (1980) ("Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous
when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged."); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446-450 (1979) (foreign commerce scrutiny seeks
to avoid duplicative taxation and ensure ability of federal government to promote uniform national policies); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986) (regarding the same issue as Japan Line, Ltd.).
In addition to these two differences, the case involved the interpretation of
certain land use restrictions reflected in zoning ordinances and land use permits. Imperial County v. McDougal, 564 P.2d at 16. Although Imperial County
also sought to invalidate water export under its groundwater management ordinance, the only court to mention that ordinance found it unnecessary to rule on
its validity. Id. at 16 n.1.
The final "peculiarities" raised by the Imperial litigation involve its complicated procedural history and its rather ambiguous resolution. Indeed, an entire
course in civil procedure could be taught from the now-20-year-old efforts to
stop these water sales. In 1972, Imperial County sought injunctive and declaratory relief in California Superior Court, against Donald C. McDougal, an
owner and operator of a commercial water sales business on a tract of land, the
Simpson Well property. Id. at 16. The county alleged that McDougal was violating a 1970 zoning law by exporting water outside Imperial County and by
employing large numbers of trucks to carry away great amounts of water without a conditional use permit, was constituting a public nuisance by his business
operation, and was violating the county's Groundwater Appropriations Ordinance. Id. The court enjoined McDougal from selling the water in violation of
the zoning law, finding that any effect on international commerce due to the
restriction was merely incidental to a valid exercise of police power designed to
regulate local land use. Id. at 17. It made no findings on the nuisance claim
and did not hold a trial on the ordinance issue. Id. at 16 n.1. Upon appeal, the
California Court of Appeal held that the export permit restriction violated the
United States Constitution's Commerce Clause, article I, § 8, cl. 3, and that
McDougal's use permit was void. See Munoz v. County of Imperial, 667 F.2d
811, 813 (9th Cir. 1982).
McDougal appealed to the California Supreme Court, claiming that he had
a vested right to this business operation and that the export permit restriction
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was invalid. Imperial County, 564 P.2d at 16. The court affirmed that McDougal was prohibited from violating the export restriction because as a successor
in title to one who acquiesced in the permit prohibition, he was estopped to
assert its invalidity. Id. at 17-18. It reversed the injunction against using large
numbers of trucks because of insufficient evidence, and remanded, allowing the
trial court to consider evidence that McDougal's business operation was a nuisance. Id. at 18-19. The Court determined that, in view of its holding, it did not
need to decide whether the permit's prohibition violated the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 18 n.3.
After this judgment, Guillermo Gallego Munoz, amicus curiae before the
California Supreme Court in McDougal and McDougal's water sales broker to
Mexico, along with two Mexican water purchasers, brought a federal action
seeking to enjoin the county from enforcing the permit export restriction, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause. Munoz v. County of Imperial, 604
F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), judgment
vacated, 449 U.S. 54 (1980), on remand, 636 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, 510 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 667 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). The district court agreed with the plaintiffs
and entered a preliminary injunction restraining the county from enforcing the
export restriction. See Munoz, 510 F. Supp. 879, 882-86, App.: Order Granting
Motion For Preliminary Injunction, 1977.
The California Supreme Court then held McDougal in contempt for selling
water outside the county, but stayed an order pending the county's appeal in
the federal courts. See Munoz, 667 F.2d at 813. On appeal, the county claimed
that under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the existence of the McDougal state proceedings removed the court's power to issue the federal injunction. Munoz, 604 F.2d at 1176. The court of appeals disagreed with the county,
and affirmed, holding that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the injunction
since the McDougal proceedings had terminated and since third parties, such
as the plaintiffs here, are not barred under this act from challenging a statute
on federal constitutional grounds when the statute is also under litigation in
the state courts. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding
that the McDougal action was a pending state court proceeding, but indicated
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the federal suit if the Mexican plaintiffs
were "strangers" to the state court litigation. County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449
U.S. 54, 59-60 (1980).
Upon remand, the district court found that the plaintiffs were indeed strangers to the McDougal proceedings and reentered the preliminary injunction.
Munoz v. County of Imperial, 510 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Cal. 1981). The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Munoz, 667 F.2d at 811. In 1983, a permanent injunction restraining enforcement of McDougal's export restriction was
entered. McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1991).
During this federal litigation, and after the California Supreme Court judgment enjoining McDougal from exporting water, the county, in 1978, successfully tried its public nuisance action against McDougal. See County of Imperial
v. McDougal, 4 Civil No. D000540, 2 (4th Dist. 1988) (unpublished opinion).
This judgment was reversed on appeal because the trial court made its findings
based on evidence of nuisance submitted during the first trial in 1973 rather
than on evidence of conditions at the time of trial in 1978. County of Imperial v.
McDougal, 4 Civil No. 18248 (1979) (unpublished opinion). Upon remand, the
trial court found that some of McDougal's activities constituted a nuisance and
issued a permanent injunction abating those activities. County of Imperial v.
McDougal, Civ. No. 43353. (1982) (unpublished opinion). The court of appeal
affirmed. County of Imperial, 4 Civ. No. D000540.
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Supreme Court's decisions in Sporhase v. Nebraska332 and,
more recently, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources.333 Using the same
paradigm considered above in the state law preemption disIn the meantime, in 1977, McDougal extended the water operations to another tract of land he had purchased, the Clifford Well property. See McDougal,
942 F.2d at 671. Soon after, the county passed an ordinance providing that
upon groundwater overdraft, the right to appropriate water should be denied or
limited, and in 1978, the county denied McDougal's appropriation permit. Id.
Under a 1980 ordinance requiring a reasonable amortization period for nonconforming uses, the county determined that the Clifford Well property water operation was a nonconforming use, and that six years was a reasonable amortization period. Id. In 1987, the California Court of Appeal upheld this decision,
and that same year, the county designated the Clifford Well property a floodway. Id. McDougal claimed this rendered his land useless for residential purposes, and then applied for a conditional use permit to continue water operations. Id. The county denied the permit application because McDougal was
unable to comply with the county's requirement to submit an Environmental
Impact Report including a verified groundwater model for that particular basin.
Id. In 1989, McDougal sued for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985(3), alleging that the county conspired to deprive him of his right to
operate his water business, and for inverse condemnation, alleging it deprived
him of the total value of his land. McDougal v. County of Imperial, Civ. No. 891488-E, Memorandum Decision and Order (S.D. Cal. 1990). The district court
granted the county's motion to dismiss, holding that the civil rights claims were
barred by a one-year statute of limitations, and that McDougal failed to state a
claim for inverse condemnation because the county's regulatory purpose was
legitimate. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the civil rights
claims, agreeing with the district court that the claims were barred by California's one-year general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. McDougal, 942 F.2d at 671-75. It reversed dismissal of the takings claim because
the trial court did not balance the substantiality of the public interest in the
county's requirements against the severity of the private interference of the
Clifford Well property. Id. at 675-80. The court remanded, allowing the district
court to consider whether the takings claim was also barred by the one-year
statute of limitations. Id. at 675 n.5.
332. 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982).
333. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992). Both the federal district court's eventually reinstated opinion, and the superseded, unpublished California Court of Appeal
opinion, predated Sporhase. See Munoz v. County of Imperial, 604 F.2d 1174,
1175 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), judgment vacated, 449
U.S. 54 (1980), on remand, 636 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, 510 F.
Supp. 879 (S.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982). The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and entered a
preliminary injunction restraining the county from enforcing the export restriction. See Munoz, 510 F. Supp. at 882-86, App.: Order Granting Motion For
Preliminary Injunction, 1977. See also Munoz v. County of Imperial, 667 F.2d
811, 813 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that, in an unpublished decision later reversed
on other grounds, California Court of Appeal concluded that Imperial County
land use restrictions on water export, via tank trucks, to Mexico violated the
Commerce Clause).
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cussion, 3 4 this section of the article considers the vulnerability of local groundwater export restrictions in light of
Sporhase and Fort Gratiot. Because the analysis encompasses several open questions of constitutional law, the discussion can only outline the contours of the arguments.
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation of
Natural Resources: An Overview

The "dormant" or "negative" aspect of the Commerce
Clause has received substantial attention from the Supreme
Court over the last fifteen years. 3 35 Although critics debate
its foundation and merits, the Supreme Court has shown little inclination to abandon its now well-established doctrine. 33 6 As more narrowly applicable to the local ground334. See supra text accompanying notes 232-233.
335. In addition to Sporhase and Fort Gratiot, some of the more recent dormant commerce cases involving natural resources or environmental law include: Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (discussing
hazardous waste disposal); New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269 (1988) (discussing ethanol tax credits); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)
(discussing baitfish); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82
(1984) (regarding timber processing); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (reviewing electrical power transmission); Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (discussing milk packaging
materials); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 1727 (1979) (regarding minnows);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (reviewing solid waste
disposal). See also White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204 (1983) (reviewing local hiring preferences); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980) (discussing cement production); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (regarding abandoned motor vehicle bounties).
336. The Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
sparked an enormous amount of scholarly debate about the doctrine. The discussion includes both general criticism and specific discussions of the doctrine's
applicability in the natural resources arena. Much of the general criticism involves attempts to make coherent the labyrinth of fact-specific decisions engendered by the Court's balancing approach to the analysis. See, e.g., Michael E.
Smith, State DiscriminationAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203
(1986); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). See also
Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17
REV. LAW & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1989-90); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and
the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). Several articles reconsider the doctrine's nineteenth-century development. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker,
The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Swift v. Tyson, Uniform State Commercial Laws, and Federal Common Law: Ships that Passed in the Night?, 8
CONST. COMM. 87 (1991); Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce
Clause in its First Century, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 417 (1988). The harshest
criticism arises from the doctrine's lack of an explicit textual foundation. Seiz-
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water regulations under review here, the recent Fort Gratiot
decision conveniently introduces the policy concerns behind
the doctrine as well as a quartet of cases that sketch its relevant portions. 3 7
In Fort Gratiot, the Court reviewed a Michigan statute
that barred the importation of solid waste into any Michigan
county unless authorized by the county's state-mandated and
approved solid waste disposal plan. 338 A landfill operator in

ing upon this deficiency, several commentators have urged the Court to abandon the doctrine entirely. See, e.g., Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce
Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69 OR. L. REV. 895 (1990);
Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy DoctrineOut of its Misery, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1991); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism,
1987 DuKE L.J. 569 (1987). See also David S. Day, The Rehnquist Court and the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The PotentialUnsettling of the "Well-Settled Principles," 22 TOL. L. REV. 675 (1991).
Because so many recent Dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved
natural resources or environmental matters, these general articles discuss
many of the resources cases in some depth. In addition, several articles have
focused more specifically on commerce in natural resources. See, e.g., Thomas
K Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and
State-Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REV. 71 (1980). The flurry of lower court
opinions involving waste disposal matters, culminating in the Supreme Court's
recent opinions in Fort Gratiot and Chemical Waste Mgmt., have triggered
scholarly discussions more focused on the doctrine's applicability in these more
circumscribed areas. See, e.g., Martin E. Gold, Solid Waste Management and
the Constitution's Commerce Clause, 25 URBAN LAWYER 21 (1993); David
Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphiav. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial"Natural"Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989); D. Marsh Prause, Comment, Environmental
Provincialism, The Commerce Clause, and Hazardous Waste: The High Court
Hazards a Guess, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 949 (1992); Jonathan R. Stone,
Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues RegardingState Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTrL. L. 1 (1990).
337. As discussed in more detail below, the quartet includes Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding patent discrimination against interstate commerce); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (developing balancing
test for state regulations of interstate commerce that do not discriminate based
on commercial item's origin or destination); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951) (holding county may not establish geographic barriers to trade);
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (finding groundwater an item of interstate commerce).
338. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2021-22 (1992). The Court quoted from two provisions
of a 1988 amendment to the Michigan Solid Waste Management Act. Id. at
2022 (quoting the 1988 amendments to the Michigan Solid Waste Management
Act, 1988 MICH. PUB. AcTs., No. 475, § 1 (codified as amended, MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 299.413a, 299.430(2) (West Supp. 1991))). As quoted by the
Court, § 299.413a states: "A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste...
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St. Clair County, Michigan, sued the county and state after
they denied him permission to accept out-of-state waste at its
landfill.3 39 Both the federal district court and the court of appeals rejected the landfill operator's claim that the combined
effect of the Michigan statute and the county solid waste
management plan unconstitutionally discriminated against
interstate commerce.3

0

Finding these decisions inconsistent

with its earlier opinion in Philadelphiav. New Jersey,34 ' the
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court began by noting that under Philadelphia v.
New Jersey an interstate market existed for commercial
transactions involving solid waste.342 Next, the Court summarized the "long recognized" anti-protectionist policies underlying the dormant commerce clause: "the 'negative' or 'dormant' aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits States from
'advanc[ing] their own commercial interests by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the
state.' ,343 It then found that the combined effect of the Michthat is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is located unless
the acceptance of solid waste ...that is not generated in the county is explicitly
authorized in the approved county solid waste management plan." Fort Gratiot,
112 S. Ct. at 2022. Section 299.430(2) states: "In order for a disposal area to
serve the disposal needs of another county, state, or country, the service ...
must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid waste management plan of
the receiving county." Id.
339. See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E. D. Mich. 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 413, 417-18 (6th
Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't
of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
340. Id. at 764-66.
341. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). In that case, the Court invalidated New Jersey's
ban on the import of solid waste finding that the New Jersey statute patently
discriminated against interstate commerce. Id.
342. The Court found that the commercial transactions involving solid waste
"unquestionably have an interstate character." Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023.
See also Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 622-23. Given Philadelphiav.
New Jersey, the commercial transactions in Fort Gratioteasily presented items
of interstate commerce. Philadelphia v. New Jersey exemplified a series of
cases that deal expressly with the interstate shipment of waste. Thus, a "market" for such waste, or waste disposal facilities, exists. Moreover, the particular
waste at issue in Fort Gratiot involved 1,750 tons per day of out-of-state waste.
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2022. Fort Gratiot does not present circumstances
where a the landfill operator simply wished to import waste from some other
Michigan county.
343. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949)) (alteration in original). Elsewhere in its decision, the Court quoted extensively from Philadelphiav. New Jersey, including
passages that speak of "the evils of protectionism," "parochial legislation," and
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igan statutes and county management plan patently discrim3 4 4 Due to the lack of any
inated against interstate commerce.
the
legitimate justification for such patent discrimination,
3 45
restrictions.
import
waste
the
Court invalidated
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the state
and county's attempt to fit under the looser balancing test
reserved for statutes that evenhandedly regulate commerce
3 4 6 In its
without regard to its place of origin or destination.
3
the
often-quoted opinion in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,

Court summarized its test:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. [Citation
omitted.] If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.3 48
The Fort Gratiot defendants argued that the Michigan wasteimport restrictions evenhandedly regulated commerce "because they treat waste from other Michigan counties no dif3 4 9 Citing Dean Milk
ferently than waste from other States."
Co. v. Madison,3 50 the Court concluded that "a State (or one
"illegitimate ...isolati[on of] the State from the national economy." Id. at 2024
(quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626-27).
344. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024-25 (1992).
345. Id. at 2027-28.
346. Id. at 2024-26.
347. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (finding Arizona statute requiring produce labeling impermissibly burdens interstate commerce).
348. Id.
349. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992).
350. 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Dean Milk involved a Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance that required milk sold within the city to have been processed within five
miles of the city centers. Id. at 350. The Court found that this geographic import barrier had the practical effect of excluding milk produced and pasteurized
in Illinois and that the ordinance "plainly discriminate[d] against interstate
commerce." Id. at 354.
Fort Gratiot also cited Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891). Fort Gratiot, 112 S.Ct. at 2025. In Brimmer, the Court struck down "aVirginia statute
that imposed special inspection fees on meat from animals that had been
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of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of
the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles
of commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than
35 1
through the State itself."

Seizing upon language from Sporhase, the Fort Gratiot
defendants also argued that they had valid health and safety
reasons for their waste-management scheme. 52 In Sporhase,
discussed more fully below,353 the Court reiterated its "well
recognized difference between economic protectionism, on the
one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other."354
Indeed, as demonstrated by Maine v. Taylor,3 55 a well-sub-

stantiated health or environmental regulation may support
patent discrimination against interstate commerce, if no nondiscriminatory alternative exists. 56 The Fort Gratiot defendants, however, failed to convince the Court that Michigan's
proffered health and safety concerns could not "be adequately
served by nondiscriminatory alternatives."357
slaughtered more than 100 miles from the place of sale." Brimmer, 138 U.S. at
82-83.
351. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024. The Fort Gratiot defendants also attempted to distinguish the patent discrimination cases by arguing that the
state statute gave counties discretion to allow interstate waste imports. Id. at
2025. The Court, however, concluded that this discretionary permission
"merely reduced the scope of the discrimination .... [In this case St. Clair
County's total ban on out-of-state waste is unaffected by the fact that some
other counties have adopted a different policy." Id.
352. Id. at 2026 (citing Sporhase v, Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
955-56 (1982)).
353. See infra text accompanying notes 361-397.
354. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2027 (1992) (citing Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-56.)
355. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
356. Id. In Maine v. Taylor, the Court upheld Maine's complete ban against
the importation of live baitfish. Id. Maine convinced the Court that the presence of parasites and other characteristics of nonnative species posed a serious
threat to native fish that could not be avoided by available inspection techniques. Id. The Court concluded:
Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish serves legitimate local
purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. This is not a case of arbitrary discrimination
against interstate commerce; the record suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, "apart from their origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish]
differently . .. ."
Id. at 151-52 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978))
(alteration in original).
357. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027. As its purpose, Michigan argued that
the import restrictions enabled counties to plan "for the safe disposal of future
waste." Id. The Court concluded that Michigan could meet this goal by nondis-
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In summary, as outlined by Fort Gratiot, in reviewing a
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a county ordinance,
a court must first determine that the matters regulated involve items of interstate commerce. Second, a court must
then determine if the local regulation discriminates against
interstate commerce. Such discrimination may be patent, as
in Fort Gratiot. Alternatively, such discrimination may be
3 58
Finally,
found in the regulation's effect, as in Dean Milk.
to
intended
legislature
the
if
exist
may
discrimination
such
a5 9
court
the
If
commerce.
discriminate against interstate
finds discrimination, then it closely examines the legitimacy
of the purposes for the discrimination, and strictly considers
the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives. Although
such scrutiny is "strict," Maine v. Taylor demonstrates that a
state law may withstand the review if a strong record exists.
If the court finds that the local law evenhandedly regulates
intra- and interstate commerce, and only effects interstate
commerce incidentally, i.e., as a consequence of a legitimate
police power exercise, then it evaluates the law's validity
6 ° Ultimately,
under the looser Pike v. Bruce Church test.
that test balances the local benefits with the burdens on interstate commerce.
B.

Sporhase v. Nebraska

361
For two reasons, Sporhase v. Nebraska, forms the
starting point for reviewing the California local groundwater

criminatory means. Id. For example, the Court noted that the State could permissibly limit the volume of waste that operators accept. Id. "There is, however, no valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that a
landfill operator may accept from outside the State, but not the amount that the
operator may accept from inside the State." Id.
358. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); see also
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(holding North Carolina apple grading scheme, although neutral on its face,
discriminated in effect against apples graded under Washington state scheme).
359. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
360. The Supreme Court has been unable to draw a bright line between
those "effects" on interstate commerce that are "discriminatory" and those that
are merely "incidental." See Brown-Forman Distillers, Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). Cf Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly,
822 F.2d 388, 400 n.18 (3rd Cir. 1987) (comparing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333 (1977)
(discrimination found) and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456 (1981) (merely incidental burdens found)). In Norfolk Southern, the Third
Circuit concluded that the distinction turns on whether the burden "evidences
purposeful discrimination." Norfolk Southern, 822 F.2d at 401 n.18.
361. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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export restrictions. 2 First, Sporhase determined that, at
least under the circumstances presented by that case,
362. Sporhase sparked a substantial amount of scholarly discussion. The
best single discussion is found in Professor Douglas Grant's contribution to the
multi-volume treatise, Waters and Water Rights. Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 589, 600-50

(Robert Beck ed., 1991) [hereinafter Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water
Export]. Three Nebraska scholars, Richard S. Harnsberger, Josephine R.
Potuto, and Norman W. Thorson, commissioned by the Nebraska Legislature,
recently published the most extensive review of the case and its implications.
Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options after
Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REV. 754 (1991). See also, e.g., Phillip M. Barnett, Mixing
Water and the Commerce Clause: The Problems of Practice,Precedent, and Policy in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161 (1984); Arthur H. Chan,
To Market or Not to Market:Allocation of Interstate Waters, 29 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 529 (1989); Arthur H. Chan, Outline of a Three-Stage Policy of Interstate
GroundwaterAllocation that Promotes Equity, Efficiency, and Orderly Development, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 149 (1991); Charles E. Corker, Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: Does the Dormant Commerce Clause Really Limit the
Power of a State to Forbid (1) The Export of Water and (2) The Creation of a
Water Right for Use in Another State, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 393 (1983); Simms &
Davis, Water Transfers Across State Systems, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1
(1985); A. Dan Tarlock, So It's Not "Ours"-Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First
Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 137 (1983); Trelease,
Interstate Use, supra note 331; Trelease, State Water & Lines, supra note 331;
Albert E. Utton, In Search of an IntegratingPrinciplefor Interstate Water Law:
Regulation Versus the Market Place, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 985 (1985); Stephen
F. Williams, Free Trade in Water Resources: Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 2 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 89 (1983). Cf Rodgers, supra note 326. In addition
to these general articles, a number of articles, mostly by students, consider the
case's applicability to specific state statutes. See, e.g., Robert Currey-Wilson,
Note, Do Oregon's Water Export Regulations Violate the Commerce Clause?, 16
ENVTL. L. 963 (1986); Connie L. Eaton, Comment, Commerce Clause Scrutiny of
Montana's Water Export Statutes, 7 Pus. LAND L. REV. 97 (1986); Allen D.
Freemyer & Craig M. Bunnell, Comment, Legal Impediments to Water Marketing: Application to Utah, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 237 (1989); Nancy E. Hetrick,
Note, Recent Developments in the El Paso/New Mexico InterstateGroundwater
Controversy-The Constitutionality of New Mexico's New Municipality Water
Planning Statute, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223 (1989); Nancy N. Kerr, Comment,
Sporhase, the Commerce Clause, and State Power to Conserve Natural Resources-Is the Local Well Running Dry?, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1033 (1983)
(Texas); A. Dan Tarlock & Darcy A. Frownfelter, State Groundwater Sover-

eignty After Sporhase: The Case of the Hueco Bolson, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 27, (1990)
(New Mexico). To date, no one has explored in detail the impact of Sporhase on
intrastate water transfer restrictions. See Nancy K. Laney, Note, Does Arizona's 1980 GroundwaterManagement Act Violate the Commerce Clause?, 24
ARIz. L. REV. 1060, 1068-71 (1982) (arguing evenhanded intrastate groundwater transfer restrictions valid under Commerce Clause). Similarly, no one
has explored the implications of Sporhase for groundwater export restrictions
in California. Cf. Carl P.A. Nelson, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas:A
Call For New Approaches to Water Resource Management, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 283, 315-19 (1984) (discussing Sporhase and its treatment of the Commerce Clause).
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363 Second,
groundwater was an item of interstate commerce.
Sporhase considered in detail a state groundwater export permit scheme. In a discussion that is arguably dicta, the Court
64 However,
upheld three elements of the statutory scheme.
it invalidated a reciprocity provision.365

1. Groundwater in Interstate Commerce
The appellants in Sporhase were farmers who jointly
owned contiguous tracts of land that straddled the Nebraska
6
and Colorado state lines. 36 They pumped water from a well

located on the Nebraska parcel to irrigate both the Nebraska
and Colorado tracts.3 6 7 A Nebraska statute, however, 3re68
state lines.
quired a permit to export groundwater across

That statute permitted the export if the state "finds that the
withdrawal of groundwater requested is reasonable, is not
and is
contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater,
36 9 As an
not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare."
additional condition to the issuance of a permit, however, Nebraska required that the state to which the groundwater was
to be exported permit groundwater export from that state to
Because Sporhase leaves so many questions unanswered, however, it cannot be the ending point of the analysis. See, e.g., Tarlock & Frownfelter, supra,
at 28 (discussing that the case "raised more questions than it answered").
363. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 945-54 (1982).
364. Id. at 954-57. Inthe narrowest sense, the only two portions of Sporhase
necessary to the decision were the holdings that water is an item of interstate
commerce and that the reciprocity clause was unconstitutional. See Corker,
supra note 362, at 414-15.
365. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58.
366. Id. at 944.
367. Id.
368. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 945-54 (1982)
(quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)).
369. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978) (emphasis added)). The
complete statute reads:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other entity intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in
the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state
shall apply to the Department of Water Resources for a permit to do so.
If the Director of Water Resources finds that the withdrawal of the
ground water requested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the state in which the water
is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground
water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
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Nebraska sued to enjoin the unpermitted

pumping. 371 The Nebraska state courts rejected defendants'
Commerce Clause challenges to the permit scheme, and enjoined the pumping.372
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
In reaching its decision, the Court first concluded that
groundwater was an item of interstate commerce.373 The
Court did note "the desirability of state and local management of groundwater."3 74 In addition, the Court acknowl-

edged that the "Western States' interests, and their asserted
superior competence, in conserving and preserving scarce
water resources are not irrelevant in the Commerce Clause
inquiry."375 Finally, the Court left some room in its analysis
for the states' claim of groundwater ownership. 76 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that these concerns did not eliminate the "interstate dimension" of the groundwater at issue.3 7 7 Rather, the Court found that "these factors inform
the determination whether the burdens on commerce imposed by state groundwater regulation are reasonable or unreasonable."378 In the Court's opinion, a decision to exempt
groundwater from Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
would necessarily restrict Congress' ability to address the
"national problem" of groundwater overdraft.379
370. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944. See also supra note 369.
371. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
372. Id. See also State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 305 N.W.2d 614, 616
(Neb. 1981).
373. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953-54. In reaching this initial conclusion, the
Court rejected contrary implications in its earlier opinion in Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 945-51. In
Hudson County, an opinion that included a brief discussion of the Commerce
Clause, the Court upheld New Jersey's restrictions on the interstate transfer of
water to New York. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357. Sporhase found that
Hudson County depended upon a state-ownership-of-natural-resources theory
overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979). See Grant, State
Regulation of Interstate Water, supra note 362, at 600-01.
374. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 952 (1982) (citing
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978) and reiterating "some of
the circumstances that support a general policy of local water management
under differing legal systems."). Id. at 952 n.13 (emphasis added).
375. Id. at 953.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 952.
378. Id. at 953.
379. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982). The
Court stated:

1994]

COHERENT GROUNDWATER POLICY

461

As evidence of the groundwater's "interstate dimension,"
noted that much
the Court cited two factors. First, the Court
° It stated: "The agwater is used for agricultural irrigation.
ricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide.
They provide the archetypical example of commerce among
Constitution
the several States for which the Framers of our
8 ' Second, the
regulation."
federal
intended to authorize
in
Court noted that the particular aquifer involved
2 AcSporhase-the Ogallala-underlies parts of six states.
cording to the Court, the Ogallala's "multistate character...
confirms the view that there is a significant federal interest
in conservation as well as in fair allocation of this diminishing resource. "383
2. The Nebraska GroundwaterExport Statute
After concluding that the groundwater before it was an
the statuitem of interstate commerce, the Court examined
4 The Court
3
tory scheme restricting groundwater export.
first found that the permit requirement's "reasonableness,"
"conservation," and "public welfare" provisions passed the
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. test for nondiscriminatory, even-

5
handed regulation.3 8 The Court accepted the importance, le-

But [Nebraska's] claim that Nebraska groundwater is not an article of
commerce goes too far: it would not only exempt Nebraska groundwater regulation from burden-on-commerce analysis, it would also curtail the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own policies
concerning such regulation. [Philadelphiav. New Jersey.] If Congress
chooses to legislate in this area under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than in Texas and States
with similar property laws. Groundwater overdraft is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that scale.
Id.
380. Id. at 953.
381. Id. (emphasis added).
382. Id..
383. Id.
384. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
385. Id. at 952 (1982) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)). See also supra note 348 and accompanying text. As quoted above, the
inNebraska permit scheme at issue in Sporhase applied only to pumping for
interstate
to
only
applicability
terstate export. See supra note 369. This patent
441
transfers would seem to trigger stricter review under Hughes v. Oklahoma,
can
U.S. 1727 (1979), and its progeny. Under this line of cases, unless a state
discrimiby
interest
significant
its
accommodate
only
can
it
demonstrate that
nation against interstate commerce, as Maine did with its baitfish ban, the statute falls. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). Indeed, when considering
the Nebraska statute's reciprocity requirement, Sporhase acknowledges that
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*gitimacy, and genuineness of Nebraska's proffered purpose
for these provisions: groundwater conservation.38 6 As evidence of the genuineness of Nebraska's regulatory intent, the
Court cited the extensive groundwater management regulations applicable to pumping for in-state purposes.38 7 The
Court concluded that the first three interstate transfer requirements "may well be no more strict in application than
the limitations upon intrastate transfers imposed by [the
State]."38 8
The Court indicated that a "confluence of [several] realities" supported its conclusion that the first three export permit requirements were reasonable on their face. 38 9 The

Court identified four such "realities." First, reiterating the

distinction between permissible local health regulations and
impermissible economic protectionism, the Court located "a
State's power to regulate the use of water in times and places
of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citi-

portion of the statute's "explicit barrier to commerce between the two states."
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957. Following Hughes, Sporhase concluded that Nebraska failed to demonstrate "a close fit between the reciprocity requirement
and its asserted local purpose." Id. at 957-58 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.)
The Sporhase Court acknowledged that "Commerce Clause concerns are
implicated by the fact that [the Nebraska statute] applies to interstate transfers but not to intrastate transfers ...." Id. at 955. Nevertheless, the Court
reviewed this seemingly patent discrimination under the looser Pike standards
because of the substantial restrictions placed upon groundwater pumping for
use within Nebraska. Id. at 954-56. In this context, the Court concluded that
'a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on
its own citizens
is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the
uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State. An exemption for interstate
transfers would be inconsistent with the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation." Id.
386. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944-45. Actually, the Court summarized the proffered purposes as "conserve and preserve." Id. See also Trelease, Interstate
Use, supra note 331, at 328-29 (discussing phrase's import). These purposes,
however, are ultimately contradictory. See, e.g., Corker, supra note 362, at 416
n.82 (citing Douglas L. Grant, Reasonable GroundwaterPumping Levels Under
the AppropriationDoctrine: The Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1 (1981)). For convenience, this article will simply refer to the
twin goals as "conservation." Cf Trelease, Interstate Use, supra note 331, at
330-35 (discussing promotion of local economy as a legitimate local purpose).
387. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955.
388. Id. at 956 (emphasis added). The Court noted that the regulations applicable to the area at issue in the case "strictly limit the intrastate transfer of
groundwater: transfers are only permitted between lands controlled by the
same groundwater user, and all transfers must be approved [a regional
agency]." Id. at 955.
389. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956-57 (1982).
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Second, the
Court noted that both its own equitable apportionment cases
and interstate compacts had fostered "the legal expectation
that under certain circumstances each State may restrict
water within its borders ... ."391 Thus, the Court stated,
bounda"[o]ur law has ... recognized the relevance of state
3 92 Third,
resources.
water
scarce
of
ries in the allocation
although state ownership claims to the groundwater at issue
had not precluded the Court from including groundwater
within Commerce Clause scope, it nevertheless found these
for its
ownership claims "may support a limited preference
393 Fourth, the
resource."
the
own citizens in the utilization of
Court found that Nebraska's groundwater conservation efforts gave such water "some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens
in times of shortage."394
After upholding these first three permit requirements,
the Court turned to the reciprocity provision. It found that
Nebraska had provided "no evidence that this restriction is
narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation razens . . . [at the core of its] police power. "39

tionale." 395 The Court noted that the statute prevented the
390. Id. at 956.
391. Id. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of EquitableApportionment
Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. CoLo. L. REV. 381 (1985); Harrison C.
Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of Western Water Resources, 66 NEB.
L. REV. 76 (1987).
392. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
393. Id. In support of this point, the Court cited Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
strike
518, 533-34 (1978). In Hicklin, the Court used the Commerce Clause to
oil
trans-Alaska
the
building
in
engaged
down Alaska's requirement that firms
project.
the
on
work
to
residents
Alaskan
of
percentage
specified
a
hire
pipeline
Id.
394. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982). In support of this point, the Court cited its "market participant" case, Reeves v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980). In Reeves, the Court approved South Dakota's preference
to state citizens for cement sales from a state-operated cement plant. Id. at
440. In so doing, the Court found that South Dakota was acting not as a market
regulator, but as a "market participant." Id. This "market participant" exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause has attracted substantial discussion in
both cases and commentaries. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market
ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 395
(1989); Stephanie Landry, Comment, State Immunity from the Dormant Commerce Clause:Extension of the Market-ParticipantDoctrinefrom State Purchase
515
and Sale of Goods and Services to NaturalResources, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J.
DocParticipant
Market
the
and
Federalism
(1985); Karl Manheim, New-Age
trine, 22 ARiZ. ST. L. REV. 559 (1991).

395. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58.
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movement of water from even a water-rich area in Nebraska
for more valuable use in a water-deficient area in an adjoining state, simply because the adjoining state prohibited export to Nebraska.396 Absent evidence of the necessity for the
reciprocity requirement, the Court found that this absolute
"requirement does note survive the 'strictest scrutiny' re397
served for facially discriminatory legislation."

C. Is there "InterstateCommerce" in California
Groundwater?
Although the Supreme Court had little difficulty finding
that the groundwater at issue in Sporhase involved interstate
commerce, several potential distinctions exist between the
Ogallala waters in that case and much of California's groundwater. First, as noted by the Court, the Ogallala itself underlies several states, including both of the parcels at issue in
Sporhase.39" Like the Ogallala, there are interstate aquifers

that underlie both California and adjoining jurisdictions. 399
But, both in absolute numerical terms and in relative com396. Id. at 958.
397. Id. In dicta, the Court stated:
If it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers a water shortage,
that the intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance to
areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance, and that the importation of water from adjoining States would roughly compensate for
any exportation to those States, then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credibly advanced for the reciprocity provision.
A demonstrably arid State conceivably might be able to marshal evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between even a total
ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and preserve
water.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court also found that Congress' deference to state water laws and approval of interstate compacts "do not indicate that Congress wished to remove
federal constitutional constraints on ...state [groundwater] laws." Id. at 95960.
398. Id. at 953. But cf. Corker, supra note 362, at 426 (arguing Sporhase
only infers that interstate aquifer involved).
399. For example, California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 11875 notes that the Honey Lake Valley basin in Lassen County, the Fish Lake
Valley basin in Inyo and Mono Counties, the Pahrump Valley basin in Inyo
County, and the Ivanpah Valley basin in San Bernadino county all extend into
Nevada. CAL. DEP'T WATER RESOURCEs, BULLETIN 118-75, CALIFORNIA'S
GROUND WATER 70, 74, 76 (1975) [hereinafter BULLETIN 118-75]. Similarly, the
Klamath River Valley basin in Modoc and Siskiyou counties extends into Oregon. Id. at 30. The number of these interstate basins is tiny compared to the
hundreds of purely intrastate basins identified in the Bulletin. Id.
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mercial importance, the handful of interstate basins is insignificant compared to California's purely intrastate basins.40 °

In particular, of the eight counties that have enacted groundwater export ordinances, five contain only intrastate aquifers.4 °1 In addition, virtually all of the precipitation that
recharges the overwhelming majority of the intrastate aquifers falls solely on California lands.40 2
A second distinction between the Sporhase export and
most of the exports at issue in California to date involves a
transfer across state lines.40 3 In Sporhase, Nebraska water
flowed across the Colorado state line. Similarly, in California, concerns over potential interstate or international
groundwater transfers have motivated at least two of the
eight local ordinances enacted to date.40 4 Nevertheless, much
of the local concern in California over potential groundwater
exports involves water pumped from one California county
400. For example, all of the important aquifers underlying the Central Valley and the South Coast plain are entirely intrastate. Id. at 3, 46, 56, 64.
401. Tehama, Glenn, Butte, Sacramento, and Nevada counties show no interstate aquifers in Bulletin 118-75. Id. at 56, 64, 68. Several basins in Imperial County appear to extend into Mexico. See id. at 84. In addition, several
more appear tributary to the Colorado River. Id. Modoc County's ordinance,
applicable only to five named aquifers, includes portions of three that appear to
be interstate. MODOC COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.08.020(B) (Surprise Valley,
Goose Lake and Tule Lake (Klamath)). Compare BULLETIN 118-75, supra note
399, at 28, 56. The Owens Valley groundwater basin, addressed by the Inyo
County ordinance, appears to extend into Nevada from Mono County. Id. at 72.
The California Legislature has created special groundwater management
districts to regulate water in two areas that straddle the California-Nevada
line. Honey Lake Valley Groundwater Management Dist., CAL. WATER CODE
app. ch. 129 (West Supp. 1993) (Lassen County, Cal.); Long Valley Groundwater Basin legislation, CAL. WATER CODE app. § 119-1301 (West Supp. 1993)
(Sierra & Plumas Counties, Cal.). The Long Valley statute expressly authorizes
the respective California counties to "enter into an agreement with the State of
Nevada or the County of Washoe [Nevada], or both, for the purposes of groundwater management within the Long Valley Groundwater Basin." Id. § 1191301.
402. A glance at a topographical map of California shows that, outside of the
Colorado River and several North Coast rivers, lakes and streams, no watershed otherwise within California has any part of its headwaters in another
state. Cf BULLETIN 118-75, supra note 399, at 6 (Figure 4).
403. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 944 (1982). See
also supra text accompanying notes 366-368.
404. As noted above, water transfers to Mexico sparked the Imperial County
groundwater ordinance. See supra note 331. Similarly, the Nevada County ordinance was enacted to regulate potential groundwater pumping down the
Truckee River into Nevada. Letter from Melanie K Wellner, Deputy County
Counsel, to Gregory S. Weber (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with author).
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for use in another California county.4 °5 In addition, although
the extensive local, state, and federal aqueduct system in
California theoretically makes groundwater "purchases" possible by out-of-state users, to date, little evidence suggests
the existence of any market for such out-of-state exports.4 °6
A third distinction exists between the Sporhase export
and much of the possible groundwater exports from California counties.40 7 As noted by the Court, the water exporters in
Sporhase intended to use it to irrigate agricultural land. The
Court found that the resulting farm products represented the
"archetypical" market appropriate to Dormant Commerce
405. Thus, groundwater exports to Southern California sparked regulatory
efforts in both Mono and Inyo Counties. See Letter from James S. Reed, Mono
County Counsel, to Gregory S. Weber (Oct. 27, 1992) (Mono County Tri-Valley
ordinance inspired by proposals to export groundwater to Southern California)
(on file with author); Rossman & Steel, supra note 42, at 916-30 (expansion of
Los Angeles' groundwater exports from Inyo County sparked Inyo County ordinance). Similar concerns over in-state competition for groundwater sparked the
Tehama ordinance. See Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1552, preamble, $ 12
(Feb. 4, 1992). Given their geographic location and the lack of demand for their
water in Nevada, similar concerns over in-state competition likely sparked the
Butte, Glenn, and Sacramento counties' efforts.
406. For example, the aqueduct network would allow Las Vegas, Nevada, to
purchase Sacramento Valley groundwater and exchange it for Colorado surface
water rights held by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWD). The MWD could pump the Sacramento Valley groundwater into the
Sacramento River and send it, via the California aqueduct, to Southern California. In exchange, Las Vegas could pump an equivalent amount of water from
the MWD's Colorado River entitlement.
Indeed, by extension, since the City of Denver's trans-Rocky-Mountain diversion system links the Colorado and Missouri/Mississippi/Ohio River drainage, Sacramento Valley groundwater could be purchased by Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, through a series of exchanges. In neither case would Sacramento
water ever physically leave California. Cf. Harnsberger et al., supra note 362,
at 779-80 (discussing hypothetical transfers of Nebraska groundwater to Southern California via pumping and exchanges).
Although these exchanges are hydraulically possible, enormous economic,
political, and legal obstacles have restricted their development to date. Moreover, California has been generally perceived as a purchaser of excess Colorado
River water, not an exporter of its own. See, e.g., Simms & Davis, supra note
362, at 22-25 to 22-28 (noting "Galloway proposal" to transfer Colorado water to
Southern California). Nevertheless, the growing Nevada thirst makes Nevada
purchases of California water less theoretical. See Faith Bremner, Critics Attack Las Vegas-Area Groundwater Models, RENO GAZETTE-JouRNAL, Feb. 14,
1993, at 16A (Las Vegas seeking 250,000 acre-feet of groundwater from rural
Nevada counties); Faith Bremner, Honey Lake's Buried Treasure, RENO GAZETrE-JoURNAL, Feb. 14, 1993, at 1A, 16A-18A (Washoe County, Nevada, seeks
to pump groundwater from beneath Honey Lake basin).
407. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
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Clause scrutiny.4 0 8 Similarly, in California, at least one case
has involved the pumping of groundwater by farmers to irrigate parcels in other counties owned by the same farming interests.4 °9 Nevertheless, the bulk of the transfers in California probably would take water from irrigation and devote it
to municipal or industrial uses.4 10
In combination, these three distinctions set up a range of
similarities to Sporhase. At one end of the continuum, an
transfer of water across the state border from an interstate
aquifer for agricultural irrigation would fall squarely under
Sporhase. As such, a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
would dictate the propriety of any local regulation burdening
such a transfer. At the opposite end of the continuum, however, an intrastate water transfer from an intrastate aquifer
for nonagricultural uses offers substantial opportunity to distinguish Sporhase. If the distinctions are legally meaningful,
then the Dormant Commerce Clause might not apply at all.
The uncertain application of Sporhase beyond its factual
41 1
setting has drawn the attention of several commentators.
In particular, three have written on the first of the three distinctions relevant to the local California groundwater restrictions: export from an interstate aquifer. Noting the Court's
failure to limit its holding to the facts before it, two commentators concluded quickly that Sporhase extends beyond its
factual setting, at least to include the interstate export of
water from an intrastate aquifer.4 12 This rationale seems
quite weak, since judicial holdings are by definition limited to
the facts and arguments presented in the case before the de413
ciding court, even if the court does not expressly so state.
408. Id.
409. See Summary Judgment at 1, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147
& 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal. Aug. 11, 1993).
410. Such transfers are typical of "Post-Reclamation Era" water reallocation.
See, e.g., Tarlock & Frownfelter, supra note 362, at 42; Steven J. Shupe et al.,
Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413

(1989).
411. See, e.g., Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note
362, at 601 n.61; Trelease, Interstate Use, supra note 331, at 326-27.
412. See Corker, supra note 362, at 426 (Court made no distinction between
interstate and intrastate aquifers); Nelson, supra note 362, at 312 n.165 and
accompanying text. See also Grant, State Regulation of InterstateWater Export,
supra note 362, at 601 n.61.
413. See, e.g., Stone v. California, 165 Cal. Rptr. 339, 345 (Cal. App. 1980)
(Watt, J., dissenting) ("Repeatedly it has been held that a case is not authority
for a point not discussed.").
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In an initial attempt to give a more solid doctrinal foundation, Professor Douglas Grant concluded that the Court's rejection of the state ownership theory "is quite likely powerful
enough to support [Commerce Clause] scrutiny of state barriers to the export of water from any source that is attractive
for interstate export."414 Upon further reflection, however,
4 15
Professor Grant found the analysis "more complex."

The problem stems in large part from the Court's uncritical combination of the "agricultural products" and "interstate
aquifer" characteristics in its conclusion that the Ogallala
presented "interstate" water.416 Although the Court identifies both factors as evidence of the interstate dimension of the
groundwater at issue, it merely hinted at the independent
significance of the two factors. 4 7 Further complications arise
from the Court's decision to consider the Dormant Commerce
Clause limitations upon state activity coextensive with the
limitations placed by affirmative congressional legislation
under the clause. 4 18

Ultimately, Professor Grant draws

414. Douglas L. Grant, The Future of Interstate Allocation of Water, 29
RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 977, 1008 (1983) [hereinafter Grant, The Future of
InterstateAllocation of Water]. See also Grant, State Regulation of Interstate
Water Export, supra note 362, at 601 nn.61-62.
415. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362, at
601 n.62 and accompanying text.
416. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
417. The "multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer" appears to be a subsidiary factor in the Court's decision. The Court notes that this "multistate
character" merely "confirms the view that there is a significant federal interest
in conservation as well as fair allocation of this diminishing resource." Id. (emphasis added). The Court's use of "confirms" suggests that the groundwater's
use in agricultural production independently demonstrated such a "significant
federal interest." See Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra
note 362, at 603.
418. See Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362,
at 602-04. Although Sporhase appears to equate the two powers, the Court has
otherwise declined to identify expressly the degree of overlap between the dormant and active Commerce Clause limitations upon state activity. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978) (declining to adopt a "twotiered definition of commerce"). Cf. Trelease, Interstate Use of Water, supra
note 331, at 325 ("The Court clearly intends that the negative commerce clause
shall be coextensive with the power of Congress."). But see contra Tangier
Sound Watermen's Ass'n v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287, 1304-06 (E.D. Va.
1982) (in holding that unharvested crabs are not items of interstate commerce,
court refused to read the Dormant Commerce Clause as broadly as affirmative
Commerce Clause). As noted above, many commentators who are critical of the
Dormant Commerce Clause would prefer that the Court sharply curtail, if not
outright eliminate, the dormant powers doctrine. See supra note 336. For a
different view, see Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution:
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heavily from the Court's preservation of room for Congress to
address affirmatively the nationwide problem of groundwater
overdraft to reaffirm his earlier conclusion that Sporhase ap419
plies to interstate exports from intrastate aquifers.
Given the broad scope that the Court has given to the
affirmative Commerce Clause powers, congressional groundwater overdraft legislation almost certainly could include
purely intrastate aquifers.4 2 ° If the Court continues to treat
the dormant and active commerce powers as coextensive,
then, as Grant notes, intrastate aquifers would fall within
the dormant clause's scope. Indeed, such a broad reading of
Sporhase and the dormant commerce power might make irrelevant not only the "multistate character" of the Ogallala
aquifer, but also the other two distinctions noted above: a
transfer across a state line, and end use in an agricultural
product. The famous Minnesota home-grown wheat case
demonstrates that a product need not cross a state line before
Congress can regulate it under the affirmative Commerce
42 1
Clause, if that product "affects" interstate commerce.
On Recovering Our Founding Principles,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 507, 533-38
(1993) (criticizing the expansive reading given to the affirmative powers to "regulate" commerce, author concludes that the "so-called negative or dormant commerce power" fulfills the framers' intent that Congress "regularize" interstate
commerce).
419. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362, at
602-04.
420. By analogy, under regulations implementing the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977), the federal government regulates "nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce."
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-26
(1985) (upholding, as "waters of the United States" within the meaning of the
CWA, Army Corps of Engineers' "wetlands" definition that included lands "adjacent to waters of the United States"). But see also id. at 124 n.6, 131 n.8 (leaving open Corps' ability to regulate wetlands not adjacent to bodies of open
water). Cf. Harnsberger et al. supra note 362, at 801-02 (without distinguishing potential differences in scope of affirmative and negative powers, authors
conclude that it is "difficult to imagine any activity that arguably could not satisfy the interstate nexus").
421. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942). In Wickard, the
Court stated: "[Elven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, by reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. . . ." Id.
at 125. Under Wickard, a court would still have to determine whether the intrastate use of groundwater from intrastate aquifers "exerted a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id. The products and services produced
in reliance upon such intrastate waters undoubtedly represent substantial economic activity. See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, GROUND WATER
STUDY, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY 1 (4th Progress Report, Sept. 1989) (the largest
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Similarly, under the Commerce Clause, Congress regulates
many more markets than the "archetypical" market for agri4 22
cultural commodities.
If the Court ultimately adopts the position of the dissent
in Sporhase and finds that the Dormant Commerce Clause
sweeps less broadly than the active Commerce Clause, then
the noted distinctions between Sporhase and the California
groundwater regulations become critical to delineating
Sporhase's applicability. The third noted distinction-between agricultural and nonagricultural end use-seems insubstantial. Although Sporhase emphasized the "archetypical" nature of the agricultural market for which the
groundwater there formed a vital input,4 2 3 an urban export
restriction challenger should easily be able to demonstrate
the value of groundwater to production of nonagricultural
goods. In this context, the Court's emphasis on "archetypical"
should not preclude comparison with other "typical" markets
for which the Commerce Clause's Framers might well have
envisioned scrutiny of protectionist state activity. Such other
"typical" markets probably include products of urban
4
42

areas.

The second distinction-lack of a transfer across state
lines-proves more difficult to dismiss. The application of
Sporhase to intrastate water transfers could subject longstanding state place-of-use restrictions to new scrutiny.4 2 5
Moreover, Sporhase implicitly accepts, and acknowledges
that courts have fostered, a state's ability to restrict intrastate water transfers.4 2 6 Yet this implicit acceptance occurs
not in the portion of the case discussing whether groundwater
state groundwater basin-the San Joaquin Valley basin-provides 50% of all
water used in "California's largest and most productive block of farmland"). If
the production of wheat in Wickard "affected" interstate commerce, then the
production of groundwater in the San Joaquin Valley-or other intrastate aquifers used for irrigation-surely affects interstate commerce.
422. Indeed, it is hard to consider a "market" that is not somehow regulated
by congressional legislation.
423. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
424. See, e.g., Pilon, supra note 418, at 533-34 n.108 and accompanying text
(Commerce Clause aimed at preventing state protection of "local manufacturers
and sellers from out-of-state competitors" (emphasis added)).
425. See Nelson, supra note 362, at 314-20 (discussing area-of-origin restrictions after Sporhase).
426. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-56 (noting Nebraska's "severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens" and the partially court-fostered
"legal expectation that ...each State may restrict water within its borders").

1994]

COHERENT GROUNDWATER POLICY

471

is an item of interstate commerce, but rather in the evaluaburden upon a recognized item of interstate
tion of the
427
commerce.

Ultimately, the fact that no state line has been crossed in

many intrastate water transfers may indicate only the grav-

4 28 Similarly,
ity of the burden and not whether one exists.
the present lack of an interstate market for purchases of California groundwater 4 29 should not preclude application of
Sporhase to local California groundwater export restrictions.
43 0 No conSporhase itself involved no groundwater "market."
sideration apparently changed hands for use of the Nebraska
groundwater in Colorado; rather, the same parties owned
43 1 Apart from
both the site of extraction and the site of use.
the interstate nature of the aquifer there at issue, what convinced the Sporhase Court that the groundwater was an item
of interstate commerce was its importance as an input for the
production4 32 of commodities that entered interstate
commerce.
As discussed in Sporhase and considered in more detail
below, many intrastate restrictions on the acquisition and
transfer of groundwater might easily survive a Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.4 3 3 Nevertheless, the ease with

427. Compare Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 945-54
(1982) (finding groundwater is an item of interstate commerce) with id. at 95458 (discussing Nebraska scheme's impact on interstate commerce).
428. Compare Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 801 (1992) ("volume of
commerce affected measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no
relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce"). See also Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362, at 614-15. Professor Grant examines the ability of a riparian state to prevent interstate water exports under the riparian doctrine's
limitation of riparian water to riparian parcels. Id. He concludes that a court
would easily find that "the riparian rule is an evenhanded measure serving legitimate state interests and affecting interstate commerce only incidentally."
Id. at 614.
429. See supra notes 403-406.
430. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
431. Id.
432. For this reason, a California resident groundwater appropriator or purchaser should have standing in federal court to challenge a local export restriction even if that resident intends to use the water in California. Under article
III, to have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury caused by governmental action and redressable by judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). Here, the "injury" involves the
economic impact caused by the restricted availability of a production input, i.e.,
groundwater.
433. See infra text accompanying notes 478-534.
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which a well-crafted, nondiscriminatory scheme passes muster should not preclude a Commerce Clause challenge to discriminatory schemes merely because they involve an intrastate water export restriction. A court should be able to
examine the circumstances giving rise to the intrastate restriction to determine whether the local legislature discriminated against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court's decisions in Dean Milk and Fort Gratiot, discussed above,434
buttress this conclusion. In both of those cases, the Court rejected challenges to geographic limitations upon goods imported into a municipality, even though those regulations
substantially burdened intrastate sales as well as interstate
sales.43 5 In both cases, the Court found discrimination
against interstate commerce, even if intrastate users beyond
the municipal boundary were also burdened. 43 6 A California

plaintiff challenging a local groundwater export restriction
should have the opportunity to show that even intrastate export restrictions burden interstate commerce by raising the
price or reducing the availability of water-often the most
critical production input for agricultural or manufactured
goods that themselves will travel in interstate commerce.
D. Affirmative DiscriminationAgainst Interstate
Commerce?
Assuming that the water subjected to a particular local
export restriction is an item of interstate commerce, the next
step in the analysis examines whether the restriction "affirmatively discriminates against"4 3 7 interstate commerce.

As

noted above, an ordinance may patently discriminate, may
discriminate in effect, or may manifest a discriminatory purpose.4 38

To date, none of the local California groundwater

export restrictions facially limit their application to exports
beyond the state's borders. Rather, as the "wall" beyond
which they restrict export, they use either their local political
borders or seemingly politically neutral hydrogeological borders. 439 Thus, any affirmative discrimination will be found, if
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

See supra text accompanying notes 349-351.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
See supra text accompanying notes 358-359.
See infra text accompanying notes 440-442.
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at all, by looking to discriminatory effects or purposes resulting from the placement of these "walls."
The likelihood of finding a discriminatory effect may well
depend upon the type of boundary used to trigger pumping
restrictions. The local regulations exhibit a range of express
recognition of local political boundaries as a regulatory
threshold. At one end of the spectrum, several of the ordinances burden only those who will move groundwater beyond
the jurisdiction's political boundaries. 44 0 At the other end of
the spectrum, several jurisdictions burden all pumpers
within their boundaries, whether or not they are exporting
from that jurisdiction.4 4 1 In the middle, the rest of the jurisdictions burden only those pumpers who are exporting be4 42
yond some often undefined "basin."
440. See supra note 242. In the Sierra Valley and Mono County Tri-Valley
groundwater management districts, the Legislature has also required permits
only from those who propose exporting groundwater beyond the districts' political boundaries. CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 119-706 (West Supp. 1993) (Sierra
Valley), id. § 128-706 (Mono Tri-Valley). In addition, the Legislature expressly
granted a use priority to those appropriators in those two districts who would
be using the water off-basin but within the district. Id. § 119-709.7 (Sierra Valley), id. § 128-710 (Mono County Tri-Valley). Both acts, however, authorizebut do not require-the respective management districts to burden substantially overlying users through extraction permits and limitations. See, e.g., id.
§ 119-601 (Sierra Valley) (extraction facility registration), § 119-709 (Sierra
Valley), id. § 128-708 (Mono County Tri-Valley) (extraction reductions possible
for in-district users if export curtailment insufficient to curtail overdraft).
441. See, e.g., INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.030 (permits required for all
pumping from identified basin); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.030 (permit required to use water anywhere but on parcel overlying or contiguous to
parcel where extracted), id. § 9.40.040 (well "radius of influence" restricted).
Both of these schemes, however, exempted large numbers of pumpers. See, e.g.,
INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.070 (de minimis pumpers exempted); TEHAMA
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.045 (pre-1992 pumpers grandfathered).
442. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-4 (permit required for water
use "outside of area in which said pumping affects the natural available supply"); IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 56201 ("appropriator"
uses water outside of "area of influence" of extraction),id. § 56302 (appropriators need permits); MODOc COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.08.020 (permit required to
take water out of defined areas); NEVADA COUNTY, CAL., LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT CODE § L-X 6.2(D) ("groundwater export" defined as "removal... to anyplace outside the immediate groundwater basin), id. § 6.3 (permit required to
"export" groundwater). For those ordinances that use off-"basin" uses as their
regulatory trigger, the failure to define "basin" brings additional ambiguity into
the Commerce Clause analysis. "Groundwater basin" is itself a vague term; its
definition is often shaped by political considerations. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER,
supra note 14, at 100 (noting political boundaries as possible lateral boundaries
for groundwater "basins"). Cf. CAL. WATER CODE § 1220(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(groundwater export barred from within the "combined Sacramento Valley-
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This range of approaches to the relationship of the
"walls" to political boundaries raises a conceptual wrinkle peculiar to local ordinances. When a court examines whether a
state legislature has discriminated against interstate commerce, the court looks to whether the state has shielded intrastate interests from competition from out-of-state interests.443 When a local government acts to protect local
businesses, however, it is as likely to be concerned with insulating the local economy from intrastate as well as from outof-state competitors.44 4 A court analyzing whether a local ordinance discriminates purposefully or practically against interstate commerce must decide initially how to focus the inquiry. On the one hand, a court might focus the inquiry
narrowly on whether the ordinance shields the local economy
from out-of-state competition. Such a narrower focus would
allow a relatively greater share of local ordinances to survive.
On the other hand, a court might focus the inquiry on
whether the ordinance shields the local economy from all
non-local competition, by any competitor who is otherwise engaged in interstate commerce. 445 Such a broader reading
would make it easier to find discrimination, and thus trigger
stricter scrutiny.
Neither of the two principal Supreme Court "local regulation" cases, Dean Milk and Fort Gratiot, address this point
directly. Language in Dean Milk suggests that the narrow
focus is appropriate. 4 Fort Gratiot is ambiguous on the
point.4 4a
Delta/Central Sierra basin" unless in accord with a county groundwater management scheme).
443. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333 (1977) (finding North Carolina apple-grading requirements benefited
North Carolina apple growers at expense of Washington state apple growers).
444. For example, in Dean Milk, the Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance protected local milk producers from competition from other, non-local Wisconsin
producers, as well as from Illinois producers. See supra note 350.
445. This distinction echoes the one between cases that examine the actual
movement of goods across state lines, and cases such as Wickard, where intrastate commerce merely "affected" interstate commerce. See supra note 421.
446. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). In that
case, the Court found that the ordinance "erect[ed] an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State...." Id.
(emphasis added).
447. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992). In Fort Gratiot, the Court initially
announced its concern with restrictions on the movement of goods across state
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The Ninth Circuit, however, has recently used the
broader reading in a case arising out of a California city's actions. In Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica,4 4 the court
considered Santa Monica's franchise fee agreement with an
interstate pipeline company. The company claimed that the
excessive fees improperly burdened interstate commerce.4 4 9
In rejecting the Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that "Santa Monica has not acted to
restrict the flow of goods or natural resources from being
shipped into or outside of its boundaries in order to protect
producers or suppliers within the city."450 The court's focus
on the city's acts to prefer local producers from competition
from anywhere beyond the city's borders implicitly adopts the
broader focus. Had the city's ordinance favored local producers over non-local competitors, discrimination against interstate commerce would have been found, and stricter scrutiny
would have been justified.
As a Ninth Circuit case, Shell Oil would control the resolution of any dormant commerce challenge to a California local groundwater export restriction. Since Shell Oil involved
no such local preference, however, its language is arguably
dicta. Nevertheless, if a trial court were to adopt the Shell
Oil language, then those California local groundwater management ordinances that burden pumpers who wish to export
beyond county or management district borders demonstrate
the strongest likelihood of finding "affirmative discrimination" against interstate commerce. Such ordinances favor local water users over non-local users, and give local producers,
particularly irrigators, competitive advantages over non-local
lines. Id. at 2023. Later, however, the Court rephrased and broadened its focus: "a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of
the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce
through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself." Id. at
2024 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court acknowledged that the Michigan
scheme allowed "each of its 83 counties to isolate itself from the national economy." Id. at 2024. This language could support the broader focus. In the next
line, however, the Court continued: "Indeed .... the statute affords local waste
producers complete protection from competition from out-of-state waste producers who seek to use local waste disposal areas." Id. (emphasis added). This
language supports the narrower focus.
448. 830 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988).
449. Id. at 1055.
450. Id. at 1058 (emphasis added). The court noted that there were neither
local oil producers nor local oil pipeline operators within the city limits who
might be favored by the city's agreement. Id.
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producers. Inevitably, these competitive advantages discriminate against interstate commerce by reducing the availability of a critical input into the production of agricultural and
manufactured goods whether produced out-of-state or produced intrastate and sold out-of-state. This rationale justifies strict scrutiny under Hughes.451
In contrast, absent evidence of a discriminatory purpose,
ordinances that burden all pumpers within a jurisdiction
equally, without regard to the water's place of use, manifest
no affirmative discrimination against interstate commerce.
Where a political entity places the same transfer restrictions
on both intra-jurisdictional pumping and export pumping, a
court should not find affirmative discrimination against interstate commerce. 452

Like the first three provisions of the

Nebraska export permit scheme upheld in Sporhase, these restrictions require examination under the less stringent Pike
v. Bruce Church factors.453
Finally, ordinances in the middle group (i.e., those that
place their burdens in reference to a hydrogeological boundary) defy easy categorization. On the one hand, they share
similarities with evenhanded legislation. When an ordinance
regulates the movement of water beyond a hydrogeological
boundary (e.g., the surface area overlying an aquifer), it does
not regulate pumpers in reference to a political boundary.
Thus, commerce is not discriminated against simply because
someone seeks to use water in another political entity. The
regulatory burden falls on citizens of the state political subdivision itself, as well as other citizens of that state, and citizens of other states.454 No economic balkanization along
state lines, or sub-state lines, would necessarily result. As
451. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979).
452. As Sporhase demonstrated, this distinction remains true even if the
particular statute at issue on its face applies only to extra-jurisdictional exporters. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 955-56 (1982).
Thus, a court will examine the entire scheme to see if, on whole, it evenhandedly burdens intra- and extra-jurisdictional users.
453. See supra note 348.
454. See Laney, supra note 362, at 1068-71 (1980 Arizona Groundwater
Management law evenhandedly regulates groundwater exports from defined
critical management areas); James A. Glasgow, Note, 9 ARIz. L. REV. 334, 338
n.38 (1967) (discussing City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966),
affd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966)) ("Conservation statutes are valid exercises of
the police power only if they operate to restrict the depletion of the water supply
within hydrological regions ....

).
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such, the burden on commerce resulting from such place-ofuse restrictions would receive scrutiny under Pike v. Bruce
Church.455 On the other hand, hydrogeologically based placeof-use restrictions are subject to manipulation. For example,
a frequently used regulatory category is a groundwater "basin." 4 5 6 This amorphous concept may be defined in reference
to political boundaries.45 7 In such an instance, the hydrogeological and political borders will overlap. If the local legislative body intended to discriminate against non-locals by
adopting such a pseudo-political boundary, the discriminatory purpose alone would deserve scrutiny under the stricter
Hughes test. Absent evidence of a discriminatory purpose,
however, a court would probably find the use of a basin's
boundaries a neutral device.458
Nevertheless, even where a legislative body does not deliberately manipulate the definition of "basin" to escape a
finding of "affirmative discrimination," the underlying local
preference behind even hydrogeologically based place of use
restrictions mandates stricter scrutiny. These preferences
take the form of exemptions from regulatory burdens placed
on those pumpers who use the water beyond the hydrogeologically defined area. These local preferences inevitably
favor those pumpers who use the water within the political
jurisdiction containing the hydrogeologically defined place-ofuse at the expense of those who seek to use the water in any
other political jurisdiction. The effect is the same as if the
counties had said: wheat grown in a given field may only be
converted to flour and baked on that field. The local political
subdivisions can justify their aquifer-based or basin-based
455. See Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362,
at 614 (discussing riparian doctrine "most likely.., an evenhanded measure").
Although Sporhase implicitly approved intrastate place-of-use restrictions, they
were not at issue in that case. Thus, the court did not indicate what level of
scrutiny such restrictions receive. Conceivably, after Maine v. Taylor, an arid
state might be able to demonstrate the validity of its intrastate place-of-use
restrictions even under the tougher Hughes test.
456. See, e.g., Bur CouNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-3 (groundwater "mining"
banned when water transported from the "basin"). The ordinance does not,
however, define "basin."
457. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 101 (political boundaries are possible
lateral boundaries of groundwater "basins").

Compare INvo CouNTY, CAL.,

§ 7.01.010(g) ("Owens Valley Groundwater basin" defined by reference to
county boundary to indicate which portion of multi-county basin is relevant to
the Inyo County groundwater management ordinance).
458. See supra note 454.
CODE
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schemes, but the stricter scrutiny of the Hughes test should
apply.
E. Affirmative Discrimination:Hughes Strict Scrutiny
1. ProperPurpose?
The preceding discussion highlights some of the conceptual difficulties in applying the Dormant Commerce Clause
cases. Not only are the distinctions subtle, but the analyses
overlap substantially.45 s In particular, the determination of
"discrimination" may well turn upon the determination of the
ordinance's "purpose."46 °
Either separately, or in conjunction with its examination
of "discrimination," a court will examine those local regulations that affirmatively discriminate against interstate com46
merce in groundwater under the two-part Hughes test. '

Under that test, the court first asks if the local legislature
had a legitimate purpose for its discriminatory legislation.
Second, the court asks if the local legislature could have met
its goals with less discriminatory legislation.
Section III's preemption discussion considered a range of
local legislative justifications for groundwater export restrictions. 462 At one end of the continuum lie ordinances based
upon conservation; at the other end lie ordinances with an
avowedly protectionist purpose. In the middle lie those that
blend conservation and protectionist rationales.
To the extent that a local legislative body actually bases
its groundwater export scheme on conservation and preservation of the resource, Sporhase affirms that the local purpose
is "unquestionably legitimate and highly important. " 4 63 Sim-

ilarly, the hypothetical, avowedly protectionist ordinance
459. As noted above, a subtle, almost imperceptible line separates ordinances whose effects on interstate commerce are "discriminatory" from those
whose effects are merely "incidental" to an evenhanded scheme. See supra note
360.
460. In attempting to reconcile seemingly similar Supreme Court cases involving discriminatory effects and incidental effects, the Third Circuit has concluded that the analysis turns on finding a discriminatory purpose. Norfolk
Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 400-01 n.18 (3rd Cir. 1987).
461. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
462. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
463. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982). Of
course, the conservation rationale must be genuinely held. See id. at 954-55. A
mere pretense of a conservation rationale would not support a discriminatory
regulation. Cf Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338 n.20 (sham orpost hoc rationalizations
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would unquestionably fall on this prong alone, as protection
of local economies at the expense of the interstate market is
anathema to the Dormant Commerce Clause.4 6 4 Where a local legislative body articulates a conservation purpose, but
evidence exists of a protectionist purpose, the Court will
likely defer to the articulated purpose unless that purpose
could not possibly have been intended. 46 5 Finally, even if evidence exists of an actual mixture of proper and improper purposes, a court will not strike the ordinance down unless it determines that the local legislative body would not have
enacted it "but for" the improper purpose.4 6 6
To date, none of the California ordinances or special district legislation evince purely protectionist goals.4 6 7 Rather,
to the extent that they contain legislative findings, they
demonstrate either purely conservationist purposes; or, more
frequently, a mixture of conservationist and protectionist
goals. 468 Absent the strongest evidence of a purely protectionist purpose, all of these purposes should survive even
Hughes scrutiny.
invalid). See also infra text accompanying note 480 (discussing potential scope
of conservation rationale).
464. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-49 (1986).
465. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471
n.15 (1981). Compare Kassel v. Consolidated. Freightways, Inc., 450 U.S. 662,
683 n.3 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing it is improper to use post hoc
proffered purposes never considered by legislature to uphold statute).
466. In equal protection cases, the Court has articulated this "but for" test
for determining the propriety of conduct motivated by a mixture of proper and
improper purposes. See Hunter v. Underwood, 421 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). Cf
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 149-51 (in Commerce Clause challenge, Court upheld trial court determination that evidence of protectionist intent was
inconclusive).
467. As long ago as Dean Milk, the Court recognized that there are only "rare
instance[s] where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate
against interstate goods." Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951). Although Sporhase and others demonstrate that patent discrimination
against interstate trade is not unthinkable, much rarer are cases where the
legislature has "artlessly" disclosed an avowedly protectionist purpose. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 n.12 (1992) (in
takings analysis, inappropriate for analysis to turn on whether legislature enacted law to "prevent harms" rather than "confer benefits upon public," since
latter easily recast as former, so that test would merely amount to "whether the
legislature has a stupid staff").
468. See, e.g., BUTrE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-1 (groundwater protection vital for residents health, welfare, safety, and "of critical importance to the economy of this county"); IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 56201
(overdraft prevention intended).
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2. Less DiscriminatoryAlternatives?

Prior to Maine v. Taylor, the Court had crafted nearly a
per se rule to invalidate affirmatively discriminatory state
legislation. 469 Although it has evaluated such statutes under
the two-part Hughes test, it has not found one that survived
such strict scrutiny. In Maine v. Taylor, however, the Court
upheld a complete baitfish importation ban against charges
that less-discriminatory alternatives existed.4 v°
In considering the application of Hughes and Maine v.
Taylor to the local groundwater export ordinances, two situations apply. First, some of the ordinances place outright restrictions on exports.471 Second, all of the schemes require a
permit.47 2
Despite the Court's apparent partial softening of the
Hughes test in Maine v. Taylor, many local groundwater export ordinances would still probably fail Hughes' second step.
This failure is almost a certainty for the three outright-restriction ordinances noted above.473 If conservation is the admitted goal of these ordinances, little justification exists for
singling out exporters to bear all the burdens of conservation.
Among these three bans, the least justifiable are the two that
burden only those who export beyond the jurisdiction's legal
boundary.474 Those two ordinances would include someone
who pumped from one portion of a basin in the subject county
for use in another portion of the same basin in a different
county.475 Those two ordinances have no hydrogeological basis for their county-line restrictions, and appear to serve only
469. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
470. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 146-47 (1986) (upholding trial court's
determination that sampling and inspection procedures do not exist to determine whether imported baitfish were infected with parasites). See also D. Lee
Shields, Note, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291, 298-300 (1989) (reviewing Maine v.
Taylor, and concluding that Court has relaxed its scrutiny).
471. See BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-4 (groundwater mining prohibited
if water taken out of area denoted by pseudo-hydrological terms); GLENN
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.400 (groundwater mining prohibited if water taken
out of county); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.020 (groundwater mining
prohibited if water taken out of county).
472. See supra note 232.
473. See supra note 471.
474. See GLENN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.400 (groundwater mining prohibited if water taken out of county); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.020
(groundwater mining prohibited if water taken out of county).
475. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Mandate at 2-3. Myers v. County of
Tehama, No. 34147 (Super. Ct. Tehama County, Cal., Aug. 11, 1993).
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protectionist interests. But even an ordinance that only singled out appropriators for regulation should also fail under
this second Hughes test. The principal hydrological difference between an appropriator and an overlying user is that
some water pumped by the overlying user will percolate back
to the aquifer again. In most instances, however, this
recharge is a relatively small component of overall water use;
most of the water used in irrigation by either an appropriator
or an overlying user will be lost from evapotranspiration.47 6
There seems no justification for allowing overlying users to
pump freely simply because perhaps ten percent of the water
they pump might return to the aquifer, at least not without a
strong showing that no further conservation can be obtained
from the ninety percent of evapotranspirative losses experienced by both appropriators and overlying users.
As for the permit schemes, facial challenges to such
schemes rarely prevail.477 But here, these schemes single out
exporters, as variously defined, for permits. The burden of
providing the information necessary to pump for export may
fall heavily on an applicant, particularly one seeking to export from a basin whose hydrogeological characteristics and
prior withdrawal patterns are not well documented. Again,
merely forcing such a potential pumper to obtain a permit
poses a substantial burden not shared by other pumpers who
may be wasting water. If the locality truly is interested in
conservation, then it certainly has more evenhanded ways of
spreading the regulatory burden.

476. "Evapotranspiration" is the "loss of water from the soil both by evaporation and by transpiration from the plants growing thereon." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (1986). Experts estimate that about three-

quarters of all water applied to an irrigated field is used by the plants for evapotranspiration. See letter of Baryohay Davidoff (Chief, Agricultural Water Conservation Section, Department of Water Resources) to Gregory S. Weber (Nov.
16, 1993) (72% of applied water) (on file with the author). The remaining quar-

ter goes to surface water runoff, salt leaching, or deep percolation. Thus, at
best, only a fraction of a quarter of the applied water might actually return to

the groundwater basin.
477. In Sporhase, the Court allowed a facial challenge because there was no

question that, under the reciprocity clause, Nebraska would not grant the export permit. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 944 n.2

(1982).
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F. Evenhanded Regulation: Pike v. Bruce Church
To the extent that a local groundwater ordinance evenhandedly regulates, its validity will depend on the Pike v.
Bruce Church factors. In this regard, Sporhase provides
some initial guidance. As noted above, the Court easily concluded that the Nebraska groundwater export statute's reasonableness, conservation, and public welfare criteria passed
muster. 478

Nevertheless, the Court's analysis leaves open

many questions about the scope of its discussion.
Like the Hughes test, the Pike v. Bruce Church test first
examines the purpose behind the local regulation. 47 9 As

noted above, Sporhase affirmed the constitutional validity of
groundwater conservation and preservation.48 ° It also upheld a permit applicant's obligation to demonstrate that the
proposed export would be reasonable, not contrary to conservation goals, and consistent with public welfare. 4 8 1 At first

glance, an evenhanded local California groundwater export
permit scheme patterned after these three Nebraska provisions could also be upheld under Sporhase.45 2
To support its conclusion, Sporhase cited a "confluence"
of four "realities" that made it "reluctant to condemn as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource in times of severe
shortage."4 13 These four "realities" included: (1) there is a
"core" state police power to protect citizens' "health";4 4 (2)

there is a judicially fostered "legal expectation" that states
may occasionally restrict water within their borders; 4 5 (3) a
state's groundwater ownership claims support "a limited
preference for its own citizens" ;486 and (4) state conservation
478. Id. at 957.
479. See id. at 954-55, 957-58.
480. See supra notes 463-464 and accompanying text.
481. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-57.
482. Sporhase emphasized that these restrictions on groundwater exports
appeared no more onerous than intrastate export limitations imposed by the
local water management district. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458
U.S. 941, 955-56 (1982). These intrastate restrictions limited transfers to
"lands controlled by the same groundwater user," and required approval for all
transfers from the local groundwater management district. Id. at 955.
483. Id. at 956 (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978)) (emphasis added).
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 956-57.
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efforts made groundwater akin to "a good publicly produced
and owned in which a State may favor its citizens in times of
shortage."48 v Commentators have questioned how Sporhase
applies in cases where these four realities may not "conflux"
so similarly.488
Fundamental to the Court's discussion is its reference to
conservation "in times of severe shortage." Sporhase itself
did not define "shortage." Moreover, as a facial challenge, the
case proceeded without a record that fully developed the particular circumstances creating the "shortage" in the applicable area of southwestern Nebraska. 48 9 As Professor Grant

has discussed, the four supporting "realities" point in different directions for the role that economic protectionism can
play in justifying a finding of "shortage."490 In particular, the
first reality specifically distinguishes the state's core police
power interest in "protecting the health of its citizens-and
not simply the health of its economy."49 ' Nevertheless, both
the second and fourth "realities" implicitly incorporate local
economic content.492
The second reality involved the twin interstate water allocation vehicles of equitable apportionment and interstate
compacts.493 Under the equitable apportionment doctrine,
the Court can consider claims for a state's future needs for
water, although it requires a high. evidentiary threshold
before existing uses can be disrupted.494 The fourth reality
487. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).

488. See, e.g., Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note
362, at 607-12; Barnett, supra note 362, at 171-72 (discussing three alternative
readings to the "realities").
489. The groundwater management district involved in the Sporhase transfer had been created by a state administrative officer's determination that
groundwater was inadequate in the area "'to meet present or reasonably foreseeable needs .... '" Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 46658(1) (Supp. 1981)). Under district rules, the district further determined that
the township in which the Sporhase farmers' land was located faced "critical"
water table declines. Id. On the facial challenge, the Court did not discuss the
validity of these two findings.
490. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362, at
609.
491. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956 (emphasis added).
492. See Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 362,
at 609 (discussing the difficulty of giving meaning to the second and fourth realities without including economic content).
493. See generally Tarlock, supra note 391 at 381; Grant, The Futureof Inter-

state Allocation of Water, supra note 414, at 977.
494. See Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado II), 467 U.S. 310, 316-23 (1984).
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references the "market participant" exception to the Commerce Clause.4 9 5 Under this exception, where a state expends funds to create a product, it can favor its own citizens
in the distribution of such a product. The Court's reference to
this doctrine in Sporhase is puzzling, since, if broadly extended, it could allow the market participant exception to
swallow the Dormant Commerce Clause rule in numerous
instances.4 9 6
In its application to the local California ordinances at issue, these uncertainties in Sporhase thus raise two important, interrelated questions. First, what criteria can a county
or management district consider in determining whether a
"shortage" is occurring? Second, several of the California localities that have enacted their groundwater export schemes
have done so even though groundwater is otherwise in no
danger of immediate shortage.4 9 7 In effect, these localities
have attempted to head off the possibility of such shortages.
How far in advance of a "shortage" can a California locality
enact a Nebraska-styled conservation permit scheme? These
two questions overlap substantially. In addition to these inquiries, application of Sporhase also raises a question about
495. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-40 (1980) (holding that
South Dakota, in operation of state-owned cement plant, could favor residents
in cement allocation). See also supra note 394 (listing recent "market participant" articles).
496. Arguably, any state restriction on development of any natural resource
makes that resource's continued availability "not simply happenstance," at
least where the state also claims some public "ownership" of this resource. See
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982). The market
participant exception avoids Dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely.
Thus, if this "reality" independently supports the regulatory scheme, it may
allow a reviewing court to bypass the Pike test entirely. Since Sporhase itself
used that test despite its reference to the market participant cases, it cautions
against overreading the meaning of the reference to this exception. Indeed, the
Court admitted that the conserved groundwater had only "some indicia"of a
good publicly produced and owned. Id. Because the Court did not discuss the
absent indicia of such publicly produced and owned goods, this reference leaves
the market participant exception less clear.
497. None of the counties that have enacted groundwater export ordinances
are identified by the State as experiencing "critical conditions of overdraft." See
CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 118-80, GROUNDWATER BASINS IN
CALIFORNIA 3-4 (1980). The State identified portions of Modoc and Inyo County
as experiencing "special problems." Id. Other "special problem" areas included
the Sierra Valley and Long Valley basins, now under management by special
district legislation. CAL. WATER CODE app. ch. 119 (West Supp. 1993). Bulletin
118-75 generally indicates that Sacramento County has experienced overdraft.
See BULLETIN 118-75, supra note 399, at 115 (fig. 16).
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the criteria that a local district can use to determine whether
an export is "reasonable" and consistent with conservation
and public welfare needs.498
Two trial court decisions involving the long-standing
feud between the City of El Paso, Texas, and New Mexico
over New Mexico's efforts to restrict groundwater exports
provide the only post-Sporhase discussions on point.499 In
particular, in the second case, known as "El Paso II, "5 °° the
court considered New Mexico's post-Sporhase revisions to the
water export restrictions struck down in "El Paso I." 5 0 1 El
Paso II sent conflicting signals on the propriety of postSporhase state groundwater export restrictions. °2 On the
one hand, in El Paso 11, the court struck down a two-year embargo on all appropriations from the relevant area of the
state.50 3 Under the circumstances, it found that this facially
neutral ban, applicable both to appropriations for in-state as
well as interstate use, actually attempted to discriminate
against interstate commerce.5 °4 Similarly, the court struck
down the portion of the statute that required special consideration of applications to export water from domestic and
transfer wells. 505 It found that this portion of the scheme
facially discriminated against interstate commerce and failed
the strict scrutiny test.50 6 On the other hand, the court up-

held New Mexico's general criteria by which it examined applications for groundwater export.50 7
498. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
499. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso I), 563 F. Supp. 379 (D. N.M. 1983);
City of El Paso v. New Mexico (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694 (D. N.M. 1984). See
also Hetrick, supra note 362; Tarlock & Frownfelter, supra note 362 (discussing
cases).
500. El Paso 11, 597 F. Supp. at 694.
501. El Paso 1, 563 F. Supp. at 379.
502. See infra text accompanying notes 503-507.
503. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. at 705-07.
504. City of El Paso v. New Mexico (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694, 705-07 (D.
N.M. 1984).
505. Id. at 703-04.
506. Id. The court noted that interstate transfers might be detrimental to
the public welfare in some circumstances when an intrastate transfer might not
be. Id. Nevertheless, the statute failed because it prevented the engineer from
barring any intrastate transfers that might be contrary to the public welfare.

Id.
507. Id. at 700-01. The conservation and public welfare criteria, and the six
statutory factors discussed below, applied to "all interstate uses of groundwater-new appropriations from declared and undeclared basins, new surface
water appropriations, transfers of water rights, and supplemental and domestic
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In its decision, the court concluded that the statute's Nebraska-like "public welfare" criterion directed the New Mexico State Engineer to consider not only economic considerations, but also "health and safety, recreational, aesthetic,
[and] environmental .

.

. interests."5 °8 The court acknowl-

edged that nearly all aspects of the "public welfare" had "economic overtones."5 °9 It reiterated that "public welfare" cannot serve as a subterfuge for economic protectionism. 510 The
court found indications, sufficient to avoid a facial challenge
to the criterion, that the state considered such factors under a
"public interest" rubric when acting on applications to appropriate surface water for in-state uses."' Ultimately, the
court announced a willingness to narrow the broad "public
welfare" criterion to exclude impermissible economic protectionism criteria.5 12
In its discussion, the court announced a reasonableness
standard to govern a state's ability to legislate in advance of a
water crisis. 51 3 To determine whether such regulation is

"reasonable," a court should consider: "The proximity in time
of a projected shortage, the certainty that it will occur, its
predicted severity, and whether alternative measures could
prevent or alleviate the shortage.... ,,s The court equated
these reasonableness factors with the balancing test required
wells. In-state, the conservation and public welfare criteria appl[ied] only to
new appropriations from declared basins." Id. at 703. The court found that the
plaintiffs had standing only to challenge the application of these criteria to interstate transfers and domestic wells. Id. Although it found that the criteria
themselves did not violate the Commerce Clause, it found that their discriminatory application did. Id. at 704.
508. Id. at 700. This criterion was part of a trio of factors that also included
the evaluation of the proposed export applicant's impact both on existing water
rights and on the conservation of water "within the state." Id. at 697. The court
did not separately discuss the "water rights" criterion. This criterion is inherent in the prior appropriation scheme, and that scheme applies to any appropriation, whether for in-state or export use. As to the conservation criterion, the
court rejected El Paso's claim that it required the State Engineer to keep water
within the state. Id. at 698-99. It concluded that the reference to water use
"within the state" referred only to the territorial limits of New Mexico's jurisdiction over groundwater. Id. at 698.
509. City of El Paso v. New Mexico (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.
N.M. 1984).
510. Id. at 701.
511. Id. at 699-700.
512. Id. at 701-02.
513. Id. at 701.
514. City of El Paso v. New Mexico (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694, 701 (D.
N.M. 1984).
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under Pike v. Bruce Church.515 The court also indicated that
additional reasonableness factors would include the third and
fourth "realities" identified in Sporhase.51 6
In addition to its consideration of the broad public welfare criterion, the court also upheld six factors that the statute required the State Engineer to consider before approving
a permit to export water beyond New Mexico lines.517 Four of
these factors addressed "the effect of the proposed export on
in-state shortages."518 The last two involved the export applicant's water supply and demand patterns, and alternative
water sources available to it. 5 19 It upheld these factors even

though the statutory scheme did not require the State Engineer to consider similar factors when reviewing applications
for in-state water appropriations.52 ° Collectively, the court
concluded, the first four factors simply allowed the State Engineer to collect information necessary to determine if an instate shortage existed that could be alleviated by intrastate
water transfers. 521 The last two factors gave the State Engi-

neer the information necessary to consider the burden on interstate commerce from an export restriction.5 22
At first glance, El Paso If admirably attempts to accommodate the policy supporting wise natural resource management and the policy encouraging interstate commerce.
Under El Paso II, a regulator need not wait until the basin is
almost empty to begin basin management.523 At the same
time, the probability, severity, and timing of an as-yet unrealized shortage circumscribes the appropriate range of regulatory responses. A regulator cannot resort to tough export restrictions before a genuine need arises.524
515. Id.
516. Id. In so doing, the court appeared to give these "realities" some independent significance. That is, they each had to be discussed as they applied
to a given case. The court, however, refused to consider how they might apply
absent a record on a challenge "as applied." Id.
517. Id. at 697, 702-03.
518. Id. at 697.
519. City of El Paso v. New Mexico (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694, 697 (D.
N.M. 1984).
520. Id.
521. Id. at 702-03.
522. Id. at 703.
523. Id. at 701.
524. City of El Paso v. New Mexico (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694, 705-07 (D.
N.M. 1984).
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On closer examination, the vague El Paso H and
Sporhase balancing tests strike the balance heavily in favor
of local regulation. As with any balancing test, little predictability results. The burden of the unpredictability will likely
fall most heavily on the permit applicant. True, Sporhase
puts an initial burden on the regulators to justify the scheme.
Given the indulgences granted government by the courts on a
facial challenge, the only real burden placed on a regulator in
a facial challenge is a showing of legitimate purpose and nondiscriminatory application. 525 Assuming that a local management scheme survives a facial challenge, an export applicant bears a heavy practical burden of applying for a permit
and having it turned down, or being otherwise qualified,
before it can challenge the regulatory scheme "as applied" to
its case. 26 Most of the California local export schemes to
date explicitly require substantial information about basin
conditions.5 27 The few that do not elaborate the required information expressly do so implicitly.5 28 In many basins in

California, detailed pumping records and information about
basin characteristics are unavailable.5 29 Given this lack of
information, a permit applicant may have to shoulder substantial expense to document the effect of its intended extractions and exports on local hydrogeological conditions. Moreover, given the phrasing of many of these restrictions, the
applicant bears the risk of an inadequate record.530
525. Only portions of the regulatory schemes that patently or practically discriminated against interstate commerce were struck down in Sporhase and El
Paso II; the did not court strike those portions after applying a balancing test in
either case.
526. Cf supra notes 23-25, 232, 239-246 and accompanying text (noting
transaction costs of initiating appropriations under common law and local permit schemes).
527. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-6; GLENN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 20.04.430; INYo COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.041; MODOC COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 13.08-050; NEVADA COUNTY LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT CODE § L-X 6.7;
TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.060.
528. See, e.g., IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODE

§ 56303 (hydrological information must be supplied as requested by reviewing officer); SACRAMENTO COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 15.08.095 (information must be supplied as requested by issuing
officer).
529. See, e.g., BULLETIN 118-75, supra note 399, at 132-33 (figures 30-32);
DAVID L. JAQUETrE & NANCY Y. MOORE, EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA:
GROUNDWATER USE AND MANAGEMENT 8 n.11 (1978) (few well records).
530. The schemes frequently require the permit-approving body to assure itself that the would-be export will not cause or otherwise aggravate any number
of identified undesirable conditions. See, e.g., BUTrrE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-7
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The application of the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing
test to California local groundwater management efforts will
likely upset few well-crafted schemes. Local police power regulations affecting interstate commerce outside of the water
resources areas have received Commerce Clause scrutiny for
years.5 3 1 Where those regulations are truly evenhanded, and
affect interstate commerce only as an incident to accomplishing a genuinely non-protectionist goal, courts are reluctant to
5 32 The tradirestrike the balance struck by the local entities.
tional deference accorded by the courts to local legislative
bodies likely will lead to the judicial approval of many decisions about when and how to regulate groundwater withdrawals and transfer.
Buttressing the probable constitutionality of any scheme
reviewed under the Pike v. Bruce Church test is the minimal
extent of an evenhanded scheme's impact on interstate commerce. There is little evidence of actual burdens upon Cali533
fornia agricultural producers from existing ordinances.
Perhaps the recent Tehama County litigation represents the
start of a new trend as California farmers seek to move
groundwater across local jurisdictional lines in response to
the shrinking availability of surface water supplies. Until
such time, however, the impact on California farmers' abilities to compete in interstate commerce may well be quite lim(export will not bring about overdraft); GLENN COUNT, CAL., CODE § 20.04.440
(export will not bring about overdraft).
531. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3rd Cir. 1972) (striking ordinance as
unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce).
532. See, e.g., Wood Marine Serv., Inc. v. City of Harahan, 858 F.2d 1061,
1065 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding not even an incidental burden on interstate commerce from local ordinance).
533. Indeed, Butte, Glenn, and Sacramento counties reported that no one
has ever applied for export permits. Letter from Vance Severin, Program Manager, Division of Environmental Health, Butte County Dep't of Public Health,
to Gregory Weber (Oct. 26, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from John Benoit,
Planning Director, Glenn County, to Brad Epstein, Research Assistant to Gregory Weber (Oct. 22, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from Steven P. Rudolph,
Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento County, to Gregory S. Weber (Nov. 13,
1992) (on file with author).
Of course, in theory, the cost and uncertainty attendant to the export permit programs might remove any incentive for the creation of groundwater exports. Under such a theory, the local ordinances create barriers to the creation
of water markets or new appropriations. To date, there is no evidence to support such a theory.
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ited.5 3 4 Given such limited impact, an evenhanded local regulator should be able to establish that the local conservation
benefits of its scheme outweigh what might be negligible or at
least minimal burdens on interstate commerce.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

At a minimum, a coherent California groundwater policy
would have to address five points. First, it would fully integrate the laws governing the private rights to use groundwater with those laws governing the private rights to use surface waters.535 Second, it would remove incentives to waste
water, either by overpumping or by leaving more water in the
ground than necessary to meet environmental or users'
needs.536 Third, it would reduce the uncertainty inherent in
the current common law schemes by allowing easier quantifi534. A court does not examine the particularized burden upon an individual
company; rather, it looks to the burdens upon interstate commerce in general.
See Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978).
Additional evidence in support of local regulation may well come from the
relative percentage of water extracted for overlying use within a regulatory district as compared with the percentage of water appropriated. Although a few
actual or proposed long-distance transfers have received some attention, they
represent a tiny portion of the total groundwater use in California, and an even
smaller percentage of the total water use in the state. So far, the restriction of
groundwater for exports may have only a tiny impact on the availability of
water in the state. See supra notes 404-05 (discussing extra-jurisdictional
transfers from Imperial, Nevada, Inyo, and Mono counties). The most frequently litigated transfer-from Inyo to Los Angeles-involved only an average
export increase of 90 cubic-feet-per-second ("cfs") of groundwater. See Rossman
& Steel, supra note 42, at 915 n.85 (proposed pumping increase from 90 to 180
cfs). One cfs, if pumped continuously, equals approximately two acre-feet per
day, or 730 acre-feet per year. See, CARL.S J. MEYERS ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 17 (Table 2 (3d ed. 1988) (one cfs equals 1.98 acre-feet per

day). Thus, the Inyo ordinance, and the litigation, was triggered by a proposal
to export and average of 65,700 acre-feet per year. Total groundwater usage in
California averages 16.6 million acre-feet per year. See BULLETIN 160-87,
supra note 1, at 31. This figure represents about 40% of the state's total applied
water needs. Id. Thus, by any measure, the most controversial groundwater
transfer in California to date involved only a tiny fraction of the total water
used annually in California.
535. See, e.g., M. Craig Haase, The Interrelationshipof Ground and Surface
Water: An Enigma to Western Water Law, 10 Sw-NEv. L. REV. 2069, 2070
(1978); HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 515-19.
536. See, e.g., DAVID L. JAQUETrE & NANCY Y. MOORE, EFFICIENT WATER USE
IN CALIFORNIA: GROUNDWATER USE & MANAGEMENT 12-13 (1978) (discussing
groundwater as a common pool resource).
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cation of rights. 5 3 7 Fourth, while setting forth broad, uniform
criteria for basin management, it would recognize the wide
variety of basin conditions prevalent throughout the state
and provide enough regulatory flexibility to accommodate
unique local conditions.5 38 Finally, it would prevent the balkanization of groundwater resources along the boundary
lines of political subdivisions by affirming that groundwater
is a resource of concern to all the people of the state, and that
users or non-local users, must help
all citizens, be they local
53 9
conserve the supply.
No truly coherent groundwater policy will emerge until
the Legislature acts. As a reactive body, limited to basin-bybasin adjudication, the courts are unequipped to forge a coherent law. 540 Nevertheless, until the Legislature acts, the
courts have an important, if limited, role to play in minimizing the extent of incoherence in the state's laissez-faire
groundwater management schemes. In particular, under the
constitutional doctrines addressed in this article, the courts
can help prevent improper hoarding of groundwater for unspecified, future local uses, while current local users remain
exempt from any practical duties to conserve groundwater.
With a proper evidentiary record, in the limited circumstances noted in this article, state law preemption and federal Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions, singly or together, may preclude improper groundwater hoarding.
Nevertheless, only limited progress toward a more coherent groundwater policy can be achieved through the litigation-driven constitutionalization of the policy debate. As a
practical matter, the current uncertain application of the
laws of preemption under article XI, section 7; of reasonable
use under article X, section 2; and of the Dormant Commerce
Clause makes the outcome of any constitutional litigation
quite unpredictable. This article's arguments and analysis
537. See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J.
681, 713-17 (1987) (summarizing debate over clarifying property rights in
water).
538. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 146, 166-69 (wide variety of
basin conditions supports strong local management strategies).
539. See WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (West 1971); Patchwork Quilt, supra note
1.
540. Cf. Corker, supra note 362, at 413-14 (courts are the least useful government instrumentalities for deciding water allocation questions).
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notwithstanding, the textual basis for the state law preemption decision on county export ordinances is slim. Similarly,
few cases concretely document "waste" under article X, section 2. Finally, despite Sporhase's decade-long existence, almost no additional doctrinal development germane to local
groundwater export controls has occurred. Collectively, the
three very vague constitutional doctrines foster much uncertainty in application. The four lawsuits discussed in this article notwithstanding, this unpredictability is a disincentive to
litigation.
Moreover, constitutionalizing the debate raises the ante
for a court considerably. If a court concluded that a state or
local groundwater control were unconstitutional under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, it would take congressional action to overturn the decision. A similar result would occur for
local regulations under the state preemption doctrine. Given
the reluctance of both state and federal legislatures to address groundwater management, a judge's decision may well
be the death knell of any management scheme. Moreover, a
decision striking down a particular management option
under article X, section 2 might preclude even the State Legislature from reversing it. Given such practical finality to its
decision, a court will most likely weigh its decision very carefully.54 1 Finally, further counseling judicial caution, the constitutionalization of the debate under preemption or the Dormant Commerce Clause implicates intergovernmental
rivalries, pitting locals against Sacramento or California
against Washington, respectively.
In addition to these general concerns over the effects of
constitutionalizing the efforts to structure a more coherent
water policy, other concerns arise. In particular, under the
implied preemption argument considered in this article, a local groundwater management scheme not otherwise authorized by Water Code sections 1220(b) or 10753 will fail even if
genuinely motivated by conservation concerns that are evenhandedly applied to local and non-local groundwater users
alike. Thus, the implied preemption doctrine is a two-edged
sword. To the extent that it furthers increased doctrinal co541.
nearly
briefs.
ers, to

For example, the trial court in the recent Tehama County litigation took
four months to decide the matter after the parties' final arguments and
Personal Communication from Janet Goldsmith, attorney for petitionGregory S. Weber (Aug. 13, 1993).
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herence by preventing the possibility for disuniformity, it
may strike down legitimate, evenhanded local conservation
strategies that prevent waste.
Nevertheless, the pre-A.B. 3030 local efforts to "manage"
groundwater suggest that the evenhanded conservation
scheme is much less likely to be produced than the "beggar
542 Human nature dictates
thy neighbor" hoarding scheme.
that local political entities are accountable only to local constituents. Groundwater exporters may not have a local surrogate to speak for them.
The recent passage of A.B. 3030 may well shift future litigation away from preemption toward article X, section 2 and
the Dormant Commerce Clause. While A.B. 3030 does not
authorize counties to manage groundwater directly, a fair
number may well qualify under Water Code section 10753.
For those that do not, the preemption analysis addressed in
this article will still apply and should limit their ability to
legislate in this area. Many other agencies, which would not
otherwise have general police powers under article XI, section 7, will have express power to regulate groundwater
under A.B. 3030. Given the political realities noted above,
the possibility exists that the new crop of A.B. 3030 groundwater management programs will simply be thinly disguised
"beggar thy neighbor" schemes masquerading as "conservation" programs. The enormous amount of discretion given to
local agencies first to fashion and then to implement their
management schemes invites opportunities to shift all the
onto outsiders and effectively lock up loregulatory burdens
54 3
cal resources.
The anti-waste provisions of article X, section 2 may provide relief to a potential exporter challenging an A.B. 3030
export control scheme, but only if a strong record exists to
show that the local scheme improperly hoards groundwater.
Of course, all legislative enactments, be they state or local,
must pass the constitution's reasonable-use criteria. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the Legislature's broad delegation of discretion to local groundwater management entities
may provide at least a limited shield for post-A.B. 3030 locally initiated groundwater export restrictions. Arguably, it
represents the same type of legislative blessing of area-of-ori542. See generally Patchwork Quilt, supra note 1 at § VI.
543. See Williams, supra note 362, at 91-92.
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gin restrictions found constitutional by the Attorney General
as part of the overall state water resources development plan.
In areas where the Legislature has given its statutory
blessing to local water export restrictions, the Dormant Commerce Clause may well be the only challenge mountable to
the restrictions. Given the doctrine's still-nascent nature in
its application to groundwater export restrictions, the outcome of such a challenge is largely unpredictable. Nevertheless, the Dormant Commerce Clause adds a potentially important litigation tool that can help force a more coherent
state groundwater management policy. To the extent that local groundwater regulators seek to preserve a priority for local citizens, the clause can force them to justify their conduct.
In particular, it can force them to spread the regulatory burden to all water users. The more a scheme focuses on appropriators or exporters to bear the burden, the more likely such
a scheme will fail.5 44 The clause seeks to avoid the creation of
miniature economic fiefdoms. The clause is equally applicable whether a state directly, or indirectly through a political
subdivision, seeks to create local preferences for protectionist
purposes. At the same time, the clause does not pose substantial obstacles to evenhanded regulation aimed at accomplishing a nonprotectionist goal. As a practical matter, the
balancing test for evaluating such schemes is heavily
weighted in favor of the regulation. A challenger's only real
chance to prevail will be to convince a court that a local ordinance discriminates, intentionally or in effect, against interstate commerce.
In summary, constitutional litigation, at best, is only a
rear-guard action in the struggle to forge a more coherent
groundwater policy. The true battleground remains the State
Legislature. In A.B. 3030, the Legislature has addressed the
state's groundwater policy concretely; it remains to be seen
whether the fruits of that effort will meet the constitutional
tests for coherence.

544. Cf. Barnett, supra note 362, at 181-82 ("the degree of judicial deference
to restrictions on exports should vary according to the extent to which out-ofstate interests are represented within the state").

